Biblio
Managing electricity effectively also means knowing as accurately as possible when, where and how electricity is used. Detailed metering and timely allocation of consumption can help identify specific areas where energy consumption is excessive and therefore requires action and optimization. All those interested in the measurement process (distributors, sellers, wholesalers, managers, ultimately customers and new prosumer figures - producers / consumers -) have an interest in monitoring and managing energy flows more efficiently, in real time.Smart meter plays a key role in sending data containing consumer measurements to both the producer and the consumer, thanks to chain 2. It allows you to connect consumption and production, during use and the customer’s identity, allowing billing as Time-of-Use or Real-Time Pricing, and through the new two-way channel, this information is also made available to the consumer / prosumer himself, enabling new services such as awareness of energy consumption at the very moment of energy use.This is made possible by latest generation devices that "talk" with the end user, which use chain 2 and the power line for communication.However, the implementation of smart meters and related digital technologies associated with the smart grid raises various concerns, including, privacy. This paper provides a comparative perspective on privacy policies for residential energy customers, moreover, it will be possible to improve security through the blockchain for the introduction of smart contracts.
A major challenge for utilities is energy theft, wherein malicious actors steal energy for financial gain. One such form of theft in the smart grid is the fraudulent amplification of energy generation measurements from DERs, such as photo-voltaics. It is important to detect this form of malicious activity, but in a way that ensures the privacy of customers. Not considering privacy aspects could result in a backlash from customers and a heavily curtailed deployment of services, for example. In this short paper, we present a novel privacy-preserving approach to the detection of manipulated DER generation measurements.
We introduce $μ$DTNSec, the first fully-implemented security layer for Delay/Disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTN) on microcontrollers. It provides protection against eavesdropping and Man-in-the-Middle attacks that are especially easy in these networks. Following the Store-Carry-Forward principle of DTNs, an attacker can simply place itself on the route between source and destination. Our design consists of asymmetric encryption and signatures with Elliptic Curve Cryptography and hardware-backed symmetric encryption with the Advanced Encryption Standard. $μ$DTNSec has been fully implemented as an extension to $μ$DTN on Contiki OS and is based on the Bundle Protocol specification. Our performance evaluation shows that the choice of the curve (secp128r1, secp192r1, secp256r1) dominates the influence of the payload size. We also provide energy measurements for all operations to show the feasibility of our security layer on energy-constrained devices.