Biblio
Recently, cellular operators have started migrating to IPv6 in response to the increasing demand for IP addresses. With the introduction of IPv6, cellular middleboxes, such as firewalls for preventing malicious traffic from the Internet and stateful NAT64 boxes for providing backward compatibility with legacy IPv4 services, have become crucial to maintain stability of cellular networks. This paper presents security problems of the currently deployed IPv6 middleboxes of five major operators. To this end, we first investigate several key features of the current IPv6 deployment that can harm the safety of a cellular network as well as its customers. These features combined with the currently deployed IPv6 middlebox allow an adversary to launch six different attacks. First, firewalls in IPv6 cellular networks fail to block incoming packets properly. Thus, an adversary could fingerprint cellular devices with scanning, and further, she could launch denial-of-service or over-billing attacks. Second, vulnerabilities in the stateful NAT64 box, a middlebox that maps an IPv6 address to an IPv4 address (and vice versa), allow an adversary to launch three different attacks: 1) NAT overflow attack that allows an adversary to overflow the NAT resources, 2) NAT wiping attack that removes active NAT mappings by exploiting the lack of TCP sequence number verification of firewalls, and 3) NAT bricking attack that targets services adopting IP-based blacklisting by preventing the shared external IPv4 address from accessing the service. We confirmed the feasibility of these attacks with an empirical analysis. We also propose effective countermeasures for each attack.
In large-scale systems, user authentication usually needs the assistance from a remote central authentication server via networks. The authentication service however could be slow or unavailable due to natural disasters or various cyber attacks on communication channels. This has raised serious concerns in systems which need robust authentication in emergency situations. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. In a slow connection situation, we present a secure generic multi-factor authentication protocol to speed up the whole authentication process. Compared with another generic protocol in the literature, the new proposal provides the same function with significant improvements in computation and communication. Another authentication mechanism, which we name stand-alone authentication, can authenticate users when the connection to the central server is down. We investigate several issues in stand-alone authentication and show how to add it on multi-factor authentication protocols in an efficient and generic way.
Mobile users access location services from a location based server. While doing so, the user's privacy is at risk. The server has access to all details about the user. Example the recently visited places, the type of information he accesses. We have presented synergetic technique to safeguard location privacy of users accessing location-based services via mobile devices. Mobile devices have a capability to form ad-hoc networks to hide a user's identity and position. The user who requires the service is the query originator and who requests the service on behalf of query originator is the query sender. The query originator selects the query sender with equal probability which leads to anonymity in the network. The location revealed to the location service provider is a rectangle instead of exact co-ordinate. In this paper we have simulated the mobile network and shown the results for cloaking area sizes and performance against the variation in the density of users.