Biblio
The electrical power system is the backbone of our nations critical infrastructure. It has been designed to withstand single component failures based on a set of reliability metrics which have proven acceptable during normal operating conditions. However, in recent years there has been an increasing frequency of extreme weather events. Many have resulted in widespread long-term power outages, proving reliability metrics do not provide adequate energy security. As a result, researchers have focused their efforts resilience metrics to ensure efficient operation of power systems during extreme events. A resilient system has the ability to resist, adapt, and recover from disruptions. Therefore, resilience has demonstrated itself as a promising concept for currently faced challenges in power distribution systems. In this work, we propose an operational resilience metric for modern power distribution systems. The metric is based on the aggregation of system assets adaptive capacity in real and reactive power. This metric gives information to the magnitude and duration of a disturbance the system can withstand. We demonstrate resilience metric in a case study under normal operation and during a power contingency on a microgrid. In the future, this information can be used by operators to make more informed decisions based on system resilience in an effort to prevent power outages.
Recent technological advancements have enabled proliferated use of small embedded and IoT devices for collecting, processing, and transferring the security-critical information and user data. This exponential use has acted as a catalyst in the recent growth of sophisticated attacks such as the replay, man-in-the-middle, and malicious code modification to slink, leak, tweak or exploit the security-critical information in malevolent activities. Therefore, secure communication and software state assurance (at run-time and boot-time) of the device has emerged as open security problems. Furthermore, these devices need to have an appropriate recovery mechanism to bring them back to the known-good operational state. Previous researchers have demonstrated independent methods for attack detection and safeguard. However, the majority of them lack in providing onboard system recovery and secure communication techniques. To bridge this gap, this manuscript proposes SRACARE - a framework that utilizes the custom lightweight, secure communication protocol that performs remote/local attestation, and secure boot with an onboard resilience recovery mechanism to protect the devices from the above-mentioned attacks. The prototype employs an efficient lightweight, low-power 32-bit RISC-V processor, secure communication protocol, code authentication, and resilience engine running on the Artix 7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board. This work presents the performance evaluation and state-of-the-art comparison results, which shows promising resilience to attacks and demonstrate the novel protection mechanism with onboard recovery. The framework achieves these with only 8% performance overhead and a very small increase in hardware-software footprint.
Machine learning algorithms used to detect attacks are limited by the fact that they cannot incorporate the back-ground knowledge that an analyst has. This limits their suitability in detecting new attacks. Reinforcement learning is different from traditional machine learning algorithms used in the cybersecurity domain. Compared to traditional ML algorithms, reinforcement learning does not need a mapping of the input-output space or a specific user-defined metric to compare data points. This is important for the cybersecurity domain, especially for malware detection and mitigation, as not all problems have a single, known, correct answer. Often, security researchers have to resort to guided trial and error to understand the presence of a malware and mitigate it.In this paper, we incorporate prior knowledge, represented as Cybersecurity Knowledge Graphs (CKGs), to guide the exploration of an RL algorithm to detect malware. CKGs capture semantic relationships between cyber-entities, including that mined from open source. Instead of trying out random guesses and observing the change in the environment, we aim to take the help of verified knowledge about cyber-attack to guide our reinforcement learning algorithm to effectively identify ways to detect the presence of malicious filenames so that they can be deleted to mitigate a cyber-attack. We show that such a guided system outperforms a base RL system in detecting malware.
