Biblio
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks aim to make a server unresponsive by flooding the target server with a large volume of packets (Volume based DDoS attacks), by keeping connections open for a long time and exhausting the resources (Low and Slow DDoS attacks) or by targeting protocols (Protocol based attacks). Volume based DDoS attacks that flood the target server with a large number of packets are easier to detect because of the abnormality in packet flow. Low and Slow DDoS attacks, however, make the server unavailable by keeping connections open for a long time, but send traffic similar to genuine traffic, making detection of such attacks difficult. This paper proposes a solution to detect and mitigate one such Low and slow DDoS attack, Slowloris in an SDN (Software Defined Networking) environment. The proposed solution involves communication between the detection and mitigation module and the controller of the Software Defined Network to get data to detect and mitigate low and slow DDoS attack.
The Internet of Things (IoT) vulnerabilities provides an ideal target for botnets, making them a major contributor in the increased number of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The increase in DDoS attacks has made it important to address the consequences it implies on the IoT industry being one of the major causes. The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of the attempts to prevent DDoS attacks, mainly at a network level. The sensibility of these solutions is extracted from their impact in resolving IoT vulnerabilities. It is evident from this review that there is no perfect solution yet for IoT security, this field still has many opportunities for research and development.
Software Defined Internet Exchange Points (SDXes) increase the flexibility of interdomain traffic delivery on the Internet. Yet, an SDX inherently requires multiple participants to have access to a single, shared physical switch, which creates the need for an authorization mechanism to mediate this access. In this paper, we introduce a logic and mechanism called FLANC (A Formal Logic for Authorizing Network Control), which authorizes each participant to control forwarding actions on a shared switch and also allows participants to delegate forwarding actions to other participants at the switch (e.g., a trusted third party). FLANC extends "says" and "speaks for" logic that have been previously designed for operating system objects to handle expressions involving network traffic flows. We describe FLANC, explain how participants can use it to express authorization policies for realistic interdomain routing settings, and demonstrate that it is efficient enough to operate in operational settings.