Biblio

The federated learning scheme enhances the privacy preservation through avoiding the private data uploading in cloud-edge computing. However, the attacks against the uploaded model updates still cause private data leakage which demotivates the privacy-sensitive participating edge devices. Facing this issue, we aim to design a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism for the federated cloud-edge learning (PFCEL) system such that 1) the edge devices are motivated to actively contribute to the updated model uploading, 2) a trade-off between the private data leakage and the model accuracy is achieved. We formulate the incentive design problem as a three-layer Stackelberg game, where the server-device interaction is further formulated as a contract design problem. Extensive numerical evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of our designed mechanism in terms of privacy preservation and system utility.

With the continuous development of edge computing, the application scope of mobile crowdsourcing (MCS) is constantly increasing. The distributed nature of edge computing can transmit data at the edge of processing to meet the needs of low latency. The trustworthiness of the third-party platform will affect the level of privacy protection, because managers of the platform may disclose the information of workers. Anonymous servers also belong to third-party platforms. For unreal third-party platforms, this paper recommends that workers first use the localized differential privacy mechanism to interfere with the real location information, and then upload it to an anonymous server to request services, called the localized differential anonymous privacy protection mechanism (LDNP). The two privacy protection mechanisms further enhance privacy protection, but exacerbate the loss of service quality. Therefore, this paper proposes to give corresponding compensation based on the authenticity of the location information uploaded by workers, so as to encourage more workers to upload real location information. Through comparative experiments on real data, the LDNP algorithm not only protects the location privacy of workers, but also maintains the availability of data. The simulation experiment verifies the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism.

Fog computing is a new computing paradigm that utilizes numerous mutually cooperating terminal devices or network edge devices to provide computing, storage, and communication services. Fog computing extends cloud computing services to the edge of the network, making up for the deficiencies of cloud computing in terms of location awareness, mobility support and latency. However, fog nodes are not active enough to perform tasks, and fog nodes recruited by cloud service providers cannot provide stable and continuous resources, which limits the development of fog computing. In the process of cloud service providers using the resources in the fog nodes to provide services to users, the cloud service providers and fog nodes are selfish and committed to maximizing their own payoffs. This situation makes it easy for the fog node to work negatively during the execution of the task. Limited by the low quality of resource provided by fog nodes, the payoff of cloud service providers has been severely affected. In response to this problem, an appropriate incentive mechanism needs to be established in the fog computing environment to solve the core problems faced by both cloud service providers and fog nodes in maximizing their respective utility, in order to achieve the incentive effect. Therefore, this paper proposes an incentive model based on repeated game, and designs a trigger strategy with credible threats, and obtains the conditions for incentive consistency. Under this condition, the fog node will be forced by the deterrence of the trigger strategy to voluntarily choose the strategy of actively executing the task, so as to avoid the loss of subsequent rewards when it is found to perform the task passively. Then, using evolutionary game theory to analyze the stability of the trigger strategy, it proves the dynamic validity of the incentive consistency condition.

In the distributed file sharing system, a large number of users share bandwidth, upload resources and store them in a decentralized manner, thus offering both an abundant supply of high-quality resources and high-speed download. However, some users only enjoy the convenient service without uploading or sharing, which is called free riding. Free-riding may discourage other honest users. When free-riding users mount to a certain number, the platform may fail to work. The current available incentive mechanisms, such as reciprocal incentive mechanisms and reputation-based incentive mechanisms, which suffer simple incentive models, inability to achieve incentive circulation and dependence on a third-party trusted agency, are unable to completely solve the free-riding problem.In this paper we build a blockchain-based distributed file sharing platform and design a nested incentive scheme for this platform. The proposed nested incentive mechanism achieves the circulation of incentives in the platform and does not rely on any trusted third parties for incentive distribution, thus providing a better solution to free-riding. Our distributed file sharing platform prototype is built on the current mainstream blockchain. Nested incentive scheme experiments on this platform verify the effectiveness and superiority of our incentive scheme in solving the free-riding problem compared to other schemes.

Security-related data collection is an essential part for attack detection and security measurement in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). Due to no fixed infrastructure of MANETs, a detection node playing as a collector should discover available routes to a collection node for data collection. Notably, route discovery suffers from many attacks (e.g., wormhole attack), thus the detection node should also collect securityrelated data during route discovery and analyze these data for determining reliable routes. However, few literatures provide incentives for security-related data collection in MANETs, and thus the detection node might not collect sufficient data, which greatly impacts the accuracy of attack detection and security measurement. In this paper, we propose B4SDC, a blockchain system for security-related data collection in MANETs. Through controlling the scale of RREQ forwarding in route discovery, the collector can constrain its payment and simultaneously make each forwarder of control information (namely RREQs and RREPs) obtain rewards as much as possible to ensure fairness. At the same time, B4SDC avoids collusion attacks with cooperative receipt reporting, and spoofing attacks by adopting a secure digital signature. Based on a novel Proof-of-Stake consensus mechanism by accumulating stakes through message forwarding, B4SDC not only provides incentives for all participating nodes, but also avoids forking and ensures high efficiency and real decentralization at the same time. We analyze B4SDC in terms of incentives and security, and evaluate its performance through simulations. The thorough analysis and experimental results show the efficacy and effectiveness of B4SDC.

