Biblio

Filters: Author is Zhu, W.  [Clear All Filters]
2019-01-31
Chang, B., Zhang, F., Chen, B., Li, Y., Zhu, W., Tian, Y., Wang, Z., Ching, A..  2018.  MobiCeal: Towards Secure and Practical Plausibly Deniable Encryption on Mobile Devices. 2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :454–465.

We introduce MobiCeal, the first practical Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) system for mobile devices that can defend against strong coercive multi-snapshot adversaries, who may examine the storage medium of a user's mobile device at different points of time and force the user to decrypt data. MobiCeal relies on "dummy write" to obfuscate the differences between multiple snapshots of storage medium due to existence of hidden data. By incorporating PDE in block layer, MobiCeal supports a broad deployment of any block-based file systems on mobile devices. More importantly, MobiCeal is secure against side channel attacks which pose a serious threat to existing PDE schemes. A proof of concept implementation of MobiCeal is provided on an LG Nexus 4 Android phone using Android 4.2.2. It is shown that the performance of MobiCeal is significantly better than prior PDE systems against multi-snapshot adversaries.

2019-02-08
Wang, M., Zhu, W., Yan, S., Wang, Q..  2018.  SoundAuth: Secure Zero-Effort Two-Factor Authentication Based on Audio Signals. 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS). :1-9.

Two-factor authentication (2FA) popularly works by verifying something the user knows (a password) and something she possesses (a token, popularly instantiated with a smart phone). Conventional 2FA systems require extra interaction like typing a verification code, which is not very user-friendly. For improved user experience, recent work aims at zero-effort 2FA, in which a smart phone placed close to a computer (where the user enters her username/password into a browser to log into a server) automatically assists with the authentication. To prove her possession of the smart phone, the user needs to prove the phone is on the login spot, which reduces zero-effort 2FA to co-presence detection. In this paper, we propose SoundAuth, a secure zero-effort 2FA mechanism based on (two kinds of) ambient audio signals. SoundAuth looks for signs of proximity by having the browser and the smart phone compare both their surrounding sounds and certain unpredictable near-ultrasounds; if significant distinguishability is found, SoundAuth rejects the login request. For the ambient signals comparison, we regard it as a classification problem and employ a machine learning technique to analyze the audio signals. Experiments with real login attempts show that SoundAuth not only is comparable to existent schemes concerning utility, but also outperforms them in terms of resilience to attacks. SoundAuth can be easily deployed as it is readily supported by most smart phones and major browsers.