Wang, Jichang, Zhang, Liancheng, Li, Zehua, Guo, Yi, Cheng, Lanxin, Du, Wenwen.
2022.
CC-Guard: An IPv6 Covert Channel Detection Method Based on Field Matching. 2022 IEEE 24th Int Conf on High Performance Computing & Communications; 8th Int Conf on Data Science & Systems; 20th Int Conf on Smart City; 8th Int Conf on Dependability in Sensor, Cloud & Big Data Systems & Application (HPCC/DSS/SmartCity/DependSys). :1416—1421.
As the IPv6 protocol has been rapidly developed and applied, the security of IPv6 networks has become the focus of academic and industrial attention. Despite the fact that the IPv6 protocol is designed with security in mind, due to insufficient defense measures of current firewalls and intrusion detection systems for IPv6 networks, the construction of covert channels using fields not defined or reserved in IPv6 protocols may compromise the information systems. By discussing the possibility of constructing storage covert channels within IPv6 protocol fields, 10 types of IPv6 covert channels are constructed with undefined and reserved fields, including the flow label field, the traffic class field of IPv6 header, the reserved fields of IPv6 extension headers and the code field of ICMPv6 header. An IPv6 covert channel detection method based on field matching (CC-Guard) is proposed, and a typical IPv6 network environment is built for testing. In comparison with existing detection tools, the experimental results show that the CC-Guard not only can detect more covert channels consisting of IPv6 extension headers and ICMPv6 headers, but also achieves real-time detection with a lower detection overhead.
Hussaini, Adamu, Qian, Cheng, Liao, Weixian, Yu, Wei.
2022.
A Taxonomy of Security and Defense Mechanisms in Digital Twins-based Cyber-Physical Systems. 2022 IEEE International Conferences on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing & Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical & Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData) and IEEE Congress on Cybermatics (Cybermatics). :597—604.
The (IoT) paradigm’s fundamental goal is to massively connect the “smart things” through standardized interfaces, providing a variety of smart services. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) include both physical and cyber components and can apply to various application domains (smart grid, smart transportation, smart manufacturing, etc.). The Digital Twin (DT) is a cyber clone of physical objects (things), which will be an essential component in CPS. This paper designs a systematic taxonomy to explore different attacks on DT-based CPS and how they affect the system from a four-layer architecture perspective. We present an attack space for DT-based CPS on four layers (i.e., object layer, communication layer, DT layer, and application layer), three attack objects (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability), and attack types combined with strength and knowledge. Furthermore, some selected case studies are conducted to examine attacks on representative DT-based CPS (smart grid, smart transportation, and smart manufacturing). Finally, we propose a defense mechanism called Secured DT Development Life Cycle (SDTDLC) and point out the importance of leveraging other enabling techniques (intrusion detection, blockchain, modeling, simulation, and emulation) to secure DT-based CPS.