This paper presents a new micro-architectural vulnerability on the power management units of modern computers which creates an electromagnetic-based side-channel. The key observations that enable us to discover this sidechannel are: 1) in an effort to manage and minimize power consumption, modern microprocessors have a number of possible operating modes (power states) in which various sub-systems of the processor are powered down, 2) for some of the transitions between power states, the processor also changes the operating mode of the voltage regulator module (VRM) that supplies power to the affected sub-system, and 3) the electromagnetic (EM) emanations from the VRM are heavily dependent on its operating mode. As a result, these state-dependent EM emanations create a side-channel which can potentially reveal sensitive information about the current state of the processor and, more importantly, the programs currently being executed. To demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting this vulnerability, we create a covert channel by utilizing the changes in the processor's power states. We show how such a covert channel can be leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive information from a secured and completely isolated (air-gapped) laptop system by placing a compact, inexpensive receiver in proximity to that system. To further show the severity of this attack, we also demonstrate how such a covert channel can be established when the target and the receiver are several meters away from each other, including scenarios where the receiver and the target are separated by a wall. Compared to the state-of-the-art, the proposed covert channel has \textbackslashtextgreater3x higher bit-rate. Finally, to demonstrate that this new vulnerability is not limited to being used as a covert channel, we demonstrate how it can be used for attacks such as keystroke logging.
Nowadays, there is a flood of data such as naked body photos and child pornography, which is making people bloodless. In addition, people also distribute drugs through unknown dark channels. In particular, most transactions are being made through the Deep Web, the dark path. “Deep Web refers to an encrypted network that is not detected on search engine like Google etc. Users must use Tor to visit sites on the dark web” [4]. In other words, the Dark Web uses Tor's encryption client. Therefore, users can visit multiple sites on the dark Web, but not know the initiator of the site. In this paper, we propose the key idea based on the current status of such crimes and a crime information visual system for Deep Web has been developed. The status of deep web is analyzed and data is visualized using Java. It is expected that the program will help more efficient management and monitoring of crime in unknown web such as deep web, torrent etc.
Safety and security of complex critical infrastructures is very important for economic, environmental and social reasons. The interdisciplinary and inter-system dependencies within these infrastructures introduce difficulties in the safety and security design. Late discovery of safety and security design weaknesses can lead to increased costs, additional system complexity, ineffective mitigation measures and delays to the deployment of the systems. Traditionally, safety and security assessments are handled using different methods and tools, although some concepts are very similar, by specialized experts in different disciplines and are performed at different system design life-cycle phases.The methodology proposed in this paper supports a concurrent safety and security Defense in Depth (DiD) assessment at an early design phase and it is designed to handle safety and security at a high level and not focus on specific practical technologies. It is assumed that regardless of the perceived level of security defenses in place, a determined (motivated, capable and/or well-funded) attacker can find a way to penetrate a layer of defense. While traditional security research focuses on removing vulnerabilities and increasing the difficulty to exploit weaknesses, our higher-level approach focuses on how the attacker's reach can be limited and to increase the system's capability for detection, identification, mitigation and tracking. The proposed method can assess basic safety and security DiD design principles like Redundancy, Physical separation, Functional isolation, Facility functions, Diversity, Defense lines/Facility and Computer Security zones, Safety classes/Security Levels, Safety divisions and physical gates/conduits (as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and international standards) concurrently and provide early feedback to the system engineer. A prototype tool is developed that can parse the exported project file of the interdisciplinary model. Based on a set of safety and security attributes, the tool is able to assess aspects of the safety and security DiD capabilities of the design. Its results can be used to identify errors, improve the design and cut costs before a formal human expert inspection. The tool is demonstrated on a case study of an early conceptual design of a complex system of a nuclear power plant.
The advanced persistent threat (APT) landscape has been studied without quantifiable data, for which indicators of compromise (IoC) may be uniformly analyzed, replicated, or used to support security mechanisms. This work culminates extensive academic and industry APT analysis, not as an incremental step in existing approaches to APT detection, but as a new benchmark of APT related opportunity. We collect 15,259 APT IoC hashes, retrieving subsequent sandbox execution logs across 41 different file types. This work forms an initial focus on Windows-based threat detection. We present a novel Windows APT executable (APT-EXE) dataset, made available to the research community. Manual and statistical analysis of the APT-EXE dataset is conducted, along with supporting feature analysis. We draw upon repeat and common APT paths access, file types, and operations within the APT-EXE dataset to generalize APT execution footprints. A baseline case analysis successfully identifies a majority of 117 of 152 live APT samples from campaigns across 2018 and 2019.