Biblio

Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are self-configuring, dynamic networks in which nodes are free to move. These nodes are susceptible to various malicious attacks. In this paper, we propose a distributed trust-based security scheme to prevent multiple attacks such as Probe, Denial-of-Service (DoS), Vampire, User-to-Root (U2R) occurring simultaneously. We report above 95% accuracy in data transmission and reception by applying the proposed scheme. The simulation has been carried out using network simulator ns-2 in a AODV routing protocol environment. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first work reporting a distributed trust-based prevention scheme for preventing multiple attacks. We also check the scalability of the technique using variable node densities in the network.

The development of a robust strategy for network security is reliant upon a combination of in-house expertise and for completeness attack vectors used by attackers. A honeypot is one of the most popular mechanisms used to gather information about attacks and attackers. However, low-interaction honeypots only emulate an operating system and services, and are more prone to a fingerprinting attack, resulting in severe consequences such as revealing the identity of the honeypot and thus ending the usefulness of the honeypot forever, or worse, enabling it to be converted into a bot used to attack others. A number of tools and techniques are available both to fingerprint low-interaction honeypots and to defend against such fingerprinting; however, there is an absence of fingerprinting techniques to identify the characteristics and behaviours that indicate fingerprinting is occurring. Therefore, this paper proposes a fuzzy technique to correlate the attack actions and predict the probability that an attack is a fingerprinting attack on the honeypot. Initially, an experimental assessment of the fingerprinting attack on the low- interaction honeypot is performed, and a fingerprinting detection mechanism is proposed that includes the underlying principles of popular fingerprinting attack tools. This implementation is based on a popular and commercially available low-interaction honeypot for Windows - KFSensor. However, the proposed fuzzy technique is a general technique and can be used with any low-interaction honeypot to aid in the identification of the fingerprinting attack whilst it is occurring; thus protecting the honeypot from the fingerprinting attack and extending its life.

Vulnerabilities of controller that is caused by separation of control and forwarding lead to a threat which attacker can take remote access detection in SDN. The current work proposes a controller architecture called secure control plane (SCP) that enhances security and increase the difficulty of the attack through a rotation of heterogeneous and multiple controllers. Specifically, a dynamic-scheduling method based on Bayesian Stackelberg Games is put forward to maximize security reward of defender during each migration. Secondly, introducing a self-cleaning mechanism combined with game strategy aims at improving the secure level and form a closed-loop defense mechanism; Finally, the experiments described quantitatively defender will get more secure gain based on the game strategy compared with traditional strategy (pure and random strategies), and the self-cleaning mechanism can make the control plane to be in a higher level of security.

The Internet of Things leads to the inter-connectivity of a wide range of devices. This heterogeneity of hardware and software poses significant challenges to security. Constrained IoT devices often do not have enough resources to carry the overhead of an intrusion protection system or complex security protocols. A typical initial step in network security is a network scan in order to find vulnerable nodes. In the context of IoT, the initiator of the scan can be particularly interested in finding constrained devices, assuming that they are easier targets. In IoT networks hosting devices of various types, performing a scan with a high discovery rate can be a challenging task, since low-power networks such as IEEE 802.15.4 are easily overloaded. In this paper, we propose an approach to increase the efficiency of network scans by combining them with active network measurements. The measurements allow the scanner to differentiate IoT nodes by the used network technology. We show that the knowledge gained from this differentiation can be used to control the scan strategy in order to reduce probe losses.

The concept of Extension Headers, newly introduced with IPv6, is elusive and enables new types of threats in the Internet. Simply dropping all traffic containing any Extension Header - a current practice by operators-seemingly is an effective solution, but at the cost of possibly dropping legitimate traffic as well. To determine whether threats indeed occur, and evaluate the actual nature of the traffic, measurement solutions need to be adapted. By implementing these specific parsing capabilities in flow exporters and performing measurements on two different production networks, we show it is feasible to quantify the metrics directly related to these threats, and thus allow for monitoring and detection. Analysing the traffic that is hidden behind Extension Headers, we find mostly benign traffic that directly affects end-user QoE: simply dropping all traffic containing Extension Headers is thus a bad practice with more consequences than operators might be aware of.

The chips in working state have electromagnetic energy leakage problem. We offer a method to analyze the problem of electromagnetic leakage when the chip is running. We execute a sequence of addition and subtraction arithmetic instructions on FPGA chip, then we use the near-field probe to capture the chip leakage of electromagnetic signals. The electromagnetic signal is collected for analysis and processing, the parts of addition and subtraction are classified and identified by SVM. In this paper, for the problem of electromagnetic leakage, six sets of data were collected for analysis and processing. Good results were obtained by using this method.

