Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is combinational circuits  [Clear All Filters]
2020-11-09
Rathor, M., Sengupta, A..  2019.  Enhanced Functional Obfuscation of DSP core using Flip-Flops and Combinational logic. 2019 IEEE 9th International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE-Berlin). :1–5.
Due to globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) design flow, Intellectual Property (IP) cores have increasingly become susceptible to various hardware threats such as Trojan insertion, piracy, overbuilding etc. An IP core can be secured against these threats using functional obfuscation based security mechanism. This paper presents a functional obfuscation of digital signal processing (DSP) core for consumer electronics systems using a novel IP core locking block (ILB) logic that leverages the structure of flip-flops and combinational circuits. These ILBs perform the locking of the functionality of a DSP design and actuate the correct functionality only on application of a valid key sequence. In existing approaches so far, executing exhaustive trials are sufficient to extract the valid keys from an obfuscated design. However, proposed work is capable of hindering the extraction of valid keys even on exhaustive trials, unless successfully applied in the first attempt only. In other words, the proposed work drastically reduces the probability of obtaining valid key of a functionally obfuscated design in exhaustive trials. Experimental results indicate that the proposed approach achieves higher security and lower design overhead than previous works.
Patooghy, A., Aerabi, E., Rezaei, H., Mark, M., Fazeli, M., Kinsy, M. A..  2018.  Mystic: Mystifying IP Cores Using an Always-ON FSM Obfuscation Method. 2018 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :626–631.
The separation of manufacturing and design processes in the integrated circuit industry to tackle the ever increasing circuit complexity and time to market issues has brought with it some major security challenges. Chief among them is IP piracy by untrusted parties. Hardware obfuscation which locks the functionality and modifies the structure of an IP core to protect it from malicious modifications or piracy has been proposed as a solution. In this paper, we develop an efficient hardware obfuscation method, called Mystic (Mystifying IP Cores), to protect IP cores from reverse engineering, IP overproduction, and IP piracy. The key idea behind Mystic is to add additional state transitions to the original/functional FSM (Finite State Machine) that are taken only when incorrect keys are applied to the circuit. Using the proposed Mystic obfuscation approach, the underlying functionality of the IP core is locked and normal FSM transitions are only available to authorized chip users. The synthesis results of ITC99 circuit benchmarks for ASIC 45nm technology reveal that the Mystic protection method imposes on average 5.14% area overhead, 5.21% delay overhead, and 8.06% power consumption overheads while it exponentially lowers the probability that an unauthorized user will gain access to or derive the chip functionality.
2020-08-24
Gohil, Nikhil N., Vemuri, Ranga R..  2019.  Automated Synthesis of Differential Power Attack Resistant Integrated Circuits. 2019 IEEE National Aerospace and Electronics Conference (NAECON). :204–211.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks were shown to be effective in recovering the secret key information from a variety cryptographic systems. In response, several design methods, ranging from the cell level to the algorithmic level, have been proposed to defend against DPA attacks. Cell level solutions depend on DPA resistant cell designs which attempt to minimize power variance during transitions while minimizing area and power consumption. In this paper, we discuss how a differential circuit design style is incorporated into a COTS tool set, resulting in a fully automated synthesis system DPA resistant integrated circuits. Based on the Secure Differential Multiplexer Logic (SDMLp), this system can be used to synthesize complete cryptographic processors which provide strong defense against DPA while minimizing area and power overhead. We discuss how both combinational and sequential cells are incorporated in the cell library. We show the effectiveness of the tool chain by using it to automatically synthesize the layouts, from RT level Verilog specifications, of both the DES and AES encryption ICs in 90nm CMOS. In each case, we present experimental data to demonstrate DPA attack resistance and area, power and performance overhead and compare these with circuits synthesized in another differential logic called MDPL as well as standard CMOS synthesis results.
2020-03-16
Chau, Cuong, Hunt, Warren A., Kaufmann, Matt, Roncken, Marly, Sutherland, Ivan.  2019.  A Hierarchical Approach to Self-Timed Circuit Verification. 2019 25th IEEE International Symposium on Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC). :105–113.
Self-timed circuits can be modeled in a link-joint style using a formally defined hardware description language. It has previously been shown how functional properties of these models can be formally verified with the ACL2 theorem prover using a scalable, hierarchical method. Here we extend that method to parameterized circuit families that may have loops and non-deterministic outputs. We illustrate this extension with iterative self-timed circuits that calculate the greatest common divisor of two natural numbers, with circuits that perform arbitrated merges non-deterministically, and with circuits that combine both of these.
2018-04-11
Cornell, N., Nepal, K..  2017.  Combinational Hardware Trojan Detection Using Logic Implications. 2017 IEEE 60th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS). :571–574.

This paper provides a proof-of-concept demonstration of the potential benefit of using logical implications for detection of combinational hardware trojans. Using logic simulation, valid logic implications are selected and added to to the checker circuitry to detect payload delivery by a combinational hardware trojan. Using combinational circuits from the ISCAS benchmark suite, and a modest hardware budget for the checker, simulation results show that the probability of a trojan escaping detection using our approach was only 16%.

2017-12-12
Poudel, B., Louis, S. J., Munir, A..  2017.  Evolving side-channel resistant reconfigurable hardware for elliptic curve cryptography. 2017 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC). :2428–2436.

We propose to use a genetic algorithm to evolve novel reconfigurable hardware to implement elliptic curve cryptographic combinational logic circuits. Elliptic curve cryptography offers high security-level with a short key length making it one of the most popular public-key cryptosystems. Furthermore, there are no known sub-exponential algorithms for solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. These advantages render elliptic curve cryptography attractive for incorporating in many future cryptographic applications and protocols. However, elliptic curve cryptography has proven to be vulnerable to non-invasive side-channel analysis attacks such as timing, power, visible light, electromagnetic, and acoustic analysis attacks. In this paper, we use a genetic algorithm to address this vulnerability by evolving combinational logic circuits that correctly implement elliptic curve cryptographic hardware that is also resistant to simple timing and power analysis attacks. Using a fitness function composed of multiple objectives - maximizing correctness, minimizing propagation delays and minimizing circuit size, we can generate correct combinational logic circuits resistant to non-invasive, side channel attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to evolve a cryptography circuit using a genetic algorithm. We implement evolved circuits in hardware on a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA. Results reveal that the evolutionary algorithm can successfully generate correct, and side-channel resistant combinational circuits with negligible propagation delay.