Biblio
In this paper, decentralized dynamic power allocation problem has been investigated for mobile ad hoc network (MANET) at tactical edge. Due to the mobility and self-organizing features in MANET and environmental uncertainties in the battlefield, many existing optimal power allocation algorithms are neither efficient nor practical. Furthermore, the continuously increasing large scale of the wireless connection population in emerging Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) introduces additional challenges for optimal power allocation due to the “Curse of Dimensionality”. In order to address these challenges, a novel Actor-Critic-Mass algorithm is proposed by integrating the emerging Mean Field game theory with online reinforcement learning. The proposed approach is able to not only learn the optimal power allocation for IoBT in a decentralized manner, but also effectively handle uncertainties from harsh environment at tactical edge. In the developed scheme, each agent in IoBT has three neural networks (NN), i.e., 1) Critic NN learns the optimal cost function that minimizes the Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), 2) Actor NN estimates the optimal transmitter power adjustment rate, and 3) Mass NN learns the probability density function of all agents' transmitting power in IoBT. The three NNs are tuned based on the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) and Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation given in the Mean Field game theory. An IoBT wireless network has been simulated to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. The results demonstrate that the actor-critic-mass algorithm can effectively approximate the probability distribution of all agents' transmission power and converge to the target SINR. Moreover, the optimal decentralized power allocation is obtained through integrated mean-field game theory with reinforcement learning.
We introduce a new defense mechanism for stochastic control systems with control objectives, to enhance their resilience before the detection of any attacks. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system since the attackers need the sensor outputs for their malicious objectives in stochastic control scenarios. Different from the defense mechanisms that seek to detect infiltration or to improve detectability of the attacks, the proposed approach seeks to minimize the damage of possible attacks before they actually have even been detected. We, specifically, consider a controlled Gauss-Markov process, where the controller could have been infiltrated into at any time within the system's operation. Within the framework of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium, we provide a semi-definite programming based algorithm to compute the optimal linear secure sensor outputs that enhance the resiliency of control systems prior to attack detection.
As a plethora of wearable devices are being introduced, significant concerns exist on the privacy and security of personal data stored on these devices. Expanding on recent works of using electrocardiogram (ECG) as a modality for biometric authentication, in this work, we investigate the possibility of using personal ECG signals as the individually unique source for physical unclonable function (PUF), which eventually can be used as the key for encryption and decryption engines. We present new signal processing and machine learning algorithms that learn and extract maximally different ECG features for different individuals and minimally different ECG features for the same individual over time. Experimental results with a large 741-subject in-house ECG database show that the distributions of the intra-subject (same person) Hamming distance of extracted ECG features and the inter-subject Hamming distance have minimal overlap. 256-b random numbers generated from the ECG features of 648 (out of 741) subjects pass the NIST randomness tests.
This paper describes Smartpig, an algorithm for the iterative mosaicking of images of a planar surface using a unique parameterization which decomposes inter-image projective warps into camera intrinsics, fronto-parallel projections, and inter-image similarities. The constraints resulting from the inter-image alignments within an image set are stored in an undirected graph structure allowing efficient optimization of image projections on the plane. Camera pose is also directly recoverable from the graph, making Smartpig a feasible solution to the problem of simultaneous location and mapping (SLAM). Smartpig is demonstrated on a set of 144 high resolution aerial images and evaluated with a number of metrics against ground control.
The rate at which cyber-attacks are increasing globally portrays a terrifying picture upfront. The main dynamics of such attacks could be studied in terms of the actions of attackers and defenders in a cyber-security game. However currently little research has taken place to study such interactions. In this paper we use behavioral game theory and try to investigate the role of certain actions taken by attackers and defenders in a simulated cyber-attack scenario of defacing a website. We choose a Reinforcement Learning (RL) model to represent a simulated attacker and a defender in a 2×4 cyber-security game where each of the 2 players could take up to 4 actions. A pair of model participants were computationally simulated across 1000 simulations where each pair played at most 30 rounds in the game. The goal of the attacker was to deface the website and the goal of the defender was to prevent the attacker from doing so. Our results show that the actions taken by both the attackers and defenders are a function of attention paid by these roles to their recently obtained outcomes. It was observed that if attacker pays more attention to recent outcomes then he is more likely to perform attack actions. We discuss the implication of our results on the evolution of dynamics between attackers and defenders in cyber-security games.
In this paper, we investigate the resilient cumulant game control problem for a cyber-physical system. The cyberphysical system is modeled as a linear hybrid stochastic system with full-state feedback. We are interested in 2-player cumulant Nash game for a linear Markovian system with quadratic cost function where the players optimize their system performance by shaping the distribution of their cost function through cost cumulants. The controllers are optimally resilient against control feedback gain variations.We formulate and solve the coupled first and second cumulant Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for the dynamic game. In addition, we derive the optimal players strategy for the second cost cumulant function. The efficiency of our proposed method is demonstrated by solving a numerical example.
