Biblio

Numerous measurement researches have been performed to discover the IPv4 network security issues by leveraging the fast Internet-wide scanning techniques. However, IPv6 brings the 128-bit address space and renders brute-force network scanning impractical. Although significant efforts have been dedicated to enumerating active IPv6 hosts, limited by technique efficiency and probing accuracy, large-scale empirical measurement studies under the increasing IPv6 networks are infeasible now. To fill this research gap, by leveraging the extensively adopted IPv6 address allocation strategy, we propose a novel IPv6 network periphery discovery approach. Specifically, XMap, a fast network scanner, is developed to find the periphery, such as a home router. We evaluate it on twelve prominent Internet service providers and harvest 52M active peripheries. Grounded on these found devices, we explore IPv6 network risks of the unintended exposed security services and the flawed traffic routing strategies. First, we demonstrate the unintended exposed security services in IPv6 networks, such as DNS, and HTTP, have become emerging security risks by analyzing 4.7M peripheries. Second, by inspecting the periphery's packet routing strategies, we present the flawed implementations of IPv6 routing protocol affecting 5.8M router devices. Attackers can exploit this common vulnerability to conduct effective routing loop attacks, inducing DoS to the ISP's and home routers with an amplification factor of \textbackslashtextbackslashgt 200. We responsibly disclose those issues to all involved vendors and ASes and discuss mitigation solutions. Our research results indicate that the security community should revisit IPv6 network strategies immediately.

Fast IPv4 scanning has made sufficient progress in network measurement and security research. However, it is infeasible to perform brute-force scanning of the IPv6 address space. We can find active IPv6 addresses through scanning candidate addresses generated by the state-of-the-art algorithms, whose probing efficiency of active IPv6 addresses, however, is still very low. In this paper, we aim to improve the probing efficiency of IPv6 addresses in two ways. Firstly, we perform a longitudinal active measurement study over four months, building a high-quality dataset called hitlist with more than 1.3 billion IPv6 addresses distributed in 45.2k BGP prefixes. Different from previous work, we probe the announced BGP prefixes using a pattern-based algorithm, which makes our dataset overcome the problems of uneven address distribution and low active rate. Secondly, we propose an efficient address generation algorithm DET, which builds a density space tree to learn high-density address regions of the seed addresses in linear time and improves the probing efficiency of active addresses. On the public hitlist and our hitlist, we compare our algorithm DET against state-of-the-art algorithms and find that DET increases the de-aliased active address ratio by 10%, and active address (including aliased addresses) ratio by 14%, by scanning 50 million addresses.

It is clear that cyber-attacks are a danger that must be addressed with great resolve, as they threaten the information infrastructure upon which we all depend. Many studies have been published expressing varying levels of success with machine learning approaches to combating cyber-attacks, but many modern studies still focus on training and evaluating with very outdated datasets containing old attacks that are no longer a threat, and also lack data on new attacks. Recent datasets like UNSW-NB15 and SANTA have been produced to address this problem. Even so, these modern datasets suffer from class imbalance, which reduces the efficacy of predictive models trained using these datasets. Herein we evaluate several pre-processing methods for addressing the class imbalance problem; using several of the most popular machine learning algorithms and a variant of UNSW-NB15 based upon the attributes from the SANTA dataset.