Biblio

As the Industrial Internet of Things (IIot) becomes more prevalent in critical application domains, ensuring security and resilience in the face of cyber-attacks is becoming an issue of paramount importance. Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures, for example, against smart water-distribution and transportation systems, pose serious threats to public health and safety. Owing to the severity of these threats, a variety of security techniques are available. However, no single technique can address the whole spectrum of cyber-attacks that may be launched by a determined and resourceful attacker. In light of this, we consider a multi-pronged approach for designing secure and resilient IIoT systems, which integrates redundancy, diversity, and hardening techniques. We introduce a framework for quantifying cyber-security risks and optimizing IIoT design by determining security investments in redundancy, diversity, and hardening. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we present a case study in water-distribution systems. Our numerical evaluation shows that integrating redundancy, diversity, and hardening can lead to reduced security risk at the same cost.

The exponential growth of information and communication technologies have caused a profound shift in the way humans engineer systems leading to the emergence of closed-loop systems involving strong integration and coordination of physical and cyber components, often referred to as cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Because of these disruptive changes, physical systems can now be attacked through cyberspace and cyberspace can be attacked through physical means. The paper considers security and resilience as system properties emerging from the intersection of system dynamics and the computing architecture. A modeling and simulation integration platform for experimentation and evaluation of resilient CPSs is presented using smart transportation systems as the application domain. Evaluation of resilience is based on attacker-defender games using simulations of sufficient fidelity. The platform integrates 1) realistic models of cyber and physical components and their interactions; 2) cyber attack models that focus on the impact of attacks to CPS behavior and operation; and 3) operational scenarios that can be used for evaluation of cybersecurity risks. Three case studies are presented to demonstrate the advantages of the platform: 1) vulnerability analysis of transportation networks to traffic signal tampering; 2) resilient sensor selection for forecasting traffic flow; and 3) resilient traffic signal control in the presence of denial-of-service attacks.

In this paper, we propose a scheme for a resilient distributed consensus problem through a set of trusted nodes within the network. Currently, algorithms that solve resilient consensus problem demand networks to have high connectivity to overrule the effects of adversaries, or require nodes to have access to some non-local information. In our scheme, we incorporate the notion of trusted nodes to guarantee distributed consensus despite any number of adversarial attacks, even in sparse networks. A subset of nodes, which are more secured against the attacks, constitute a set of trusted nodes. It is shown that the network becomes resilient against any number of attacks whenever the set of trusted nodes form a connected dominating set within the network. We also study a relationship between trusted nodes and the network robustness. Simulations are presented to illustrate and compare our scheme with the existing ones.

Distributed consensus protocols are an important class of distributed algorithms. Recently, an Adversarial Resilient Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) has been proposed which is capable to achieve consensus despite false information pro- vided by a limited number of malicious nodes. In order to withstand false information, this algorithm requires a mesh- like topology, so that multiple alternative information flow paths exist. However, these assumptions are not always valid. For instance, in Smart Grid, an emerging distributed CPS, the node connectivity is expected to resemble the scale free network topology. Especially closer to the end customer, in home and building area networks, the connectivity graph resembles a tree structure.

In this paper, we propose a Range-based Adversary Re- silient Consensus Protocol (R.ARC-P). Three aspects dis- tinguish R.ARC-P from its predecessor: This protocol op- erates on the tree topology, it distinguishes between trust- worthiness of nodes in the immediate neighborhood, and it uses a valid value range in order to reduce the number of nodes considered as outliers. R.ARC-P is capable of reach- ing global consensus among all genuine nodes in the tree if assumptions about maximal number of malicious nodes in the neighborhood hold. In the case that this assumption is wrong, it is still possible to reach Strong Partial Consensus, i.e., consensus between leafs of at least two different parents.

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to detect anoma- lous sensor readings, where each sensor’s measure- ment is predicted as a function of other sensors. We show that several common learning approaches in this context are still vulnerable to stealthy at- tacks, which carefully modify readings of compro- mised sensors to cause desired damage while re- maining undetected. Next, we model the interac- tion between the CPS defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game in which the defender chooses detection thresholds, while the attacker deploys a stealthy attack in response. We present a heuris- tic algorithm for finding an approximately optimal threshold for the defender in this game, and show that it increases system resilience to attacks without significantly increasing the false alarm rate.

