Biblio
Complex CPS such as UAS got rapid development these years, but also became vulnerable to GPS spoofing, packets injection, buffer-overflow and other malicious attacks. Ensuring the behaviors of UAS always keeping secure no matter how the environment changes, would be a prospective direction for UAS security. This paper aims at presenting a reactive synthesis-based approach to implement the automatic generation of secure UAS controller. First, we study the operating mechanism of UAS and construct a high-Ievel model consisting of actuator and monitor. Besides, we analyze the security threats of UAS from the perspective of hardware, software and data transmission, and then extract the corresponding specifications of security properties with LTL formulas. Based on the UAS model and security specifications, the controller can be constructed by GR(1) synthesis algorithm, which is a two-player game process between UAV and Environment. Finally, we expand the function of LTLMoP platform to construct the automatons for controller in multi-robots system, which provides secure behavior strategies under several typical UAS attack scenarios.
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are implemented in many industrial and embedded control applications. Where these systems are safety-critical, correct and safe behavior is of paramount importance. Malicious attacks on such CPSs can have far-reaching repercussions. For instance, if elements of a power grid behave erratically, physical damage and loss of life could occur. Currently, there is a trend toward increased complexity and connectivity of CPS. However, as this occurs, the potential attack vectors for these systems grow in number, increasing the risk that a given controller might become compromised. In this article, we examine how the dangers of compromised controllers can be mitigated. We propose a novel application of runtime enforcement that can secure the safety of real-world physical systems. Here, we synthesize enforcers to a new hardware architecture within programmable logic controller I/O modules to act as an effective line of defence between the cyber and the physical domains. Our enforcers prevent the physical damage that a compromised control system might be able to perform. To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we present several benchmarks, and show that the overhead for each system is extremely minimal.
Platoon is one of cooperative driving applications where a set of vehicles can collaboratively sense each other for driving safety and traffic efficiency. However, platoon without security insurance makes the cooperative vehicles vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which may cause life-threatening accidents. In this paper, we introduce malicious attacks in platoon maneuvers. To defend against these attacks, we propose a Cyphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) based Platoon Secure Sensing scheme, named CPSS. In the CPSS, platoon key is encapsulated in the access control structure in the key distribution process, so that interference messages sending by attackers without the platoon key could be ignored. Therefore, the sensing data which contains speed and position information can be protected. In this way, speed and distance fluctuations caused by attacks can be mitigated even eliminated thereby avoiding the collisions and ensuring the overall platoon stability. Time complexity analysis shows that the CPSS is more efficient than that of the polynomial time solutions. Finally, to evaluate capabilities of the CPSS, we integrate a LTE-V2X with platoon maneuvers based on Veins platform. The evaluation results show that the CPSS outperforms the baseline algorithm by 25% in terms of distance variations.
We consider distributed Kalman filter for dynamic state estimation over wireless sensor networks. It is promising but challenging when network is under cyber attacks. Since the information exchange between nodes, the malicious attacks quickly spread across the entire network, which causing large measurement errors and even to the collapse of sensor networks. Aiming at the malicious network attack, a trust-based distributed processing frame is proposed. Which allows neighbor nodes to exchange information, and a series of trusted nodes are found using truth discovery. As a demonstration, distributed Cooperative Localization is considered, and numerical results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach by considering random, false data injection and replay attacks.
With the remarkable success of deep learning, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been applied as dominant tools to various machine learning domains. Despite this success, however, it has been found that DNNs are surprisingly vulnerable to malicious attacks; adding a small, perceptually indistinguishable perturbations to the data can easily degrade classification performance. Adversarial training is an effective defense strategy to train a robust classifier. In this work, we propose to utilize the generator to learn how to create adversarial examples. Unlike the existing approaches that create a one-shot perturbation by a deterministic generator, we propose a recursive and stochastic generator that produces much stronger and diverse perturbations that comprehensively reveal the vulnerability of the target classifier. Our experiment results on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets show that the classifier adversarially trained with our method yields more robust performance over various white-box and black-box attacks.