Software-defined networking (SDN) separates the control plane from underlying devices, and allows it to control the data plane from a global view. While SDN brings conveniences to management, it also introduces new security threats. Knowing reactive rules, attackers can launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by sending numerous rule-matched packets which trigger packet-in packets to overburden the controller. In this work, we present a novel method ``INferring SDN by Probing and Rule Extraction'' (INSPIRE) to discover the flow rules in SDN from probing packets. We evaluate the delay time from probing packets, classify them into defined classes, and infer the rules. This method involves three relevant steps: probing, clustering and rule inference. First, forged packets with various header fields are sent to measure processing and propagation time in the path. Second, it classifies the packets into multiple classes by using k-means clustering based on packet delay time. Finally, the apriori algorithm will find common header fields in the classes to infer the rules. We show how INSPIRE is able to infer flow rules via simulation, and the accuracy of inference can be up to 98.41% with very low false-positive rates.

The wireless boundaries of networks are becoming increasingly important from a security standpoint as the proliferation of 802.11 WiFi technology increases. Concurrently, the complexity of 802.11 access point implementation is rapidly outpacing the standardization process. The result is that nascent wireless functionality management is left up to the individual provider's implementation, which creates new vulnerabilities in wireless networks. One such functional improvement to 802.11 is the virtual access point (VAP), a method of broadcasting logically separate networks from the same physical equipment. Network reconnaissance benefits from VAP identification, not only because network topology is a primary aim of such reconnaissance, but because the knowledge that a secure network and an insecure network are both being broadcast from the same physical equipment is tactically relevant information. In this work, we present a novel graph-theoretic approach to VAP identification which leverages a body of research concerned with establishing community structure. We apply our approach to both synthetic data and a large corpus of real-world data to demonstrate its efficacy. In most real-world cases, near-perfect blind identification is possible highlighting the effectiveness of our proposed VAP identification algorithm.

Numerous event-based probing methods exist for cloud computing environments allowing a hypervisor to gain insight into guest activities. Such event-based probing has been shown to be useful for detecting attacks, system hangs through watchdogs, and for inserting exploit detectors before a system can be patched, among others. Here, we illustrate how to use such probing for trustworthy logging and highlight some of the challenges that existing event-based probing mechanisms do not address. Challenges include ensuring a probe inserted at given address is trustworthy despite the lack of attestation available for probes that have been inserted dynamically. We show how probes can be inserted to ensure proper logging of every invocation of a probed instruction. When combined with attested boot of the hypervisor and guest machines, we can ensure the output stream of monitored events is trustworthy. Using these techniques we build a trustworthy log of certain guest-system-call events. The log powers a cloud-tuned Intrusion Detection System (IDS). New event types are identified that must be added to existing probing systems to ensure attempts to circumvent probes within the guest appear in the log. We highlight the overhead penalties paid by guests to increase guarantees of log completeness when faced with attacks on the guest kernel. Promising results (less that 10% for guests) are shown when a guest relaxes the trade-off between log completeness and overhead. Our demonstrative IDS detects common attack scenarios with simple policies built using our guest behavior recording system.

Security evaluation of diverse SDN frameworks is of significant importance to design resilient systems and deal with attacks. Focused on SDN scenarios, a game-theoretic model is proposed to analyze their security performance in existing SDN architectures. The model can describe specific traits in different structures, represent several types of information of players (attacker and defender) and quantitatively calculate systems' reliability. Simulation results illustrate dynamic SDN structures have distinct security improvement over static ones. Besides, effective dynamic scheduling mechanisms adopted in dynamic systems can enhance their security further.

With the developing understanding of Information Security and digital assets, IT technology has put on tremendous importance of network admission control (NAC). In NAC architecture, admission decisions and resource reservations are taken at edge devices, rather than resources or individual routers within the network. The NAC architecture enables resilient resource reservation, maintaining reservations even after failures and intra-domain rerouting. Admission Control Networks destiny is based on IP networks through its Security and Quality of Service (QoS) demands for real time multimedia application via advance resource reservation techniques. To achieve Security & QoS demands, in real time performance networks, admission control algorithm decides whether the new traffic flow can be admitted to the network or not. Secure allocation of Peer for multimedia traffic flows with required performance is a great challenge in resource reservation schemes. In this paper, we have proposed our model for VoIP networks in order to achieve security services along with QoS, where admission control decisions are taken place at edge routers. We have analyzed and argued that the measurement based admission control should be done at edge routers which employs on-demand probing parallel from both edge routers to secure the source and destination nodes respectively. In order to achieve Security and QoS for a new call, we choose various probe packet sizes for voice and video calls respectively. Similarly a technique is adopted to attain a security allocation approach for selecting an admission control threshold by proposing our admission control algorithm. All results are tested on NS2 based simulation to evalualate the network performance of edge router based upon network admission control in VoIP traffic.

