Post-quantum Security Using Channel Noise
Title | Post-quantum Security Using Channel Noise |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2018 |
Authors | Sharifian, Setareh, Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh, Lin, Fuchun |
Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Publisher | ACM |
Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-5693-0 |
Keywords | composability, control theory, finite-length regime, Human Behavior, information theoretic security, information-theoretic security, Metrics, physical layer security, physical-layer security, post-quantum security, pubcrawl, Resiliency, security, sensor security, wiretap channel |
Abstract | Post-quantum secure communication has attracted much interest in recent years. Known computationally secure post-quantum key agreement protocols are resource intensive for small devices. These devices may need to securely send frequent short messages, for example to report the measurement of a sensor. Secure communication using physical assumptions provides information-theoretic security (and so quantum-safe) with small computational over-head. Security and efficiency analysis of these systems however is asymptotic. In this poster we consider two secure message communication systems, and derive and compare their security and efficiency for finite length messages. Our results show that these systems indeed provide an attractive alternative for post-quantum security. |
URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3243734.3278517 |
DOI | 10.1145/3243734.3278517 |
Citation Key | sharifian_post-quantum_2018 |