The Internet has gradually penetrated into the national economy, politics, culture, military, education and other fields. Due to its openness, interconnectivity and other characteristics, the Internet is vulnerable to all kinds of malicious attacks. The research uses a honeynet to collect attacker information, and proposes a network penetration recognition technology based on interactive behavior analysis. Using Sebek technology to capture the attacker's keystroke record, time series modeling of the keystroke sequences of the interaction behavior is proposed, using a Recurrent Neural Network. The attack recognition method is constructed by using Long Short-Term Memory that solves the problem of gradient disappearance, gradient explosion and long-term memory shortage in ordinary Recurrent Neural Network. Finally, the experiment verifies that the short-short time memory network has a high accuracy rate for the recognition of penetration attacks.
Due to the wide implementation of communication networks, industrial control systems are vulnerable to malicious attacks, which could cause potentially devastating results. Adversaries launch integrity attacks by injecting false data into systems to create fake events or cover up the plan of damaging the systems. In addition, the complexity and nonlinearity of control systems make it more difficult to detect attacks and defense it. Therefore, a novel security situation awareness framework based on particle filtering, which has good ability in estimating state for nonlinear systems, is proposed to provide an accuracy understanding of system situation. First, a system state estimation based on particle filtering is presented to estimate nodes state. Then, a voting scheme is introduced into hazard situation detection to identify the malicious nodes and a local estimator is constructed to estimate the actual system state by removing the identified malicious nodes. Finally, based on the estimated actual state, the actual measurements of the compromised nodes are predicted by using the situation prediction algorithm. At the end of this paper, a simulation of a continuous stirred tank is conducted to verify the efficiency of the proposed framework and algorithms.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems play a critical role in the operation of large-scale distributed industrial systems. There are many vulnerabilities in SCADA systems and inadvertent events or malicious attacks from outside as well as inside could lead to catastrophic consequences. Network-based intrusion detection is a preferred approach to provide security analysis for SCADA systems due to its less intrusive nature. Data in SCADA network traffic can be generally divided into transport, operation, and content levels. Most existing solutions only focus on monitoring and event detection of one or two levels of data, which is not enough to detect and reason about attacks in all three levels. In this paper, we develop a novel edge-based multi-level anomaly detection framework for SCADA networks named EDMAND. EDMAND monitors all three levels of network traffic data and applies appropriate anomaly detection methods based on the distinct characteristics of data. Alerts are generated, aggregated, prioritized before sent back to control centers. A prototype of the framework is built to evaluate the detection ability and time overhead of it.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), such as Water Distribution Networks (WDNs), deploy digital devices to monitor and control the behavior of physical processes. These digital devices, however, are susceptible to cyber and physical attacks, that may alter their functionality, and therefore the integrity of their measurements/actions. In practice, industrial control systems utilize simple control laws, which rely on various sensor measurements and algorithms which are expected to operate normally. To reduce the impact of a potential failure, operators may deploy redundant components; this however may not be useful, e.g., when a cyber attack at a PLC component occurs. In this work, we address the problem of reducing vulnerability to cyber-physical attacks in water distribution networks. This is achieved by augmenting the graph which describes the information flow from sensors to actuators, by adding new connections and algorithms, to increase the number of redundant cyber components. These, in turn, increase the \textitcyber-physical security level, which is defined in the present paper as the number of malicious attacks a CPS may sustain before becoming unable to satisfy the control requirements. A proof-of-concept of the approach is demonstrated over a simple WDN, with intuition on how this can be used to increase the cyber-physical security level of the system.
Modern vehicles are opening up, with wireless interfaces such as Bluetooth integrated in order to enable comfort and safety features. Furthermore a plethora of aftermarket devices introduce additional connectivity which contributes to the driving experience. This connectivity opens the vehicle to potentially malicious attacks, which could have negative consequences with regards to safety. In this paper, we survey vehicles with Bluetooth connectivity from a threat intelligence perspective to gain insight into conditions during real world driving. We do this in two ways: firstly, by examining Bluetooth implementation in vehicles and gathering information from inside the cabin, and secondly, using war-nibbling (general monitoring and scanning for nearby devices). We find that as the vehicle age decreases, the security (relatively speaking) of the Bluetooth implementation increases, but that there is still some technological lag with regards to Bluetooth implementation in vehicles. We also find that a large proportion of vehicles and aftermarket devices still use legacy pairing (and are therefore more insecure), and that these vehicles remain visible for sufficient time to mount an attack (assuming some premeditation and preparation). We demonstrate a real-world threat scenario as an example of the latter. Finally, we provide some recommendations on how the security risks we discover could be mitigated.