Many modern defenses rely on address space layout randomization (ASLR) to efficiently hide security-sensitive metadata in the address space. Absent implementation flaws, an attacker can only bypass such defenses by repeatedly probing the address space for mapped (security-sensitive) regions, incurring a noisy application crash on any wrong guess. Recent work shows that modern applications contain idioms that allow the construction of crash-resistant code primitives, allowing an attacker to efficiently probe the address space without causing any visible crash. In this paper, we classify different crash-resistant primitives and show that this problem is much more prominent than previously assumed. More specifically, we show that rather than relying on labor-intensive source code inspection to find a few "hidden" application-specific primitives, an attacker can find such primitives semi-automatically, on many classes of real-world programs, at the binary level. To support our claims, we develop methods to locate such primitives in real-world binaries. We successfully identified 29 new potential primitives and constructed proof-of-concept exploits for four of them.

Wireless security has been an active research area since the last decade. A lot of studies of wireless security use cryptographic tools, but traditional cryptographic tools are normally based on computational assumptions, which may turn out to be invalid in the future. Consequently, it is very desirable to build cryptographic tools that do not rely on computational assumptions. In this paper, we focus on a crucial cryptographic tool, namely 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. This tool plays a central role in cryptography because we can build a cryptographic protocol for any polynomial-time computable function using this tool. We present a novel 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol based on wireless channel characteristics, which does not rely on any computational assumption. We also illustrate the potential broad applications of this protocol by giving two applications, one on private communications and the other on privacy preserving password verification. We have fully implemented this protocol on wireless devices and conducted experiments in real environments to evaluate the protocol. Our experimental results demonstrate that it has reasonable efficiency.
 

The significant dependence on cyberspace has indeed brought new risks that often compromise, exploit and damage invaluable data and systems. Thus, the capability to proactively infer malicious activities is of paramount importance. In this context, inferring probing events, which are commonly the first stage of any cyber attack, render a promising tactic to achieve that task. We have been receiving for the past three years 12 GB of daily malicious real darknet data (i.e., Internet traffic destined to half a million routable yet unallocated IP addresses) from more than 12 countries. This paper exploits such data to propose a novel approach that aims at capturing the behavior of the probing sources in an attempt to infer their orchestration (i.e., coordination) pattern. The latter defines a recently discovered characteristic of a new phenomenon of probing events that could be ominously leveraged to cause drastic Internet-wide and enterprise impacts as precursors of various cyber attacks. To accomplish its goals, the proposed approach leverages various signal and statistical techniques, information theoretical metrics, fuzzy approaches with real malware traffic and data mining methods. The approach is validated through one use case that arguably proves that a previously analyzed orchestrated probing event from last year is indeed still active, yet operating in a stealthy, very low rate mode. We envision that the proposed approach that is tailored towards darknet data, which is frequently, abundantly and effectively used to generate cyber threat intelligence, could be used by network security analysts, emergency response teams and/or observers of cyber events to infer large-scale orchestrated probing events for early cyber attack warning and notification.
 

Existing main-memory hash join algorithms for multi-core can be classified into two camps. Hardware-oblivious hash join variants do not depend on hardware-specific parameters. Rather, they consider qualitative characteristics of modern hardware and are expected to achieve good performance on any technologically similar platform. The assumption behind these algorithms is that hardware is now good enough at hiding its own limitations-through automatic hardware prefetching, out-of-order execution, or simultaneous multi-threading (SMT)-to make hardware-oblivious algorithms competitive without the overhead of carefully tuning to the underlying hardware. Hardware-conscious implementations, such as (parallel) radix join, aim to maximally exploit a given architecture by tuning the algorithm parameters (e.g., hash table sizes) to the particular features of the architecture. The assumption here is that explicit parameter tuning yields enough performance advantages to warrant the effort required. This paper compares the two approaches under a wide range of workloads (relative table sizes, tuple sizes, effects of sorted data, etc.) and configuration parameters (VM page sizes, number of threads, number of cores, SMT, SIMD, prefetching, etc.). The results show that hardware-conscious algorithms generally outperform hardware-oblivious ones. However, on specific workloads and special architectures with aggressive simultaneous multi-threading, hardware-oblivious algorithms are competitive. The main conclusion of the paper is that, in existing multi-core architectures, it is still important to carefully tailor algorithms to the underlying hardware to get the necessary performance. But processor developments may require to revisit this conclusion in the future.
 

