Visible to the public BootJacker: Compromising Computers Using Forced Restarts

TitleBootJacker: Compromising Computers Using Forced Restarts
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2008
AuthorsChan, Ellick M., Carlyle, Jeffrey C., David, Francis M., Farivar, Reza, Campbell, Roy H.
Conference NameProceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-59593-810-7
Keywordsattacks, memory remanence, pubcrawl, remanence, Resiliency, security
Abstract

BootJacker is a proof-of-concept attack tool which demonstrates that authentication mechanisms employed by an operating system can be bypassed by obtaining physical access and simply forcing a restart. The key insight that enables this attack is that the contents of memory on some machines are fully preserved across a warm boot. Upon a reboot, BootJacker uses this residual memory state to revive the original host operating system environment and run malicious payloads. Using BootJacker, an attacker can break into a locked user session and gain access to open encrypted disks, web browser sessions or other secure network connections. BootJacker's non-persistent design makes it possible for an attacker to leave no traces on the victim machine.

URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1455770.1455840
DOI10.1145/1455770.1455840
Citation Keychan_bootjacker:_2008