Biblio
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are capable of making driving decisions autonomously using multiple sensors and a complex autonomous driving (AD) software. However, AVs introduce numerous unique security challenges that have the potential to create safety consequences on the road. Security mechanisms require a benchmark suite and an evaluation framework to generate comparable results. Unfortunately, AVs lack a proper benchmarking framework to evaluate the attack and defense mechanisms and quantify the safety measures. This paper introduces BenchAV – a security benchmark suite and evaluation framework for AVs to address current limitations and pressing challenges of AD security. The benchmark suite contains 12 security and performance metrics, and an evaluation framework that automates the metric collection process using Carla simulator and Robot Operating System (ROS).
Due to the widespread use of the Internet of Things (IoT) in recent years, the need for IoT technologies to handle communications with the rest of the globe has grown dramatically. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) play a vital role in the operation of the IoT. The creation of Internet of Things operating systems (OS), which can handle the newly constructed IoT hardware, as well as new protocols and procedures for all communication levels, all of which are now in development, will pave the way for the future. When compared to other devices, these gadgets require a comparatively little amount of electricity, memory, and other resources. This has caused the scientific community to become more aware of the relevance of IoT device operating systems as a result of their findings. These devices may be made more versatile and powerful by including an operating system that contains real-time capabilities, kernel, networking, and other features, among other things. IEEE 802.15.4 networks are linked together using IPv6, which has a wide address space and so enables more devices to connect to the internet using the 6LoWPAN protocol. It is necessary to address some privacy and security issues that have arisen as a result of the widespread use of the Internet, notwithstanding the great benefits that have resulted. For the Internet of Things operating systems, this research has provided a network security architecture that ensures secure communication by utilizing the Cooja network simulator in combination with the Contiki operating system and demonstrate and explained how the nodes can protect from the network layer and physical layer attacks. Also, this research has depicted the energy consumption results of each designated node type during the authentication and communication process. Finally, proposed a few further improvements for the architecture which will enhance the network layer protection.
The ongoing trend of moving data and computation to the cloud is met with concerns regarding privacy and protection of intellectual property. Cloud Service Providers (CSP) must be fully trusted to not tamper with or disclose processed data, hampering adoption of cloud services for many sensitive or critical applications. As a result, CSPs and CPU manufacturers are rushing to find solutions for secure and trustworthy outsourced computation in the Cloud. While enclaves, like Intel SGX, are strongly limited in terms of throughput and size, AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers hardware support for transparently protecting code and data of entire VMs, thus removing the performance, memory and software adaption barriers of enclaves. Through attestation of boot code integrity and means for securely transferring secrets into an encrypted VM, CSPs are effectively removed from the list of trusted entities. There have been several attacks on the security of SEV, by abusing I/O channels to encrypt and decrypt data, or by moving encrypted code blocks at runtime. Yet, none of these attacks have targeted the attestation protocol, the core of the secure computing environment created by SEV. We show that the current attestation mechanism of Zen 1 and Zen 2 architectures has a significant flaw, allowing us to manipulate the loaded code without affecting the attestation outcome. An attacker may abuse this weakness to inject arbitrary code at startup–and thus take control over the entire VM execution, without any indication to the VM’s owner. Our attack primitives allow the attacker to do extensive modifications to the bootloader and the operating system, like injecting spy code or extracting secret data. We present a full end-to-end attack, from the initial exploit to leaking the key of the encrypted disk image during boot, giving the attacker unthrottled access to all of the VM’s persistent data.