Biblio
In cloud computing, computationally weak users are always willing to outsource costly computations to a cloud, and at the same time they need to check the correctness of the result provided by the cloud. Such activities motivate the occurrence of verifiable computation (VC). Recently, Parno, Raykova and Vaikuntanathan showed any VC protocol can be constructed from an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for a same class of functions. In this paper, we propose two practical and efficient semi-adaptively secure key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) schemes with constant-size ciphertexts. The semi-adaptive security requires that the adversary designates the challenge attribute set after it receives public parameters but before it issues any secret key query, which is stronger than selective security guarantee. Our first construction deals with small universe while the second one supports large universe. Both constructions employ the technique underlying the prime-order instantiation of nested dual system groups, which are based on the \$d\$-linear assumption including SXDH and DLIN assumptions. In order to evaluate the performance, we implement our ABE schemes using \$\textbackslashtextsf\Python\\$ language in Charm. Compared with previous KP-ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts, our constructions achieve shorter ciphertext and secret key sizes, and require low computation costs, especially under the SXDH assumption.
In cloud computing, computationally weak users are always willing to outsource costly computations to a cloud, and at the same time they need to check the correctness of the result provided by the cloud. Such activities motivate the occurrence of verifiable computation (VC). Recently, Parno, Raykova and Vaikuntanathan showed any VC protocol can be constructed from an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for a same class of functions. In this paper, we propose two practical and efficient semi-adaptively secure key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) schemes with constant-size ciphertexts. The semi-adaptive security requires that the adversary designates the challenge attribute set after it receives public parameters but before it issues any secret key query, which is stronger than selective security guarantee. Our first construction deals with small universe while the second one supports large universe. Both constructions employ the technique underlying the prime-order instantiation of nested dual system groups, which are based on the \$d\$-linear assumption including SXDH and DLIN assumptions. In order to evaluate the performance, we implement our ABE schemes using \$\textbackslashtextsf\Python\\$ language in Charm. Compared with previous KP-ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts, our constructions achieve shorter ciphertext and secret key sizes, and require low computation costs, especially under the SXDH assumption.
The recent growth of anonymous social network services – such as 4chan, Whisper, and Yik Yak – has brought online anonymity into the spotlight. For these services to function properly, the integrity of user anonymity must be preserved. If an attacker can determine the physical location from where an anonymous message was sent, then the attacker can potentially use side information (for example, knowledge of who lives at the location) to de-anonymize the sender of the message. In this paper, we investigate whether the popular anonymous social media application Yik Yak is susceptible to localization attacks, thereby putting user anonymity at risk. The problem is challenging because Yik Yak application does not provide information about distances between user and message origins or any other message location information. We provide a comprehensive data collection and supervised machine learning methodology that does not require any reverse engineering of the Yik Yak protocol, is fully automated, and can be remotely run from anywhere. We show that we can accurately predict the locations of messages up to a small average error of 106 meters. We also devise an experiment where each message emanates from one of nine dorm colleges on the University of California Santa Cruz campus. We are able to determine the correct dorm college that generated each message 100\textbackslash% of the time.