Wesemeyer, Stephan, Boureanu, Ioana, Smith, Zach, Treharne, Helen.
2020.
Extensive Security Verification of the LoRaWAN Key-Establishment: Insecurities Patches. 2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :425–444.
LoRaWAN (Low-power Wide-Area Networks) is the main specification for application-level IoT (Internet of Things). The current version, published in October 2017, is LoRaWAN 1.1, with its 1.0 precursor still being the main specification supported by commercial devices such as PyCom LoRa transceivers. Prior (semi)-formal investigations into the security of the LoRaWAN protocols are scarce, especially for Lo-RaWAN 1.1. Moreover, amongst these few, the current encodings [4], [9] of LoRaWAN into verification tools unfortunately rely on much-simplified versions of the LoRaWAN protocols, undermining the relevance of the results in practice. In this paper, we fill in some of these gaps. Whilst we briefly discuss the most recent cryptographic-orientated works [5] that looked at LoRaWAN 1.1, our true focus is on producing formal analyses of the security and correctness of LoRaWAN, mechanised inside automated tools. To this end, we use the state-of-the-art prover, Tamarin. Importantly, our Tamarin models are a faithful and precise rendering of the LoRaWAN specifications. For example, we model the bespoke nonce-generation mechanisms newly introduced in LoRaWAN 1.1, as well as the “classical” but shortdomain nonces in LoRaWAN 1.0 and make recommendations regarding these. Whilst we include small parts on device-commissioning and application-level traffic, we primarily scrutinise the Join Procedure of LoRaWAN, and focus on version 1.1 of the specification, but also include an analysis of Lo-RaWAN 1.0. To this end, we consider three increasingly strong threat models, resting on a Dolev-Yao attacker acting modulo different requirements made on various channels (e.g., secure/insecure) and the level of trust placed on entities (e.g., honest/corruptible network servers). Importantly, one of these threat models is exactly in line with the LoRaWAN specification, yet it unfortunately still leads to attacks. In response to the exhibited attacks, we propose a minimal patch of the LoRaWAN 1.1 Join Procedure, which is as backwards-compatible as possible with the current version. We analyse and prove this patch secure in the strongest threat model mentioned above. This work has been responsibly disclosed to the LoRa Alliance, and we are liaising with the Security Working Group of the LoRa Alliance, in order to improve the clarity of the LoRaWAN 1.1 specifications in light of our findings, but also by using formal analysis as part of a feedback-loop of future and current specification writing.
Abirami, R., Wise, D. C. Joy Winnie, Jeeva, R., Sanjay, S..
2020.
Detecting Security Vulnerabilities in Website using Python. 2020 International Conference on Electronics and Sustainable Communication Systems (ICESC). :844–846.
On the current website, there are many undeniable conditions and there is the existence of new plot holes. If data link is normally extracted on each of the websites, it becomes difficult to evaluate each vulnerability, with tolls such as XS S, SQLI, and other such existing tools for vulnerability assessment. Integrated testing criteria for vulnerabilities are met. In addition, the response should be automated and systematic. The primary value of vulnerability Buffer will be made of predefined and self-formatted code written in python, and the software is automated to send reports to their respective users. The vulnerabilities are tried to be classified as accessible. OWASP is the main resource for developing and validating web security processes.
Wu, Chongke, Shao, Sicong, Tunc, Cihan, Hariri, Salim.
2020.
Video Anomaly Detection using Pre-Trained Deep Convolutional Neural Nets and Context Mining. 2020 IEEE/ACS 17th International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA). :1—8.
Anomaly detection is critically important for intelligent surveillance systems to detect in a timely manner any malicious activities. Many video anomaly detection approaches using deep learning methods focus on a single camera video stream with a fixed scenario. These deep learning methods use large-scale training data with large complexity. As a solution, in this paper, we show how to use pre-trained convolutional neural net models to perform feature extraction and context mining, and then use denoising autoencoder with relatively low model complexity to provide efficient and accurate surveillance anomaly detection, which can be useful for the resource-constrained devices such as edge devices of the Internet of Things (IoT). Our anomaly detection model makes decisions based on the high-level features derived from the selected embedded computer vision models such as object classification and object detection. Additionally, we derive contextual properties from the high-level features to further improve the performance of our video anomaly detection method. We use two UCSD datasets to demonstrate that our approach with relatively low model complexity can achieve comparable performance compared to the state-of-the-art approaches.