The landscape of cyber security has been reformed dramatically by the recently emerging Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). It is uniquely featured by the stealthy, continuous, sophisticated and well-funded attack process for long-term malicious gain, which render the current defense mechanisms inapplicable. A novel design of defense strategy, continuously combating APT in a long time-span with imperfect/incomplete information on attacker's actions, is urgently needed. The challenge is even more escalated when APT is coupled with the insider threat (a major threat in cyber-security), where insiders could trade valuable information to APT attacker for monetary gains. The interplay among the defender, APT attacker and insiders should be judiciously studied to shed insights on a more secure defense system. In this paper, we consider the joint threats from APT attacker and the insiders, and characterize the fore-mentioned interplay as a two-layer game model, i.e., a defense/attack game between defender and APT attacker and an information-trading game among insiders. Through rigorous analysis, we identify the best response strategies for each player and prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium for both games. Extensive numerical study further verifies our analytic results and examines the impact of different system configurations on the achievable security level.
Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) from attacks has been in securing the networks using information security techniques. Effort has also been applied to increasing the protection and reliability of the control system against random hardware and software failures. However, the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop systems under optimal signal attacks are provided. Finally, an illustrative numerical example using a power generation network is provided together with distributed LQ controllers.
We propose a distributed continuous-time algorithm to solve a network optimization problem where the global cost function is a strictly convex function composed of the sum of the local cost functions of the agents. We establish that our algorithm, when implemented over strongly connected and weight-balanced directed graph topologies, converges exponentially fast when the local cost functions are strongly convex and their gradients are globally Lipschitz. We also characterize the privacy preservation properties of our algorithm and extend the convergence guarantees to the case of time-varying, strongly connected, weight-balanced digraphs. When the network topology is a connected undirected graph, we show that exponential convergence is still preserved if the gradients of the strongly convex local cost functions are locally Lipschitz, while it is asymptotic if the local cost functions are convex. We also study discrete-time communication implementations. Specifically, we provide an upper bound on the stepsize of a synchronous periodic communication scheme that guarantees convergence over connected undirected graph topologies and, building on this result, design a centralized event-triggered implementation that is free of Zeno behavior. Simulations illustrate our results.
We propose a distributed continuous-time algorithm to solve a network optimization problem where the global cost function is a strictly convex function composed of the sum of the local cost functions of the agents. We establish that our algorithm, when implemented over strongly connected and weight-balanced directed graph topologies, converges exponentially fast when the local cost functions are strongly convex and their gradients are globally Lipschitz. We also characterize the privacy preservation properties of our algorithm and extend the convergence guarantees to the case of time-varying, strongly connected, weight-balanced digraphs. When the network topology is a connected undirected graph, we show that exponential convergence is still preserved if the gradients of the strongly convex local cost functions are locally Lipschitz, while it is asymptotic if the local cost functions are convex. We also study discrete-time communication implementations. Specifically, we provide an upper bound on the stepsize of a synchronous periodic communication scheme that guarantees convergence over connected undirected graph topologies and, building on this result, design a centralized event-triggered implementation that is free of Zeno behavior. Simulations illustrate our results.
Distributed optimization is an emerging research topic. Agents in the network solve the problem by exchanging information which depicts people's consideration on a optimization problem in real lives. In this paper, we introduce two algorithms in continuous-time to solve distributed optimization problems with equality constraints where the cost function is expressed as a sum of functions and where each function is associated to an agent. We firstly construct a continuous dynamic system by utilizing the Lagrangian function and then show that the algorithm is locally convergent and globally stable under certain conditions. Then, we modify the Lagrangian function and re-construct the dynamic system to prove that the new algorithm will be convergent under more relaxed conditions. At last, we present some simulations to prove our theoretical results.
We consider the estimation of a scalar state based on m measurements that can be potentially manipulated by an adversary. The attacker is assumed to have full knowledge about the true value of the state to be estimated and about the value of all the measurements. However, the attacker has limited resources and can only manipulate up to l of the m measurements. The problem is formulated as a minimax optimization, where one seeks to construct an optimal estimator that minimizes the “worst-case” expected cost against all possible manipulations by the attacker. We show that if the attacker can manipulate at least half the measurements (l ≥ m/2), then the optimal worst-case estimator should ignore all measurements and be based solely on the a-priori information. We provide the explicit form of the optimal estimator when the attacker can manipulate less than half the measurements (l <; m/2), which is based on (m2l) local estimators. We further prove that such an estimator can be reduced into simpler forms for two special cases, i.e., either the estimator is symmetric and monotone or m = 2l + 1. Finally we apply the proposed methodology in the case of Gaussian measurements.
Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) from attacks has been in securing the networks using information security techniques. Effort has also been applied to increasing the protection and reliability of the control system against random hardware and software failures. However, the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop systems under optimal signal attacks are provided. Finally, an illustrative numerical example using a power generation network is provided together with distributed LQ controllers.