Descriptors such as local binary patterns perform well for face recognition. Searching large databases using such descriptors has been problematic due to the cost of the linear search, and the inadequate performance of existing indexing methods. We present Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) hashing for creating index structures for face descriptors. Hashes play the role of keywords: an index is created, and queried to find the images most similar to the query image. Common hash suppression is used to improve retrieval efficiency and accuracy. Results are shown on a combination of six publicly available face databases (LFW, FERET, FEI, BioID, Multi-PIE, and RaFD). It is shown that DCT hashing has significantly better retrieval accuracy and it is more efficient compared to other popular state-of-the-art hash algorithms.
 

The detectability of malicious circuitry on FPGAs with varying placement properties yet has to be investigated. The authors utilize a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro target platform in order to insert a sequential denial-of-service Trojan into an existing AES design by manipulating a Xilinx-specific, intermediate file format prior to the bitstream generation. Thereby, there is no need for an attacker to acquire access to the hardware description language representation of a potential target architecture. Using a side-channel analysis setup for electromagnetic emanation (EM) measurements, they evaluate the detectability of different Trojan designs with varying location and logic distribution properties. The authors successfully distinguish the malicious from the genuine designs and provide information on how the location and distribution properties of the Trojan logic affect its detectability. To the best of their knowledge, this has been the first practically conducted Trojan detection using localized EM measurements.
 

Due to deep automation, the configuration of many Cloud infrastructures is static and homogeneous, which, while easing administration, significantly decreases a potential attacker's uncertainty on a deployed Cloud-based service and hence increases the chance of the service being compromised. Moving-target defense (MTD) is a promising solution to the configuration staticity and homogeneity problem. This paper presents our findings on whether and to what extent MTD is effective in protecting a Cloud-based service with heterogeneous and dynamic attack surfaces - these attributes, which match the reality of current Cloud infrastructures, have not been investigated together in previous works on MTD in general network settings. We 1) formulate a Cloud-based service security model that incorporates Cloud-specific features such as VM migration/snapshotting and the diversity/compatibility of migration, 2) consider the accumulative effect of the attacker's intelligence on the target service's attack surface, 3) model the heterogeneity and dynamics of the service's attack surfaces, as defined by the (dynamic) probability of the service being compromised, as an S-shaped generalized logistic function, and 4) propose a probabilistic MTD service deployment strategy that exploits the dynamics and heterogeneity of attack surfaces for protecting the service against attackers. Through simulation, we identify the conditions and extent of the proposed MTD strategy's effectiveness in protecting Cloud-based services. Namely, 1) MTD is more effective when the service deployment is dense in the replacement pool and/or when the attack is strong, and 2) attack-surface heterogeneity-and-dynamics awareness helps in improving MTD's effectiveness.

Address shuffling is a type of moving target defense that prevents an attacker from reliably contacting a system by periodically remapping network addresses. Although limited testing has demonstrated it to be effective, little research has been conducted to examine the theoretical limits of address shuffling. As a result, it is difficult to understand how effective shuffling is and under what circumstances it is a viable moving target defense. This paper introduces probabilistic models that can provide insight into the performance of address shuffling. These models quantify the probability of attacker success in terms of network size, quantity of addresses scanned, quantity of vulnerable systems, and the frequency of shuffling. Theoretical analysis shows that shuffling is an acceptable defense if there is a small population of vulnerable systems within a large network address space, however shuffling has a cost for legitimate users. These results will also be shown empirically using simulation and actual traffic traces.
 

Port hopping is a typical moving target defense, which constantly changes service port number to thwart reconnaissance attack. It is effective in hiding service identities and confusing potential attackers, but it is still unknown how effective port hopping is and under what circumstances it is a viable proactive defense because the existed works are limited and they usually discuss only a few parameters and give some empirical studies. This paper introduces urn model and quantifies the likelihood of attacker success in terms of the port pool size, number of probes, number of vulnerable services, and hopping frequency. Theoretical analysis shows that port hopping is an effective and promising proactive defense technology in thwarting network attacks.
 

Future networks may change the way how network administrators monitor and account their users. History shows that usually a completely new design (clean slate) is used to propose a new network architecture - e.g. Network Control Protocol to TCP/IP, IPv4 to IPv6 or IP to Recursive Inter Network Architecture. The incompatibility between these architectures changes the user accounting process as network administrators have to use different information to identify a user. The paper presents a methodology how it is possible to gather all necessary information needed for smooth transition between two incompatible architectures. The transition from IPv4 and IPv6 is used as a use case, but it should be able to use the same process with any new networking architecture.
 