Adversaries may cause significant damage to smart infrastructure using malicious attacks. To detect and mitigate these attacks before they can cause physical damage, operators can deploy anomaly detection systems (ADS), which can alarm operators to suspicious activities. However, detection thresholds of ADS need to be configured properly, as an oversensitive detector raises a prohibitively large number of false alarms, while an undersensitive detector may miss actual attacks. This is an especially challenging problem in dynamical environments, where the impact of attacks may significantly vary over time. Using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate the problem of computing optimal detection thresholds which minimize both the number of false alarms and the probability of missing actual attacks as a two-player Stackelberg security game. We provide an efficient dynamic programming-based algorithm for solving the game, thereby finding optimal detection thresholds. We analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm and show that its running time scales polynomially as the length of the time horizon of interest increases. In addition, we study the problem of finding optimal thresholds in the presence of both random faults and attacks. Finally, we evaluate our result using a case study of contamination attacks in water networks, and show that our optimal thresholds significantly outperform fixed thresholds that do not consider that the environment is dynamical.

To penetrate sensitive computer networks, attackers can use spear phishing to sidestep technical security mechanisms by exploiting the privileges of careless users. In order to maximize their success probability, attackers have to target the users that constitute the weakest links of the system. The optimal selection of these target users takes into account both the damage that can be caused by a user and the probability of a malicious e-mail being delivered to and opened by a user. Since attackers select their targets in a strategic way, the optimal mitigation of these attacks requires the defender to also personalize the e-mail filters by taking into account the users' properties. In this paper, we assume that a learned classifier is given and propose strategic per-user filtering thresholds for mitigating spear-phishing attacks. We formulate the problem of filtering targeted and non-targeted malicious e-mails as a Stackelberg security game. We characterize the optimal filtering strategies and show how to compute them in practice. Finally, we evaluate our results using two real-world datasets and demonstrate that the proposed thresholds lead to lower losses than non-strategic thresholds.

Assuring communication integrity is a central problem in security. However, overhead costs associated with cryptographic primitives used towards this end introduce significant practical implementation challenges for resource-bounded systems, such as cyber-physical systems. For example, many control systems are built on legacy components which are computationally limited but have strict timing constraints. If integrity protection is a binary decision, it may simply be infeasible to introduce into such systems; without it, however, an adversary can forge malicious messages, which can cause significant physical or financial harm. We propose a formal game-theoretic framework for optimal stochastic message authentication, providing provable integrity guarantees for resource-bounded systems based on an existing MAC scheme. We use our framework to investigate attacker deterrence, as well as optimal design of stochastic message authentication schemes when deterrence is impossible. Finally, we provide experimental results on the computational performance of our framework in practice.

In order to be resilient to attacks, a cyber-physical system (CPS) must be able to detect attacks before they can cause significant damage. To achieve this, intrusion detection systems (IDS) may be deployed, which can detect attacks and alert human operators, who can then intervene. However, the resource-constrained nature of many CPS poses a challenge, since reliable IDS can be computationally expensive. Consequently, computational nodes may not be able to perform intrusion detection continuously, which means that we have to devise a schedule for performing intrusion detection. While a uniformly random schedule may be optimal in a purely cyber system, an optimal schedule for protecting CPS must also take into account the physical properties of the system, since the set of adversarial actions and their consequences depend on the physical systems. Here, in the context of water distribution networks, we study IDS scheduling problems in two settings and under the constraints on the available battery supplies. In the first problem, the objective is to design, for a given duration of time, scheduling schemes for IDS so that the probability of detecting an attack is maximized within that duration. We propose efficient heuristic algorithms for this general problem and evaluate them on various networks. In the second problem, our objective is to design scheduling schemes for IDS so that the overall lifetime of the network is maximized while ensuring that an intruder attack is always detected. Various strategies to deal with this problem are presented and evaluated for various networks.

