Visible to the public Cyber Mutual Assured Destruction as a System of Systems and the Implications for System Design

TitleCyber Mutual Assured Destruction as a System of Systems and the Implications for System Design
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsStraub, Jeremy
Conference Name2019 14th Annual Conference System of Systems Engineering (SoSE)
Date Published04 July 2019
PublisherIEEE
ISBN Number978-1-7281-0457-7
Keywordscyber attack mutual assured destruction scenario, cyber mutual assured destruction, cyber warfare, cybersecurity, destructive capability, deterrence, enemy attack, Human Behavior, mutual assured destruction, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, security of data, system design, system of systems, systems analysis
Abstract

Mutual assured destruction is a Cold War era principle of deterrence through causing your enemy to fear that you can destroy them to at least the same extent that they can destroy you. It is based on the threat of retaliation and requires systems that can either be triggered after an enemy attack is launched and before the destructive capability is destroyed or systems that can survive an initial attack and be launched in response. During the Cold War, the weapons of mutual assured destructions were nuclear. However, with the incredible reliance on computers for everything from power generation control to banking to agriculture logistics, a cyber attack mutual assured destruction scenario is plausible. This paper presents this concept and considers the deterrent need, to prevent such a crippling attack from ever being launched, from a system of systems perspective.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8753834
DOI10.1109/SYSOSE.2019.8753834
Citation Keystraub_cyber_2019