Visible to the public Post-quantum Security Using Channel Noise

TitlePost-quantum Security Using Channel Noise
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsSharifian, Setareh, Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh, Lin, Fuchun
Conference NameProceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-5693-0
Keywordscomposability, control theory, finite-length regime, Human Behavior, information theoretic security, information-theoretic security, Metrics, physical layer security, physical-layer security, post-quantum security, pubcrawl, Resiliency, security, sensor security, wiretap channel
Abstract

Post-quantum secure communication has attracted much interest in recent years. Known computationally secure post-quantum key agreement protocols are resource intensive for small devices. These devices may need to securely send frequent short messages, for example to report the measurement of a sensor. Secure communication using physical assumptions provides information-theoretic security (and so quantum-safe) with small computational over-head. Security and efficiency analysis of these systems however is asymptotic. In this poster we consider two secure message communication systems, and derive and compare their security and efficiency for finite length messages. Our results show that these systems indeed provide an attractive alternative for post-quantum security.

URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3243734.3278517
DOI10.1145/3243734.3278517
Citation Keysharifian_post-quantum_2018