| Title | Cryptanalysis of a One-Time Code-Based Digital Signature Scheme |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2019 |
| Authors | Santini, Paolo, Baldi, Marco, Chiaraluce, Franco |
| Conference Name | 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) |
| Date Published | jul |
| Keywords | attack complexity, code-based cryptography, Complexity theory, cryptanalysis, cryptography, Decoding, digital signatures, Hamming weight, information set decoding, key recovery attack, one-time code-based digital signature scheme, pubcrawl, public key cryptography, Resiliency, Scalability, Secret key, statistical analysis |
| Abstract | We consider a one-time digital signature scheme recently proposed by Persichetti and show that a successful key recovery attack can be mounted with limited complexity. The attack we propose exploits a single signature intercepted by the attacker, and relies on a statistical analysis performed over such a signature, followed by information set decoding. We assess the attack complexity and show that a full recovery of the secret key can be performed with a work factor that is far below the claimed security level. The efficiency of the attack is motivated by the sparsity of the signature, which leads to a significant information leakage about the secret key. |
| DOI | 10.1109/ISIT.2019.8849244 |
| Citation Key | santini_cryptanalysis_2019 |
Cryptanalysis of a One-Time Code-Based Digital Signature Scheme