There is an increased research trend towards the application of distributed control algorithms for network power system control. We analyze the vulnerability of these distributed control algorithms to a potential attack on the communication network. We show that that the decentralized load-side control algorithm for frequency regulation in power system is fragile to communication channel uncertainty. We also propose an optimization-based framework for the design of distributed load-side control algorithm robust to communication channel uncertainty.
FORCES is designed to help protect the nation's critical infrastructure from attack and to ensure its robust, secure and efficient operation. Specifically, FORCES aims to increase the resilience of large-scale networked cyber-physical systems (CPS) in the key areas of energy delivery, transportation, and energy management in buildings.
We developed a systematic analytical and computational framework for the vulnerability analysis and mitigation of data integrity attacks on Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) employed for wide area monitoring and control of power system. The analytical framework is based on the stability theory of stochastic dynamical system and it allows one to systematically determine the PMUs most critical to power network security.
