Visible to the public Smart I/O Modules for Mitigating Cyber-Physical Attacks on Industrial Control Systems

TitleSmart I/O Modules for Mitigating Cyber-Physical Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2020
AuthorsPearce, Hammond, Pinisetty, Srinivas, Roop, Partha S., Kuo, Matthew M. Y., Ukil, Abhisek
JournalIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Volume16
Pagination4659—4669
ISSN1941-0050
Keywordscontrol engineering computing, control systems, CPS, cyber-physical attacks, cyber-physical attacks mitigation, Cyber-physical systems, cyber-physical systems (CPSs), embedded control, Embedded systems, Hardware, hardware architecture, I-O Systems, i-o systems security, industrial control, industrial control systems, Industries, input-output programs, malicious attacks, Monitoring, power grid, production engineering computing, programmable controllers, programmable logic controller I/O modules, pubcrawl, real-world physical systems, Runtime, runtime enforcement, Safety, Scalability, security, security of data, smart I/O modules
Abstract

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are implemented in many industrial and embedded control applications. Where these systems are safety-critical, correct and safe behavior is of paramount importance. Malicious attacks on such CPSs can have far-reaching repercussions. For instance, if elements of a power grid behave erratically, physical damage and loss of life could occur. Currently, there is a trend toward increased complexity and connectivity of CPS. However, as this occurs, the potential attack vectors for these systems grow in number, increasing the risk that a given controller might become compromised. In this article, we examine how the dangers of compromised controllers can be mitigated. We propose a novel application of runtime enforcement that can secure the safety of real-world physical systems. Here, we synthesize enforcers to a new hardware architecture within programmable logic controller I/O modules to act as an effective line of defence between the cyber and the physical domains. Our enforcers prevent the physical damage that a compromised control system might be able to perform. To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we present several benchmarks, and show that the overhead for each system is extremely minimal.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8859335
DOI10.1109/TII.2019.2945520
Citation Keypearce_smart_2020