Biblio

On the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provide significant operational advantages. However, the exploitation of the UAV by an untrustworthy entity might lead to security violations or possibly the destruction of crucial IoBT network functionality. The IoBT system has substantial issues related to data tampering and fabrication through illegal access. This paper proposes the use of an intelligent architecture called IoBT-Net, which is built on a convolution neural network (CNN) and connected with blockchain technology, to identify and trace illicit UAV in the IoBT system. Data storage on the blockchain ledger is protected from unauthorized access, data tampering, and invasions. Conveniently, this paper presents a low complexity and robustly performed CNN called LRCANet to estimate AOA for object localization. The proposed LRCANet is efficiently designed with two core modules, called GFPU and stacks, which are cleverly organized with regular and point convolution layers, a max pool layer, and a ReLU layer associated with residual connectivity. Furthermore, the effectiveness of LRCANET is evaluated by various network and array configurations, RMSE, and compared with the accuracy and complexity of the existing state-of-the-art. Additionally, the implementation of tailored drone-based consensus is evaluated in terms of three major classes and compared with the other existing consensus.

Recently deep learning has demonstrated much success within the fields of image and natural language processing, facial recognition, and computer vision. The success is attributed to large, accessible databases and deep learning's ability to learn highly accurate models. Thus, deep learning is being investigated as a viable end-to-end approach to digital communications design. This work investigates the use of adversarial deep learning to ensure that a radio can communicate covertly, via Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), with another while a third (the adversary) is actively attempting to detect, intercept and exploit their communications. The adversary's ability to detect and exploit the DSSS signals is hindered by: (i) generating a set of spreading codes that are balanced and result in low side lobes as well as (ii) actively adapting the encoding scheme. Lastly, DSSS communications performance is assessed using energy constrained devices to accurately portray IoT and IoBT device limitations.

With the remarkable growth of the Internet and communication technologies over the past few decades, Internet of Things (IoTs) is enabling the ubiquitous connectivity of heterogeneous physical devices with software, sensors, and actuators. IoT networks are naturally two layers with the cloud and cellular networks coexisting with the underlaid device-to-device communications. The connectivity of IoTs plays an important role in information dissemination for mission-critical and civilian applications. However, IoT communication networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks including the denial-of-service and jamming attacks, resulting in link removals in the IoT network. In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous IoT network design framework in which a network designer can add links to provide additional communication paths between two nodes or secure links against attacks by investing resources. By anticipating the strategic cyber attacks, we characterize the optimal design of the secure IoT network by first providing a lower bound on the number of links a secure network requires for a given budget of protected links, and then developing a method to construct networks that satisfy the heterogeneous network design specifications. Therefore, each layer of the designed heterogeneous IoT network is resistant to a predefined level of malicious attacks with minimum resources. Finally, we provide case studies on the Internet of Battlefield Things to corroborate and illustrate our obtained results.

The real-time information of enemy locations is capable to transform the outcome of combat operations. Such information gathered using connected soldiers on the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) is highly beneficial to create situational awareness (SA) and to plan an effective war strategy. This article presents the novel enemy localization method that uses the soldier's own locations and their gunshot direction. The hardware prototype has been developed that uses a triangulation for an enemy localization in two soldiers and a single enemy scenario. 4.24±1.77 m of average localization error and ±4° of gunshot direction error has been observed during this prototype testing. This basic model is further extended using three-stage software simulation for multiple soldiers and multiple enemy scenarios with the necessary assumptions. The effective algorithm has been proposed, which differentiates between the ghost and true predictions by analyzing the groups of subsequent shooting intents (i.e., frames). Four different complex scenarios are tested in the first stage of the simulation, around three to six frames are required for the accurate enemy localization in the relatively simple cases, and nine frames are required for the complex cases. The random error within ±4° in gunshot direction is included in the second stage of the simulation which required almost double the number of frames for similar four cases. As the number of frames increases, the accuracy of the proposed algorithm improves and better ghost point elimination is observed. In the third stage, two conventional clustering algorithms are implemented to validate the presented work. The comparative analysis shows that the proposed algorithm is faster, computationally simple, consistent, and reliable compared with others. Detailed analysis of hardware and software results for various scenarios has been discussed in this article.

As a typical representative of a new generation military information technology, the value and significance of Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) has been widely recognized by the world's military forces. At the same time, Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) is facing serious scalability and security challenges. This paper presents the basic concept and six-domain model of IoBT, explains the integration security framework of IoBT and blockchain. Furthermore, we design and build a novel IoT framework called IoBTChain based on blockchain and smart contracts, which adopts a credit-based resource management system to control the amount of resources that an IoBT device can obtain from a cloud server based on pre-defined priority rules, application types, and behavior history. We illustrate the deployment procedure of blockchain and smart contracts, the device registration procedure on blockchain, the IoBT behavior regulation workflow and the pricing-based resource allocation algorithm.

In this paper, the problem of network connectivity is studied for an adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker aims at disrupting the connectivity of the network by choosing to compromise one of the IoBT nodes at each time epoch. To counter such attacks, an IoBT defender attempts to reestablish the IoBT connectivity by either deploying new IoBT nodes or by changing the roles of existing nodes. This problem is formulated as a dynamic multistage Stackelberg connectivity game that extends classical connectivity games and that explicitly takes into account the characteristics and requirements of the IoBT network. In particular, the defender's payoff captures the IoBT latency as well as the sum of weights of disconnected nodes at each stage of the game. Due to the dependence of the attacker's and defender's actions at each stage of the game on the network state, the feedback Stackelberg solution [feedback Stackelberg equilibrium (FSE)] is used to solve the IoBT connectivity game. Then, sufficient conditions under which the IoBT system will remain connected, when the FSE solution is used, are determined analytically. Numerical results show that the expected number of disconnected sensors, when the FSE solution is used, decreases up to 46% compared to a baseline scenario in which a Stackelberg game with no feedback is used, and up to 43% compared to a baseline equal probability policy.