Starting with the seminal work by Kempe et al., a broad variety of problems, such as targeted marketing and the spread of viruses and malware, have been modeled as selecting a subset of nodes to maximize diffusion through a network. In cyber-security applications, however, a key consideration largely ignored in this literature is stealth. In particular, an attacker often has a specific target in mind, but succeeds only if the target is reached (e.g., by malware) before the malicious payload is detected and corresponding countermeasures deployed. The dual side of this problem is deployment of a limited number of monitoring units, such as cyber-forensics specialists, so as to limit the likelihood of such targeted and stealthy diffusion processes reaching their intended targets. We investigate the problem of optimal monitoring of targeted stealthy diffusion processes, and show that a number of natural variants of this problem are NP-hard to approximate. On the positive side, we show that if stealthy diffusion starts from randomly selected nodes, the defender's objective is submodular, and a fast greedy algorithm has provable approximation guarantees. In addition, we present approximation algorithms for the setting in which an attacker optimally responds to the placement of monitoring nodes by adaptively selecting the starting nodes for the diffusion process. Our experimental results show that the proposed algorithms are highly effective and scalable.

Monitoring large areas using sensors is fundamental in a number of applications, including electric power grid, traffic networks, and sensor-based pollution control systems. However, the number of sensors that can be deployed is often limited by financial or technological constraints. This problem is further complicated by the presence of strategic adversaries, who may disable some of the deployed sensors in order to impair the operator's ability to make predictions. Assuming that the operator employs a Gaussian-process-based regression model, we formulate the problem of attack-resilient sensor placement as the problem of selecting a subset from a set of possible observations, with the goal of minimizing the uncertainty of predictions. We show that both finding an optimal resilient subset and finding an optimal attack against a given subset are NP-hard problems. Since both the design and the attack problems are computationally complex, we propose efficient heuristic algorithms for solving them and present theoretical approximability results. Finally, we show that the proposed algorithms perform exceptionally well in practice using numerical results based on real-world datasets.

(No abstract.)

Complex traffic networks include a number of controlled intersections, and, commonly, multiple districts or municipalities. The result is that the overall traffic control problem is extremely complex computationally. Moreover, given that different municipalities may have distinct, non-aligned, interests, traffic light controller design is inherently decentralized, a consideration that is almost entirely absent from related literature. Both complexity and decentralization have great bearing both on the quality of the traffic network overall, as well as on its security. We consider both of these issues in a dynamic traffic network. First, we propose an effective local search algorithm to efficiently design system-wide control logic for a collection of intersections. Second, we propose a game theoretic (Stackelberg game) model of traffic network security in which an attacker can deploy denial-of-service attacks on sensors, and develop a resilient control algorithm to mitigate such threats. Finally, we propose a game theoretic model of decentralization, and investigate this model both in the context of baseline traffic network design, as well as resilient design accounting for attacks. Our methods are implemented and evaluated using a simple traffic network scenario in SUMO.

Spear-phishing attacks pose a serious threat to sensitive computer systems, since they sidestep technical security mechanisms by exploiting the carelessness of authorized users. A common way to mitigate such attacks is to use e-mail filters which block e-mails with a maliciousness score above a chosen threshold. Optimal choice of such a threshold involves a tradeoff between the risk from delivered malicious emails and the cost of blocking benign traffic. A further complicating factor is the strategic nature of an attacker, who may selectively target users offering the best value in terms of likelihood of success and resulting access privileges. Previous work on strategic threshold-selection considered a single organization choosing thresholds for all users. In reality, many organizations are potential targets of such attacks, and their incentives need not be well aligned. We therefore consider the problem of strategic threshold-selection by a collection of independent self-interested users. We characterize both Stackelberg multi-defender equilibria, corresponding to short-term strategic dynamics, as well as Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game between all users and the attacker, modeling long-term dynamics, and exhibit a polynomial-time algorithm for computing short-term (Stackelberg) equilibria. We find that while Stackelberg multi-defender equilibrium need not exist, Nash equilibrium always exists, and remarkably, both equilibria are unique and socially optimal.

