Biblio
5G mobile networks promise universal communication environment and aims at providing higher bandwidth, increased communication and networking capabilities, and extensive signal coverage by using multiple communication technologies including Device-to-Device (D-to-D). This paradigm, will allow scalable and ubiquitous connectivity for large-scale mobile networks where a huge number of heterogeneous devices with limited resources will cooperate to enhance communication efficiency in terms of link reliability, spectral efficiency, system capacity, and transmission range. However, owing to its decentralized nature, cooperative D-to-D communication could be vulnerable to attacks initiated on relay nodes. Consequently, a source node has the interest to select the more protected relay to ensure the security of its traffic. Nevertheless, an improvement in the protection level has a counterpart cost that must be sustained by the device. To address this trade-off as well as the interaction between the attacker and the source device, we propose a dynamic game theoretic based approach to model and analyze this problem as a cost model. The utility function of the proposed non-cooperative game is based on the concepts of return on protection and return on attack which illustrate the gain of selecting a relay for transmitting a data packet by a source node and the reward of the attacker to perform an attack to compromise the transmitted data. Moreover, we discuss and analyze Nash equilibrium convergence of this attack-defense model and we propose an heuristic algorithm that can determine the equilibrium state in a limited number of running stages. Finally, we perform simulation work to show the effectiveness of the game model in assessing the behavior of the source node and the attacker and its ability to reach equilibrium within a finite number of steps.
With the ever so growing boundaries for security in the cloud, it is necessary to develop ways to prevent from total cloud server failure. In this paper, we try to design a Game Strategy Block that sets up rules for security based on a tower defence game to secure the hypervisor from potential threats. We also try to define a utility function named the Virtual Machine Vitality Measure (VMVM) that could enlighten on the status of the virtual machines on the virtual environment.
Gaussian random attacks that jointly minimize the amount of information obtained by the operator from the grid and the probability of attack detection are presented. The construction of the attack is posed as an optimization problem with a utility function that captures two effects: firstly, minimizing the mutual information between the measurements and the state variables; secondly, minimizing the probability of attack detection via the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the distribution of the measurements with an attack and the distribution of the measurements without an attack. Additionally, a lower bound on the utility function achieved by the attacks constructed with imperfect knowledge of the second order statistics of the state variables is obtained. The performance of the attack construction using the sample covariance matrix of the state variables is numerically evaluated. The above results are tested in the IEEE 30-Bus test system.