Biblio

Wireless sensor-actuator networks (WSANs) are being adopted in process industries because of their advantages in lowering deployment and maintenance costs. While there has been significant theoretical advancement in networked control design, only limited empirical results that combine control design with realistic WSAN standards exist. This paper presents a cyber-physical case study on a wireless process control system that integrates state-of-the-art network control design and a WSAN based on the WirelessHART standard. The case study systematically explores the interactions between wireless routing and control design in the process control plant. The network supports alternative routing strategies, including single-path source routing and multi-path graph routing. To mitigate the effect of data loss in the WSAN, the control design integrates an observer based on an Extended Kalman Filter with a model predictive controller and an actuator buffer of recent control inputs. We observe that sensing and actuation can have different levels of resilience to packet loss under this network control design. We then propose a flexible routing approach where the routing strategy for sensing and actuation can be configured separately. Finally, we show that an asymmetric routing configuration with different routing strategies for sensing and actuation can effectively improve control performance under significant packet loss. Our results highlight the importance of co-joining the design of wireless network protocols and control in wireless control systems.

This paper presents a six-layer Aluminum Industry 4.0 architecture for the aluminum production and full lifecycle supply chain management. It integrates a series of innovative technologies, including the IoT sensing physical system, industrial cloud platform for data management, model-driven and big data driven analysis & decision making, standardization & securitization intelligent control and management, as well as visual monitoring and backtracking process etc. The main relevant control models are studied. The applications of real-time accurate perception & intelligent decision technology in the aluminum electrolytic industry are introduced.

In this paper, a new method for quantitative evaluation of the security of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) is proposed. The proposed method models the different classes of adversarial attacks against CPSs, including cross-domain attacks, i.e., cyber-to-cyber and cyber-to-physical attacks. It also takes the secondary consequences of attacks on CPSs into consideration. The intrusion process of attackers has been modeled using attack graph and the consequence estimation process of the attack has been investigated using process model. The security attributes and the special parameters involved in the security analysis of CPSs, have been identified and considered. The quantitative evaluation has been done using the probability of attacks, time-to-shutdown of the system and security risks. The validation phase of the proposed model is performed as a case study by applying it to a boiling water power plant and estimating the suitable security measures.

Content delivery such as P2P or video streaming generates the main part of the Internet traffic and Content Centric Network (CCN) appears as an appropriate architecture to satisfy the user needs. However, the lack of scalable routing scheme is one of the main obstacles that slows down a large deployment of CCN at an Internet-scale. In this paper we propose to use the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm to decouple data plane and control plane and present SRSC, a new routing scheme for CCN. Our solution is a clean-slate approach using only CCN messages and the SDN paradigm. We implemented our solution into the NS-3 simulator and perform simulations of our proposal. SRSC shows better performances than the flooding scheme used by default in CCN: it reduces the number of messages, while still improves CCN caching performances.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) which among others are comprised of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) are used to control industrial processes. ICS have now been connected to other Information Technology (IT) systems and have as a result become vulnerable to Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). APTs are targeted attacks that use zero-day attacks to attack systems. Current ICS security mechanisms fail to deter APTs from infiltrating ICS. An analysis of possible solutions to deter APTs was done. This paper proposes the use of Artificial Immune Systems to secure ICS from APTs.

Critical Infrastructure represents the basic facilities, services and installations necessary for functioning of a community, such as water, power lines, transportation, or communication systems. Any act or practice that causes a real-time Critical Infrastructure System to impair its normal function and performance will have debilitating impact on security and economy, with direct implication on the society. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system is a control system which is widely used in Critical Infrastructure System to monitor and control industrial processes autonomously. As SCADA architecture relies on computers, networks, applications and programmable controllers, it is more vulnerable to security threats/attacks. Traditional SCADA communication protocols such as IEC 60870, DNP3, IEC 61850, or Modbus did not provide any security services. Newer standards such as IEC 62351 and AGA-12 offer security features to handle the attacks on SCADA system. However there are performance issues with the cryptographic solutions of these specifications when applied to SCADA systems. This research is aimed at improving the performance of SCADA security standards by employing NTRU, a faster and light-weight NTRU public key algorithm for providing end-to-end security.

An application of two Cyber-Physical System (CPS) security countermeasures - Intelligent Checker (IC) and Cross-correlator - for enhancing CPS safety and achieving required CPS safety integrity level is presented. ICs are smart sensors aimed at detecting attacks in CPS and alerting the human operators. Cross-correlator is an anomaly detection technique for detecting deception attacks. We show how ICs could be implemented at three different CPS safety protection layers to maintain CPS in a safe state. In addition, we combine ICs with the cross-correlator technique to assure high probability of failure detection. Performance simulations show that a combination of these two security countermeasures is effective in detecting and mitigating CPS failures, including catastrophic failures.
 

Security is a major challenge preventing wide deployment of the smart grid technology. Typically, the classical power grid is protected with a set of isolated security tools applied to individual grid components and layers ignoring their cross-layer interaction. Such an approach does not address the smart grid security requirements because usually intricate attacks are cross-layer exploiting multiple vulnerabilities at various grid layers and domains. We advance a conceptual layering model of the smart grid and a high-level overview of a security framework, termed CyNetPhy, towards enabling cross-layer security of the smart grid. CyNetPhy tightly integrates and coordinates between three interrelated, and highly cooperative real-time security systems crossing section various layers of the grid cyber and physical domains to simultaneously address the grid's operational and security requirements. In this article, we present in detail the physical security layer (PSL) in CyNetPhy. We describe an attack scenario raising the emerging hardware Trojan threat in process control systems (PCSes) and its novel PSL resolution leveraging the model predictive control principles. Initial simulation results illustrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the PSL.