Biblio
Despite the latest initiatives and research efforts to increase user privacy in digital scenarios, identity-related cybercrimes such as identity theft, wrong identity or user transactions surveillance are growing. In particular, blanket surveillance that might be potentially accomplished by Identity Providers (IdPs) contradicts the data minimization principle laid out in GDPR. Hence, user movements across Service Providers (SPs) might be tracked by malicious IdPs that become a central dominant entity, as well as a single point of failure in terms of privacy and security, putting users at risk when compromised. To cope with this issue, the OLYMPUS H2020 EU project is devising a truly privacy-preserving, yet user-friendly, and distributed identity management system that addresses the data minimization challenge in both online and offline scenarios. Thus, OLYMPUS divides the role of the IdP among various authorities by relying on threshold cryptography, thereby preventing user impersonation and surveillance from malicious or nosy IdPs. This paper overviews the OLYMPUS framework, including requirements considered, the proposed architecture, a series of use cases as well as the privacy analysis from the legal point of view.
Cyber physical systems (CPS) is a dominant technology in today's world due to its vast variety of applications. But in recent times, the alarmingly increasing breach of privacy and security in CPS is a matter of grave concern. Security and trust of CPS has become the need of the hour. Hardware Trojans are one such a malicious attack which compromises on the security of the CPS by changing its functionality or denial of services or leaking important information. This paper proposes the detection of Hardware Trojans at the system level in AES-256 decryption algorithm implemented in Atmel XMega Controller (Target Board) using a combination of side-channel power analysis and machine learning. Power analysis is done with help of ChipWhisperer-Lite board. The power traces of the golden algorithm (Hardware Trojan free) and Hardware Trojan infected algorithms are obtained and used to train the machine learning model using the 80/20 rule. The proposed machine learning model obtained an accuracy of 97%-100% for all the Trojans inserted.
The regularity of devastating cyber-attacks has made cybersecurity a grand societal challenge. Many cybersecurity professionals are closely examining the international Dark Web to proactively pinpoint potential cyber threats. Despite its potential, the Dark Web contains hundreds of thousands of non-English posts. While machine translation is the prevailing approach to process non-English text, applying MT on hacker forum text results in mistranslations. In this study, we draw upon Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM), Cross-Lingual Knowledge Transfer (CLKT), and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) principles to design a novel Adversarial CLKT (A-CLKT) approach. A-CLKT operates on untranslated text to retain the original semantics of the language and leverages the collective knowledge about cyber threats across languages to create a language invariant representation without any manual feature engineering or external resources. Three experiments demonstrate how A-CLKT outperforms state-of-the-art machine learning, deep learning, and CLKT algorithms in identifying cyber-threats in French and Russian forums.
The existing anonymized differential privacy model adopts a unified anonymity method, ignoring the difference of personal privacy, which may lead to the problem of excessive or insufficient protection of the original data [1]. Therefore, this paper proposes a personalized k-anonymity model for tuples (PKA) and proposes a differential privacy data publishing algorithm (DPPA) based on personalized anonymity, firstly based on the tuple personality factor set by the user in the original data set. The values are classified and the corresponding privacy protection relevance is calculated. Then according to the tuple personality factor classification value, the data set is clustered by clustering method with different anonymity, and the quasi-identifier attribute of each cluster is aggregated and noise-added to realize anonymized differential privacy; finally merge the subset to get the data set that meets the release requirements. In this paper, the correctness of the algorithm is analyzed theoretically, and the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed algorithm are verified by comparison with similar algorithms.
Bluetooth Classic (BT) remains the de facto connectivity technology in car stereo systems, wireless headsets, laptops, and a plethora of wearables, especially for applications that require high data rates, such as audio streaming, voice calling, tethering, etc. Unlike in Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), where address randomization is a feature available to manufactures, BT addresses are not randomized because they are largely believed to be immune to tracking attacks. We analyze the design of BT and devise a robust de-anonymization technique that hinges on the apparently benign information leaking from frame encoding, to infer a piconet's clock, hopping sequence, and ultimately the Upper Address Part (UAP) of the master device's physical address, which are never exchanged in clear. Used together with the Lower Address Part (LAP), which is present in all frames transmitted, this enables tracking of the piconet master, thereby debunking the privacy guarantees of BT. We validate this attack by developing the first Software-defined Radio (SDR) based sniffer that allows full BT spectrum analysis (79 MHz) and implements the proposed de-anonymization technique. We study the feasibility of privacy attacks with multiple testbeds, considering different numbers of devices, traffic regimes, and communication ranges. We demonstrate that it is possible to track BT devices up to 85 meters from the sniffer, and achieve more than 80% device identification accuracy within less than 1 second of sniffing and 100% detection within less than 4 seconds. Lastly, we study the identified privacy attack in the wild, capturing BT traffic at a road junction over 5 days, demonstrating that our system can re-identify hundreds of users and infer their commuting patterns.
Humans are a key part of software development, including customers, designers, coders, testers and end users. In this keynote talk I explain why incorporating human-centric issues into software engineering for next-generation applications is critical. I use several examples from our recent and current work on handling human-centric issues when engineering various `smart living' cloud- and edge-based software systems. This includes using human-centric, domain-specific visual models for non-technical experts to specify and generate data analysis applications; personality impact on aspects of software activities; incorporating end user emotions into software requirements engineering for smart homes; incorporating human usage patterns into emerging edge computing applications; visualising smart city-related data; reporting diverse software usability defects; and human-centric security and privacy requirements for smart living systems. I assess the usefulness of these approaches, highlight some outstanding research challenges, and briefly discuss our current work on new human-centric approaches to software engineering for smart living applications.