Smart I/O Modules for Mitigating Cyber-Physical Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
Title | Smart I/O Modules for Mitigating Cyber-Physical Attacks on Industrial Control Systems |
Publication Type | Journal Article |
Year of Publication | 2020 |
Authors | Pearce, Hammond, Pinisetty, Srinivas, Roop, Partha S., Kuo, Matthew M. Y., Ukil, Abhisek |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics |
Volume | 16 |
Pagination | 4659—4669 |
ISSN | 1941-0050 |
Keywords | control engineering computing, control systems, CPS, cyber-physical attacks, cyber-physical attacks mitigation, Cyber-physical systems, cyber-physical systems (CPSs), embedded control, Embedded systems, Hardware, hardware architecture, I-O Systems, i-o systems security, industrial control, industrial control systems, Industries, input-output programs, malicious attacks, Monitoring, power grid, production engineering computing, programmable controllers, programmable logic controller I/O modules, pubcrawl, real-world physical systems, Runtime, runtime enforcement, Safety, Scalability, security, security of data, smart I/O modules |
Abstract | Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are implemented in many industrial and embedded control applications. Where these systems are safety-critical, correct and safe behavior is of paramount importance. Malicious attacks on such CPSs can have far-reaching repercussions. For instance, if elements of a power grid behave erratically, physical damage and loss of life could occur. Currently, there is a trend toward increased complexity and connectivity of CPS. However, as this occurs, the potential attack vectors for these systems grow in number, increasing the risk that a given controller might become compromised. In this article, we examine how the dangers of compromised controllers can be mitigated. We propose a novel application of runtime enforcement that can secure the safety of real-world physical systems. Here, we synthesize enforcers to a new hardware architecture within programmable logic controller I/O modules to act as an effective line of defence between the cyber and the physical domains. Our enforcers prevent the physical damage that a compromised control system might be able to perform. To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we present several benchmarks, and show that the overhead for each system is extremely minimal. |
URL | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8859335 |
DOI | 10.1109/TII.2019.2945520 |
Citation Key | pearce_smart_2020 |
- input-output programs
- smart I/O modules
- security of data
- security
- Scalability
- Safety
- runtime enforcement
- Runtime
- real-world physical systems
- pubcrawl
- programmable logic controller I/O modules
- programmable controllers
- production engineering computing
- Power Grid
- Monitoring
- malicious attacks
- control engineering computing
- Industries
- Industrial Control Systems
- industrial control
- i-o systems security
- I-O Systems
- hardware architecture
- Hardware
- embedded systems
- embedded control
- cyber-physical systems (CPSs)
- cyber-physical systems
- cyber-physical attacks mitigation
- Cyber-physical attacks
- CPS
- control systems