With the proliferation of WiFi-enabled devices, people expect to be able to use them everywhere, be it at work, while commuting, or when visiting friends. In the latter case, home owners are confronted with the burden of controlling the access to their WiFi router, and usually resort to simply sharing the password. Although convenient, this solution breaches basic security principles, and puts the burden on the friends who have to enter the password in each and every of their devices. The use of social networks, specifying the trust relations between people and devices, provides for a more secure and more friendly authentication mechanism. In this paper, we progress the state-of-the-art by abandoning the centralized solution to embed social networks in WiFi authentication; we introduce EAP-SocTLS, a decentralized approach for authentication and authorization of WiFi access points and other devices, exploiting the embedded trust relations. In particular, we address the (quadratic) search complexity when indirect trust relations, like the smartphone of a friend's kid, are involved. We show that the simple heuristic of limiting the search to friends and devices in physical proximity makes for a scalable solution. Our prototype implementation, which is based on WebID and EAP-TLS, uses WiFi probe requests to determine the pool of neighboring devices and was shown to reduce the search time from 1 minute for the naive policy down to 11 seconds in the case of granting access over an indirect friend.
 

Cyber scanning refers to the task of probing enterprise networks or Internet wide services, searching for vulnerabilities or ways to infiltrate IT assets. This misdemeanor is often the primarily methodology that is adopted by attackers prior to launching a targeted cyber attack. Hence, it is of paramount importance to research and adopt methods for the detection and attribution of cyber scanning. Nevertheless, with the surge of complex offered services from one side and the proliferation of hackers' refined, advanced, and sophisticated techniques from the other side, the task of containing cyber scanning poses serious issues and challenges. Furthermore recently, there has been a flourishing of a cyber phenomenon dubbed as cyber scanning campaigns - scanning techniques that are highly distributed, possess composite stealth capabilities and high coordination - rendering almost all current detection techniques unfeasible. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the entire cyber scanning topic. It categorizes cyber scanning by elaborating on its nature, strategies and approaches. It also provides the reader with a classification and an exhaustive review of its techniques. Moreover, it offers a taxonomy of the current literature by focusing on distributed cyber scanning detection methods. To tackle cyber scanning campaigns, this paper uniquely reports on the analysis of two recent cyber scanning incidents. Finally, several concluding remarks are discussed.
 

Practical intrusion detection in Wireless Multihop Networks (WMNs) is a hard challenge. The distributed nature of the network makes centralized intrusion detection difficult, while resource constraints of the nodes and the characteristics of the wireless medium often render decentralized, node-based approaches impractical. We demonstrate that an active-probing-based network intrusion detection system (AP-NIDS) is practical for WMNs. The key contribution of this paper is to optimize the active probing process: we introduce a general Bayesian model and design a probe selection algorithm that reduces the number of probes while maximizing the insights gathered by the AP-NIDS. We validate our model by means of testbed experimentation. We integrate it to our open source AP-NIDS DogoIDS and run it in an indoor wireless mesh testbed utilizing the IEEE 802.11s protocol. For the example of a selective packet dropping attack, we develop the detection states for our Bayes model, and show its feasibility. We demonstrate that our approach does not need to execute the complete set of probes, yet we obtain good detection rates.

Denial-of-Service (DoS) and probe attacks are growing more modern and sophisticated in order to evade detection by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and to increase the potent threat to the availability of network services. Detecting these attacks is quite tough for network operators using misuse-based IDSs because they need to see through attackers and upgrade their IDSs by adding new accurate attack signatures. In this paper, we proposed a novel signal and image processing-based method for detecting network probe and DoS attacks in which prior knowledge of attacks is not required. The method uses a time-frequency representation technique called S-transform, which is an extension of Wavelet Transform, to reveal abnormal frequency components caused by attacks in a traffic signal (e.g., a time-series of the number of packets). Firstly, S-Transform converts the traffic signal to a two-dimensional image which describes time-frequency behavior of the traffic signal. The frequencies that behave abnormally are discovered as abnormal regions in the image. Secondly, Otsu's method is used to detect the abnormal regions and identify time that attacks occur. We evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed method with several network probe and DoS attacks such as port scans, packet flooding attacks, and a low-intensity DoS attack. The results clearly indicated that the method is effective for detecting the probe and DoS attack streams which were generated to real-world Internet.