Biblio
Recent advances in pervasive computing have caused a rapid growth of the Smart Home market, where a number of otherwise mundane pieces of technology are capable of connecting to the Internet and interacting with other similar devices. However, with the lack of a commonly adopted set of guidelines, several IT companies are producing smart devices with their own proprietary standards, leading to highly heterogeneous Smart Home systems in which the interoperability of the present elements is not always implemented in the most straightforward manner. As such, understanding the cyber risk of these cyber-physical systems beyond the individual devices has become an almost intractable problem. This paper tackles this issue by introducing a Smart Home reference architecture which facilitates security analysis. Being composed by three viewpoints, it gives a high-level description of the various functions and components needed in a domestic IoT device and network. Furthermore, this document demonstrates how the architecture can be used to determine the various attack surfaces of a home automation system from which its key vulnerabilities can be determined.
Active Noise Cancellation (ANC) is a classical area where noise in the environment is canceled by producing anti-noise signals near the human ears (e.g., in Bose's noise cancellation headphones). This paper brings IoT to active noise cancellation by combining wireless communication with acoustics. The core idea is to place an IoT device in the environment that listens to ambient sounds and forwards the sound over its wireless radio. Since wireless signals travel much faster than sound, our ear-device receives the sound in advance of its actual arrival. This serves as a glimpse into the future, that we call lookahead, and proves crucial for real-time noise cancellation, especially for unpredictable, wide-band sounds like music and speech. Using custom IoT hardware, as well as lookahead-aware cancellation algorithms, we demonstrate MUTE, a fully functional noise cancellation prototype that outperforms Bose's latest ANC headphone. Importantly, our design does not need to block the ear - the ear canal remains open, making it comfortable (and healthier) for continuous use.
The Internet of Things (IoT) devices have expanded into many aspects of everyday life. As these smart home devices grow more popular, security concerns increase. Researchers have modeled the privacy and security threats for smart home devices, but have yet to fully address the problem of unintended user access within the home. Often, smart home devices are purchased by one of the family members and associated with the same family member's account, yet are shared by the entire home. Currently most devices implement a course-grained access control model where someone in the home either has complete access or no access. We provide scenarios that highlight the need for exible authorization control and seamless authentication in IoT devices, especially in multi-user environments. We present design recommendations for IoT device manufacturers to provide fine-grained access control and authentication and describe the challenges to meeting the expectations of all users within a home.
The Internet of Things (IoT) increasingly demonstrates its role in smart services, such as smart home, smart grid, smart transportation, etc. However, due to lack of standards among different vendors, existing networked IoT devices (NoTs) can hardly provide enough security. Moreover, it is impractical to apply advanced cryptographic solutions to many NoTs due to limited computing capability and power supply. Inspired by recent advances in IoT demand, in this paper, we develop an IoT security architecture that can protect NoTs in different IoT scenarios. Specifically, the security architecture consists of an auditing module and two network-level security controllers. The auditing module is designed to have a stand-alone intrusion detection system for threat detection in a NoT network cluster. The two network-level security controllers are designed to provide security services from either network resource management or cryptographic schemes regardless of the NoT security capability. We also demonstrate the proposed IoT security architecture with a network based one-hop confidentiality scheme and a cryptography-based secure link mechanism.
Some IoT data are time-sensitive and cannot be processed in clouds, which are too far away from IoT devices. Fog computing, located as close as possible to data sources at the edge of IoT systems, deals with this problem. Some IoT data are sensitive and require privacy controls. The proposed Policy Enforcement Fog Module (PEFM), running within a single fog, operates close to data sources connected to their fog, and enforces privacy policies for all sensitive IoT data generated by these data sources. PEFM distinguishes two kinds of fog data processing. First, fog nodes process data for local IoT applications, running within the local fog. All real-time data processing must be local to satisfy real-time constraints. Second, fog nodes disseminate data to nodes beyond the local fog (including remote fogs and clouds) for remote (and non-real-time) IoT applications. PEFM has two components for these two kinds of fog data processing. First, Local Policy Enforcement Module (LPEM), performs direct privacy policy enforcement for sensitive data accessed by local IoT applications. Second, Remote Policy Enforcement Module (RPEM), sets up a mechanism for indirectly enforcing privacy policies for sensitive data sent to remote IoT applications. RPEM is based on creating and disseminating Active Data Bundles-software constructs bundling inseparably sensitive data, their privacy policies, and an execution engine able to enforce privacy policies. To prove effectiveness and efficiency of the solution, we developed a proof-of-concept scenario for a smart home IoT application. We investigate privacy threats for sensitive IoT data and show a framework for using PEFM to overcome these threats.
In the Internet of Things (IoT), smart devices are connected using various communication protocols, such as Wi-Fi, ZigBee. Some IoT devices have multiple built-in communication modules. If an IoT device equipped with multiple communication protocols is compromised by an attacker using one communication protocol (e.g., Wi-Fi), it can be exploited as an entry point to the IoT network. Another protocol (e.g., ZigBee) of this IoT device could be used to exploit vulnerabilities of other IoT devices using the same communication protocol. In order to find potential attacks caused by this kind of cross-protocol devices, we group IoT devices based on their communication protocols and construct a graphical security model for each group of devices using the same communication protocol. We combine the security models via the cross-protocol devices and compute hidden attack paths traversing different groups of devices. We use two use cases in the smart home scenario to demonstrate our approach and discuss some feasible countermeasures.
In smart factories and smart homes, devices such as smart sensors are connected to the Internet. Independent of the context in which such a smart sensor is deployed, the possibility to change its configuration parameters in a secure way is essential. Existing solutions do provide only minimal security or do not allow to transfer arbitrary configuration data. In this paper, we present an NFC- and QR-code based configuration interface for smart sensors which improves the security and practicability of the configuration altering process while introducing as little overhead as possible. We present a protocol for configuration as well as a hardware extension including a dedicated security controller (SC) for smart sensors. For customers, no additional hardware other than a commercially available smartphone will be necessary which makes the proposed approach highly applicable for smart factory and smart home contexts alike.
The Internet of Things (IoT) will connect not only computers and mobile devices, but it will also interconnect smart buildings, houses, and cities, as well as electrical grids, gas plants, and water networks, automobiles, airplanes, etc. IoT will lead to the development of a wide range of advanced information services that are pervasive, cost-effective, and can be accessed from anywhere and at any time. However, due to the exponential number of interconnected devices, cyber-security in the IoT is a major challenge. It heavily relies on the digital identity concept to build security mechanisms such as authentication and authorization. Current centralized identity management systems are built around third party identity providers, which raise privacy concerns and present a single point of failure. In addition, IoT unconventional characteristics such as scalability, heterogeneity and mobility require new identity management systems to operate in distributed and trustless environments, and uniquely identify a particular device based on its intrinsic digital properties and its relation to its human owner. In order to deal with these challenges, we present a Blockchain-based Identity Framework for IoT (BIFIT). We show how to apply our BIFIT to IoT smart homes to achieve identity self-management by end users. In the context of smart home, the framework autonomously extracts appliances signatures and creates blockchain-based identifies for their appliance owners. It also correlates appliances signatures (low level identities) and owners identifies in order to use them in authentication credentials and to make sure that any IoT entity is behaving normally.