The Browsers Strike Back: Countering Cryptojacking and Parasitic Miners on the Web
Title | The Browsers Strike Back: Countering Cryptojacking and Parasitic Miners on the Web |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2019 |
Authors | Tahir, Rashid, Durrani, Sultan, Ahmed, Faizan, Saeed, Hammas, Zaffar, Fareed, Ilyas, Saqib |
Conference Name | IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications |
Date Published | May 2019 |
Publisher | IEEE |
ISBN Number | 978-1-7281-0515-4 |
Keywords | browser code, browser cryptojacking, browser extension, Browsers, Computer hacking, countering cryptojacking, covert mining operations, cryptocurrency, cryptocurrency market, cryptography, cryptojacking, data mining, exploitative exercise, Hardware, hardware-assisted profiling, heavily obfuscated code, Human Behavior, human factors, learning (artificial intelligence), Metrics, mining code, mining prevention plug-ins, online front-ends, parasitic miners, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, stealthy mining operations, under-the-hood practices, Web sites |
Abstract | With the recent boom in the cryptocurrency market, hackers have been on the lookout to find novel ways of commandeering users' machine for covert and stealthy mining operations. In an attempt to expose such under-the-hood practices, this paper explores the issue of browser cryptojacking, whereby miners are secretly deployed inside browser code without the knowledge of the user. To this end, we analyze the top 50k websites from Alexa and find a noticeable percentage of sites that are indulging in this exploitative exercise often using heavily obfuscated code. Furthermore, mining prevention plug-ins, such as NoMiner, fail to flag such cleverly concealed instances. Hence, we propose a machine learning solution based on hardware-assisted profiling of browser code in real-time. A fine-grained micro-architectural footprint allows us to classify mining applications with \textbackslashtextgreater99% accuracy and even flags them if the mining code has been heavily obfuscated or encrypted. We build our own browser extension and show that it outperforms other plug-ins. The proposed design has negligible overhead on the user's machine and works for all standard off-the-shelf CPUs. |
URL | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8737360 |
DOI | 10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737360 |
Citation Key | tahir_browsers_2019 |
- heavily obfuscated code
- Web sites
- under-the-hood practices
- stealthy mining operations
- Resiliency
- resilience
- pubcrawl
- parasitic miners
- online front-ends
- mining prevention plug-ins
- mining code
- Metrics
- learning (artificial intelligence)
- Human Factors
- Human behavior
- browser code
- hardware-assisted profiling
- Hardware
- exploitative exercise
- Data mining
- cryptojacking
- Cryptography
- cryptocurrency market
- cryptocurrency
- covert mining operations
- countering cryptojacking
- Computer hacking
- Browsers
- browser extension
- browser cryptojacking