Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Fazeli, M.  [Clear All Filters]
2021-03-29
Kazemi, Z., Fazeli, M., Hély, D., Beroulle, V..  2020.  Hardware Security Vulnerability Assessment to Identify the Potential Risks in A Critical Embedded Application. 2020 IEEE 26th International Symposium on On-Line Testing and Robust System Design (IOLTS). :1—6.

Internet of Things (IoT) is experiencing significant growth in the safety-critical applications which have caused new security challenges. These devices are becoming targets for different types of physical attacks, which are exacerbated by their diversity and accessibility. Therefore, there is a strict necessity to support embedded software developers to identify and remediate the vulnerabilities and create resilient applications against such attacks. In this paper, we propose a hardware security vulnerability assessment based on fault injection of an embedded application. In our security assessment, we apply a fault injection attack by using our clock glitch generator on a critical medical IoT device. Furthermore, we analyze the potential risks of ignoring these attacks in this embedded application. The results will inform the embedded software developers of various security risks and the required steps to improve the security of similar MCU-based applications. Our hardware security assessment approach is easy to apply and can lead to secure embedded IoT applications against fault attacks.

2020-11-09
Patooghy, A., Aerabi, E., Rezaei, H., Mark, M., Fazeli, M., Kinsy, M. A..  2018.  Mystic: Mystifying IP Cores Using an Always-ON FSM Obfuscation Method. 2018 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :626–631.
The separation of manufacturing and design processes in the integrated circuit industry to tackle the ever increasing circuit complexity and time to market issues has brought with it some major security challenges. Chief among them is IP piracy by untrusted parties. Hardware obfuscation which locks the functionality and modifies the structure of an IP core to protect it from malicious modifications or piracy has been proposed as a solution. In this paper, we develop an efficient hardware obfuscation method, called Mystic (Mystifying IP Cores), to protect IP cores from reverse engineering, IP overproduction, and IP piracy. The key idea behind Mystic is to add additional state transitions to the original/functional FSM (Finite State Machine) that are taken only when incorrect keys are applied to the circuit. Using the proposed Mystic obfuscation approach, the underlying functionality of the IP core is locked and normal FSM transitions are only available to authorized chip users. The synthesis results of ITC99 circuit benchmarks for ASIC 45nm technology reveal that the Mystic protection method imposes on average 5.14% area overhead, 5.21% delay overhead, and 8.06% power consumption overheads while it exponentially lowers the probability that an unauthorized user will gain access to or derive the chip functionality.