Biblio

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a ubiquitous system connecting many different devices - the things - which can be accessed from the distance. The cyber-physical systems (CPSs) monitor and control the things from the distance. As a result, the concepts of dependability and security get deeply intertwined. The increasing level of dynamicity, heterogeneity, and complexity adds to the system's vulnerability, and challenges its ability to react to faults. This paper summarizes the state of the art of existing work on anomaly detection, fault-tolerance, and self-healing, and adds a number of other methods applicable to achieve resilience in an IoT. We particularly focus on non-intrusive methods ensuring data integrity in the network. Furthermore, this paper presents the main challenges in building a resilient IoT for the CPS, which is crucial in the era of smart CPS with enhanced connectivity (an excellent example of such a system is connected autonomous vehicles). It further summarizes our solutions, work-in-progress and future work to this topic to enable ``Trustworthy IoT for CPS''. Finally, this framework is illustrated on a selected use case: a smart sensor infrastructure in the transport domain.

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) data privacy protection during sharing, aggregating, and publishing is a challenging problem. Several privacy protection mechanisms have been developed in the literature to protect sensitive data from adversarial analysis and eliminate the risk of re-identifying the original properties of shared data. However, most of the existing solutions have drawbacks, such as (i) lack of a proper vulnerability characterization model to accurately identify where privacy is needed, (ii) ignoring data providers privacy preference, (iii) using uniform privacy protection which may create inadequate privacy for some provider while over-protecting others, and (iv) lack of a comprehensive privacy quantification model assuring data privacy-preservation. To address these issues, we propose a personalized privacy preference framework by characterizing and quantifying the CPS vulnerabilities as well as ensuring privacy. First, we introduce a Standard Vulnerability Profiling Library (SVPL) by arranging the nodes of an energy-CPS from maximum to minimum vulnerable based on their privacy loss. Based on this model, we present our personalized privacy framework (PDP) in which Laplace noise is added based on the individual node's selected privacy preferences. Finally, combining these two proposed methods, we demonstrate that our privacy characterization and quantification model can attain better privacy preservation by eliminating the trade-off between privacy, utility, and risk of losing information.

The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) also referred as Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) as critical elements, expected to play a key role in Industry 4.0 and always been vulnerable to cyber-attacks and vulnerabilities. Terrorists use cyber vulnerability as weapons for mass destruction. The dark web's strong transparency and hard-to-track systems offer a safe haven for criminal activity. On the dark web (DW), there is a wide variety of illicit material that is posted regularly. For supervised training, large-scale web pages are used in traditional DW categorization. However, new study is being hampered by the impossibility of gathering sufficiently illicit DW material and the time spent manually tagging web pages. We suggest a system for accurately classifying criminal activity on the DW in this article. Rather than depending on the vast DW training package, we used authorized regulatory to various types of illicit activity for training Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and get appreciable categorization results. Espionage, Sabotage, Electrical power grid, Propaganda and Economic disruption are the cyber warfare motivations and We choose appropriate data from the open source links for supervised Learning and run a categorization experiment on the illicit material obtained from the actual DW. The results shows that in the experimental setting, using TF-IDF function extraction and a AdaBoost classifier, we were able to achieve an accuracy of 0.942. Our method enables the researchers and System authoritarian agency to verify if their DW corpus includes such illicit activity depending on the applicable rules of the illicit categories they are interested in, allowing them to identify and track possible illicit websites in real time. Because broad training set and expert-supplied seed keywords are not required, this categorization approach offers another option for defining illicit activities on the DW.

Securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet of Things (IoT) systems requires the identification of how interdependence among existing atomic vulnerabilities may be exploited by an adversary to stitch together an attack that can compromise the system. Therefore, accurate attack graphs play a significant role in systems security. A manual construction of the attack graphs is tedious and error-prone, this paper proposes a model-checking-based automated attack graph generator and visualizer (A2G2V). The proposed A2G2V algorithm uses existing model-checking tools, an architecture description tool, and our own code to generate an attack graph that enumerates the set of all possible sequences in which atomic-level vulnerabilities can be exploited to compromise system security. The architecture description tool captures a formal representation of the networked system, its atomic vulnerabilities, their pre-and post-conditions, and security property of interest. A model-checker is employed to automatically identify an attack sequence in the form of a counterexample. Our own code integrated with the model-checker parses the counterexamples, encodes those for specification relaxation, and iterates until all attack sequences are revealed. Finally, a visualization tool has also been incorporated with A2G2V to generate a graphical representation of the generated attack graph. The results are illustrated through application to computer as well as control (SCADA) networks.

While vehicle to everything (V2X) communication enables safety-critical automotive control systems to better support various connected services to improve safety and convenience of drivers, they also allow automotive attack surfaces to increase dynamically in modern vehicles. Many researchers as well as hackers have already demonstrated that they can take remote control of the targeted car by exploiting the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks such as Controller Area Networks (CANs). For assuring CAN security, we focus on how to authenticate electronic control units (ECUs) in real-time by addressing the security challenges of in-vehicle networks. In this paper, we propose a novel and lightweight authentication protocol with an attack-resilient tree algorithm, which is based on one-way hash chain. The protocol can be easily deployed in CAN by performing a firmware update of ECU. We have shown analytically that the protocol achieves a high level of security. In addition, the performance of the proposed protocol is validated on CANoe simulator for virtual ECUs and Freescale S12XF used in real vehicles. The results show that our protocol is more efficient than other authentication protocol in terms of authentication time, response time, and service delay.