Visible to the public A New Three Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol Which Is Defiant towards Password Guessing Attack

TitleA New Three Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol Which Is Defiant towards Password Guessing Attack
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsNag, Soumyajit, Banerjee, Subhasish, Sen, Srijon
Conference Name2019 International Conference on Automation, Computational and Technology Management (ICACTM)
ISBN Number978-1-5386-8010-0
Keywordsaccurate guess, authentication, Bio-Hash, common session secret key, cryptographic key agreement protocol, cryptographic protocols, Encryption, Human Behavior, human factors, insecure channel, key agreement protocol, lost smart card, message authentication, Metrics, new three party authenticated key agreement protocol, off-line password guessing attack, password, Password authentication, Password Guessing Attacks, password related attacks, private key cryptography, protocol vulnerable, Protocols, pubcrawl, Scalability, Servers, side channel attacks, Smart card, smart cards, Tamper resistance, tampered resistance property, telecommunication security, transaction secret values
Abstract

In order to develop a `common session secret key' though the insecure channel, cryptographic Key Agreement Protocol plays a major role. Many researchers' cryptographic protocol uses smart card as a medium to store transaction secret values. The tampered resistance property of smart card is unable to defend the secret values from side channel attacks. It means a lost smart card is an easy target for any attacker. Though password authentication helps the protocol to give secrecy but on-line as well as off-line password guessing attack can make the protocol vulnerable. The concerned paper manifested key agreement protocol based on three party authenticated key agreement protocol to defend all password related attacks. The security analysis of our paper has proven that the accurate guess of the password of a legitimate user will not help the adversary to generate a common session key.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8776744
DOI10.1109/ICACTM.2019.8776744
Citation Keynag_new_2019