Traffic signals were originally standalone hardware devices running on fixed schedules, but by now, they have evolved into complex networked systems. As a consequence, traffic signals have become susceptible to attacks through wireless interfaces or even remote attacks through the Internet. Indeed, recent studies have shown that many traffic lights deployed in practice have easily exploitable vulnerabilities, which allow an attacker to tamper with the configuration of the signal. Due to hardware-based failsafes, these vulnerabilities cannot be used to cause accidents. However, they may be used to cause disastrous traffic congestions. Building on Daganzo's well-known traffic model, we introduce an approach for evaluating vulnerabilities of transportation networks, identifying traffic signals that have the greatest impact on congestion and which, therefore, make natural targets for attacks. While we prove that finding an attack that maximally impacts congestion is NP-hard, we also exhibit a polynomial-time heuristic algorithm for computing approximately optimal attacks. We then use numerical experiments to show that our algorithm is extremely efficient in practice. Finally, we also evaluate our approach using the SUMO traffic simulator with a real-world transportation network, demonstrating vulnerabilities of this network. These simulation results extend the numerical experiments by showing that our algorithm is extremely efficient in a microsimulation model as well.

In recent years, we have seen a number of successful attacks against high-profile targets, some of which have even caused severe physical damage. These examples have shown us that resourceful and determined attackers can penetrate virtually any system, even those that are secured by the "air-gap." Consequently, in order to minimize the impact of stealthy attacks, defenders have to focus not only on strengthening the first lines of defense but also on deploying effective intrusion-detection systems. Intrusion-detection systems can play a key role in protecting sensitive computer systems since they give defenders a chance to detect and mitigate attacks before they could cause substantial losses. However, an over-sensitive intrusion-detection system, which produces a large number of false alarms, imposes prohibitively high operational costs on a defender since alarms need to be manually investigated. Thus, defenders have to strike the right balance between maximizing security and minimizing costs. Optimizing the sensitivity of intrusion detection systems is especially challenging in the case when multiple interdependent computer systems have to be defended against a strategic attacker, who can target computer systems in order to maximize losses and minimize the probability of detection. We model this scenario as an attacker-defender security game and study the problem of finding optimal intrusion detection thresholds.

— Recent experimental studies have shown that traf- fic management systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks on sensor data. This paper studies the vulnerability of fixedtime control of signalized intersections when sensors measuring traffic flow information are compromised and perturbed by an adversary. The problems are formulated by considering three malicious objectives: 1) worst-case network accumulation, which aims to destabilize the overall network as much as possible; 2) worst-case lane accumulation, which aims to cause worstcase accumulation on some target lanes; and 3) risk-averse target accumulation, which aims to reach a target accumulation by making the minimum perturbation to sensor data. The problems are solved using bilevel programming optimization methods. Finally, a case study of a real network is used to illustrate the results.

In recent years, we have seen a number of successful attacks against high-profile targets, some of which have even caused severe physical damage. These examples have shown us that resourceful and determined attackers can penetrate virtually any system, even those that are secured by the "air-gap." Consequently, in order to minimize the impact of stealthy attacks, defenders have to focus not only on strengthening the first lines of defense but also on deploying effective intrusion-detection systems. Intrusion-detection systems can play a key role in protecting sensitive computer systems since they give defenders a chance to detect and mitigate attacks before they could cause substantial losses. However, an over-sensitive intrusion-detection system, which produces a large number of false alarms, imposes prohibitively high operational costs on a defender since alarms need to be manually investigated. Thus, defenders have to strike the right balance between maximizing security and minimizing costs. Optimizing the sensitivity of intrusion detection systems is especially challenging in the case when multiple inter-dependent computer systems have to be defended against a strategic attacker, who can target computer systems in order to maximize losses and minimize the probability of detection. We model this scenario as an attacker-defender security game and study the problem of finding optimal intrusion detection thresholds.