In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) paradigm, a model owner is able to leverage on the enhanced capabilities of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICV) to develop promising Artificial Intelligence (AI) based applications, e.g., for traffic efficiency. However, in some cases, a model owner may have insufficient data samples to build an effective AI model. To this end, we propose a Federated Learning (FL) based privacy preserving approach to facilitate collaborative FL among multiple model owners in the IoV. Our system model enables collaborative model training without compromising data privacy given that only the model parameters instead of the raw data are exchanged within the federation. However, there are two main challenges of incentive mismatches between workers and model owners, as well as among model owners. For the former, we leverage on the self-revealing mechanism in contract theory under information asymmetry. For the latter, we use the coalitional game theory approach that rewards model owners based on their marginal contributions. The numerical results validate the performance efficiency of our proposed hierarchical incentive mechanism design.

With the development of big data and machine learning techniques, medical data sharing for the use of disease diagnosis has received considerable attention. Blockchain, as an emerging technology, has been widely used to resolve the efficiency and security issues in medical data sharing. However, the existing studies on blockchain-based medical data sharing have rarely concerned about the reasonable incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose a cooperation model where medical data is shared via blockchain. We derive the topological relationships among the participants consisting of data owners, miners and third parties, and gradually develop the computational process of Shapley value revenue distribution. Specifically, we explore the revenue distribution under different consensuses of blockchain. Finally, we demonstrate the incentive effect and rationality of the proposed solution by analyzing the revenue distribution.

Collaborative trajectory privacy preservation (CTPP) scheme is an effective method for continuous queries. However, collaborating with other users need pay some cost. Therefore, some rational and selfish users will not choose collaboration, which will result in users' privacy disclosing. To solve the problem, this paper proposes a collaboration incentive mechanism by rewarding collaborative users and punishing non-collaborative users. The paper models the interactions of users participating in CTPP as a repeated game and analysis the utility of participated users. The analytical results show that CTPP with the proposed incentive mechanism can maximize user's payoffs. Experiments show that the proposed mechanism can effectively encourage users' collaboration behavior and effectively preserve the trajectory privacy for continuous query users.

Cyber insurance is a viable method for cyber risk transfer. However, the cyber insurance faces critical challenges, the most important of which is lack of statistical data. In this paper, we proposed an incentive model considering monitoring signals for cybersecurity information haring based on the principal-agent theory. We studied the effect of monitoring signals on increasing the rationality of the incentive contract and reducing moral hazard in the process of cybersecurity information sharing, and analyzed factors influencing the effectiveness of the incentive contract. We show that by introducing monitoring signals, the insurer can collect more information about the effort level of the insured, and encourage the insured to share cybersecurity information based on the information sharing output and monitoring signals of the effort level, which can not only reduce the blindness of incentive to the insured in the process of cybersecurity information sharing, but also reduce moral hazard.

We develop an auction framework for privacy-preserving data aggregation in mobile crowdsensing, where the platform plays the role as an auctioneer to recruit workers for a sensing task. In this framework, the workers are allowed to report privacy-preserving versions of their data to protect their data privacy; and the platform selects workers based on their sensing capabilities, which aims to address the drawbacks of game-theoretic models that cannot ensure the accuracy level of the aggregated result, due to the existence of multiple Nash Equilibria. Observe that in this auction based framework, there exists externalities among workers' data privacy, because the data privacy of each worker depends on both her injected noise and the total noise in the aggregated result that is intimately related to which workers are selected to fulfill the task. To achieve a desirable accuracy level of the data aggregation in a cost-effective manner, we explicitly characterize the externalities, i.e., the impact of the noise added by each worker on both the data privacy and the accuracy of the aggregated result. Further, we explore the problem structure, characterize the hidden monotonicity property of the problem, and determine the critical bid of workers, which makes it possible to design a truthful, individually rational and computationally efficient incentive mechanism. The proposed incentive mechanism can recruit a set of workers to approximately minimize the cost of purchasing private sensing data from workers subject to the accuracy requirement of the aggregated result. We validate the proposed scheme through theoretical analysis as well as extensive simulations.

The recent proliferation of human-carried mobile devices has given rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that outsource the collection of sensory data to the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices. A fundamental issue in such systems is to effectively incentivize worker participation. However, instead of being an isolated module, the incentive mechanism usually interacts with other components which may affect its performance, such as data aggregation component that aggregates workers' data and data perturbation component that protects workers' privacy. Therefore, different from past literature, we capture such interactive effect, and propose INCEPTION, a novel MCS system framework that integrates an incentive, a data aggregation, and a data perturbation mechanism. Specifically, its incentive mechanism selects workers who are more likely to provide reliable data, and compensates their costs for both sensing and privacy leakage. Its data aggregation mechanism also incorporates workers' reliability to generate highly accurate aggregated results, and its data perturbation mechanism ensures satisfactory protection for workers' privacy and desirable accuracy for the final perturbed results. We validate the desirable properties of INCEPTION through theoretical analysis, as well as extensive simulations.

We study the value of data privacy in a game-theoretic model of trading private data, where a data collector purchases private data from strategic data subjects (individuals) through an incentive mechanism. The private data of each individual represents her knowledge about an underlying state, which is the information that the data collector desires to learn. Different from most of the existing work on privacy-aware surveys, our model does not assume the data collector to be trustworthy. Then, an individual takes full control of its own data privacy and reports only a privacy-preserving version of her data. In this paper, the value of ε units of privacy is measured by the minimum payment of all nonnegative payment mechanisms, under which an individual's best response at a Nash equilibrium is to report the data with a privacy level of ε. The higher ε is, the less private the reported data is. We derive lower and upper bounds on the value of privacy which are asymptotically tight as the number of data subjects becomes large. Specifically, the lower bound assures that it is impossible to use less amount of payment to buy ε units of privacy, and the upper bound is given by an achievable payment mechanism that we designed. Based on these fundamental limits, we further derive lower and upper bounds on the minimum total payment for the data collector to achieve a given learning accuracy target, and show that the total payment of the designed mechanism is at most one individual's payment away from the minimum.