Biblio

This paper studies the synthesis of controllers for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) that are required to carry out complex tasks that are time-sensitive, in the presence of an adversary. The task is specified as a formula in metric interval temporal logic (MITL). The adversary is assumed to have the ability to tamper with the control input to the CPS and also manipulate timing information perceived by the CPS. In order to model the interaction between the CPS and the adversary, and also the effect of these two classes of attacks, we define an entity called a durational stochastic game (DSG). DSGs probabilistically capture transitions between states in the environment, and also the time taken for these transitions. With the policy of the defender represented as a finite state controller (FSC), we present a value-iteration based algorithm that computes an FSC that maximizes the probability of satisfying the MITL specification under the two classes of attacks. A numerical case-study on a signalized traffic network is presented to illustrate our results.

In this paper, we study system security against Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). APTs are stealthy and persistent but APTs interact with system and introduce information flows in the system as data-flow and control-flow commands. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a promising detection mechanism against APTs which taints suspicious input sources in the system and performs online security analysis when a tainted information is used in unauthorized manner. Our objective in this paper is to model DIFT that handle data-flow and conditional branches in the program that arise from control-flow commands. We use game theoretic framework and provide the first analytical model of DIFT with data-flow and conditional-branch tracking. Our game model which is an undiscounted infinite-horizon stochastic game captures the interaction between APTs and DIFT and the notion of conditional branching. We prove that the best response of the APT is a maximal reachability probability problem and provide a polynomial-time algorithm to find the best response by solving a linear optimization problem. We formulate the best response of the defense as a linear optimization problem and show that an optimal solution to the linear program returns a deterministic optimal policy for the defense. Since finding Nash equilibrium for infinite-horizon undiscounted stochastic games is computationally difficult, we present a nonlinear programming based polynomial-time algorithm to find an E-Nash equilibrium. Finally, we perform experimental analysis of our algorithm on real-world data for NetRecon attack augmented with conditional branching.

In this work, we synthesize collaboration protocols for human-unmanned aerial vehicle (H-UAV) command and control systems, where the human operator aids in securing the UAV by intermittently performing geolocation tasks to confirm its reported location. We first present a stochastic game-based model for the system that accounts for both the operator and an adversary capable of launching stealthy false-data injection attacks, causing the UAV to deviate from its path. We also describe a synthesis challenge due to the UAV's hidden-information constraint. Next, we perform human experiments using a developed RESCHU-SA testbed to recognize the geolocation strategies that operators adopt. Furthermore, we deploy machine learning techniques on the collected experimental data to predict the correctness of a geolocation task at a given location based on its geographical features. By representing the model as a delayed-action game and formalizing the system objectives, we utilize off-the-shelf model checkers to synthesize protocols for the human-UAV coalition that satisfy these objectives. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of the H-UAV protocol synthesis through a case study where the protocols are experimentally analyzed and further evaluated by human operators.

This paper presents a control strategy for Cyber-Physical System defense developed in the framework of the European Project ATENA, that concerns Critical Infrastructure (CI) protection. The aim of the controller is to find the optimal security configuration, in terms of countermeasures to implement, in order to address the system vulnerabilities. The attack/defense problem is modeled as a multi-agent general sum game, where the aim of the defender is to prevent the most damage possible by finding an optimal trade-off between prevention actions and their costs. The problem is solved utilizing Reinforcement Learning and simulation results provide a proof of the proposed concept, showing how the defender of the protected CI is able to minimize the damage caused by his her opponents by finding the Nash equilibrium of the game in the zero-sum variant, and, in a more general scenario, by driving the attacker in the position where the damage she/he can cause to the infrastructure is lower than the cost it has to sustain to enforce her/his attack strategy.

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to analyze the interactions between an attacker and a defender in a cyber-physical system (CPS) and develops effective defense strategies. In a CPS, the attacker launches cyber attacks on a number of nodes in the cyber layer, trying to maximize the potential damage to the underlying physical system while the system operator seeks to defend several nodes in the cyber layer to minimize the physical damage. Given that CPS attacking and defending is often a continual process, a zero-sum Markov game is proposed in this paper to model these interactions subject to underlying uncertainties of real-world events and actions. A novel model is also proposed in this paper to characterize the interdependence between the cyber layer and the physical layer in a CPS and quantify the impact of the cyber attack on the physical damage in the proposed game. To find the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game, we design an efficient algorithm based on value iteration. The proposed general approach is then applied to study the wide-area monitoring and protection issue in smart grid. Extensive simulations are conducted based on real-world data, and results show the effectiveness of the defending strategies derived from the proposed approach.

Deception has been widely considered in literature as an effective means of enhancing security protection when the defender holds some private information about the ongoing rivalry unknown to the attacker. However, most of the existing works on deception assume static environments and thus consider only myopic deception, while practical security games between the defender and the attacker may happen in dynamic scenarios. To better exploit the defender's private information in dynamic environments and improve security performance, a stochastic deception game (SDG) framework is developed in this work to enable the defender to conduct foresighted deception. To solve the proposed SDG, a new iterative algorithm that is provably convergent is developed. A corresponding learning algorithm is developed as well to facilitate the defender in conducting foresighted deception in unknown dynamic environments. Numerical results show that the proposed foresighted deception can offer a substantial performance improvement as compared to the conventional myopic deception.

Establishing a secret and reliable wireless communication is a challenging task that is of paramount importance. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security of a legitimate transmission link between a user that assists an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in detecting eavesdropping and jamming attacks in the presence of an adversary that is capable of conducting an eavesdropping or a jamming attack. The user is being faced by a challenge of whether to transmit, thus becoming vulnerable to an eavesdropping or a jamming attack, or to keep silent and consequently his/her transmission will be delayed. The adversary is also facing a challenge of whether to conduct an eavesdropping or a jamming attack that will not get him/her to be detected. We model the interactions between the user and the adversary as a two-state stochastic game. Explicit solutions characterize some properties while highlighting some interesting strategies that are being embraced by the user and the adversary. Results show that our proposed system outperform current systems in terms of communication secrecy.

Preserving the availability and integrity of networked computing systems in the face of fast-spreading intrusions requires advances not only in detection algorithms, but also in automated response techniques. In this paper, we propose a new approach to automated response called the response and recovery engine (RRE). Our engine employs a game-theoretic response strategy against adversaries modeled as opponents in a two-player Stackelberg stochastic game. The RRE applies attack-response trees (ART) to analyze undesired system-level security events within host computers and their countermeasures using Boolean logic to combine lower level attack consequences. In addition, the RRE accounts for uncertainties in intrusion detection alert notifications. The RRE then chooses optimal response actions by solving a partially observable competitive Markov decision process that is automatically derived from attack-response trees. To support network-level multiobjective response selection and consider possibly conflicting network security properties, we employ fuzzy logic theory to calculate the network-level security metric values, i.e., security levels of the system's current and potentially future states in each stage of the game. In particular, inputs to the network-level game-theoretic response selection engine, are first fed into the fuzzy system that is in charge of a nonlinear inference and quantitative ranking of the possible actions using its previously defined fuzzy rule set. Consequently, the optimal network-level response actions are chosen through a game-theoretic optimization process. Experimental results show that the RRE, using Snort's alerts, can protect large networks for which attack-response trees have more than 500 nodes.