In networked systems, monitoring devices such as sensors are typically deployed to monitor various target locations. Targets are the points in the physical space at which events of some interest, such as random faults or attacks, can occur. Most often, these devices have limited energy supplies, and they can operate for a limited duration. As a result, energyefficient monitoring of various target locations through a set of monitoring devices with limited energy supplies is a crucial problem in networked systems. In this paper, we study optimal scheduling of monitoring devices to maximize network coverage for detecting and isolating events on targets for a given network lifetime. The monitoring devices considered could remain active only for a fraction of the overall network lifetime. We formulate the problem of scheduling of monitoring devices as a graph labeling problem, which unlike other existing solutions, allows us to directly utilize the underlying network structure to explore the trade-off between coverage and network lifetime. In this direction, first we propose a greedy heuristic to solve the graph labeling problem, and then provide a game-theoretic solution to achieve optimal graph labeling. Moreover, the proposed setup can be used to simultaneously solve the scheduling and placement of monitoring devices, which yields improved performance as compared to separately solving the placement and scheduling problems. Finally, we illustrate our results on various networks, including real-world water distribution networks.

Most existing models of Stackelberg security games ignore the underlying topology of the space in which targets and defence resources are located. As a result, allocation of resources is restricted to a discrete collection of exogenously defined targets. However, in many practical security settings, defense resources can be located on a continuous plane. Better defense solutions could therefore be potentially achieved by placing resources in a space outside of actual targets (e.g., between targets). To address this limitation, we propose a model called Security Game on a Plane (SGP) in which targets are distributed on a 2-dimensional plane, and security resources, to be allocated on the same plane, protect targets within a certain effective distance. We investigate the algorithmic aspects of SGP. We find that computing a strong Stackelberg equilibrium of an SGP is NP-hard even for zerosum games, and these are inapproximable in general. On the positive side, we find an exact solution technique for general SGPs based on an existing approach, and develop a PTAS (polynomial-time approximation scheme) for zero-sum SGP to more fundamentally overcome the computational obstacle. Our experiments demonstrate the value of considering SGP and effectiveness of our algorithms.

We study a dataset of billions of program binary files that appeared on 100 million computers over the course of 12 months, discovering that 94% of these files were present on a single machine. Though malware polymorphism is one cause for the large number of singleton files, additional factors also contribute to polymorphism, given that the ratio of benign to malicious singleton files is 80:1. The huge number of benign singletons makes it challenging to reliably identify the minority of malicious singletons. We present a large-scale study of the properties, characteristics, and distribution of benign and malicious singleton files. We leverage the insights from this study to build a classifier based purely on static features to identify 92% of the remaining malicious singletons at a 1.4% percent false positive rate, despite heavy use of obfuscation and packing techniques by most malicious singleton files that we make no attempt to de-obfuscate. Finally, we demonstrate robustness of our classifier to important classes of automated evasion attacks.

Recommendation and collaborative filtering systems are important in modern information and e-commerce applications. As these systems are becoming increasingly popular in the industry, their outputs could affect business decision making, introducing incentives for an adversarial party to compromise the availability or integrity of such systems. We introduce a data poisoning attack on collaborative filtering systems. We demonstrate how a powerful attacker with full knowledge of the learner can generate malicious data so as to maximize his/her malicious objectives, while at the same time mimicking normal user behavior to avoid being detected. While the complete knowledge assumption seems extreme, it enables a robust assessment of the vulnerability of collaborative filtering schemes to highly motivated attacks. We present efficient solutions for two popular factorization-based collaborative filtering algorithms: the alternative minimization formulation and the nuclear norm minimization method. Finally, we test the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms on real-world data and discuss potential defensive strategies.

Assuring communication integrity is a central problem in security. However, overhead costs associated with cryptographic primitives used towards this end introduce significant practical implementation challenges for resource-bounded systems, such as cyberphysical systems. For example, many control systems are built on legacy components which are computationally limited but have strict timing constraints. If integrity protection is a binary decision, it may simply be infeasible to introduce into such systems; without it, however, an adversary can forge malicious messages, which can cause significant physical or financial harm. To bridge the gap between such binary decisions, we propose a stochastic message authentication approach that can explicitly trade computational cost off for security. We introduce a formal game-theoretic framework for optimal stochastic message authentication, providing provable guarantees for resource-bounded systems based on an existing message authentication scheme. We use our framework to investigate attacker deterrence, as well as optimal stochastic message authentication when deterrence is impossible, in both short-term and long-term equilibria. Additionally, we propose two schemes for implementing stochastic message authentication in practice, one for saving computation only at the receiver and one for saving computation at both ends, and demonstrate the associated computational savings using an actual implementation.