Visible to the public RSGX: Defeating SGX Side Channel Attack with Return Oriented Programming

TitleRSGX: Defeating SGX Side Channel Attack with Return Oriented Programming
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2021
AuthorsJinhui, Yuan, Hongwei, Zhou, Laisun, Zhang
Conference Name2021 IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computer Applications (ICAICA)
Date Publishedjun
Keywordscomposability, Conferences, data privacy, human factors, Loading, Programming, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, return oriented programming, Return Oriented Programming (ROP), ROP, rop attacks, Runtime, Scalability, Semantics, SGX, side channel attack, side-channel attacks
AbstractIntel SGX provides a new method to protect software privacy data, but it faces the security risk of side channel attack. In our opinion, SGX side channel attack depend on the implicit mapping between control flow and data flow to infer privacy data indirectly with control flow. For this reason, we propose code reuse to construct dynamic control flow software. In this method, by loading a large number of related gadgets in advance, the software reset the software control data according to the original software semantics at runtime, so that the software control flow can change dynamically heavily. Based on code reuse, we make the software control flow change dynamically, and the mapping between control flow and data flow more complex and difficult to determine, which can increase the difficulty of SGX side channel attack.
DOI10.1109/ICAICA52286.2021.9498147
Citation Keyjinhui_rsgx_2021