Biblio
Software vulnerabilities are weaknesses in software systems that can have serious consequences when exploited. Examples of side effects include unauthorized authentication, data breaches, and financial losses. Due to the nature of the software industry, companies are increasingly pressured to deploy software as quickly as possible, leading to a large number of undetected software vulnerabilities. Static code analysis, with the support of Static Analysis Tools (SATs), can generate security alerts that highlight potential vulnerabilities in an application's source code. Software Metrics (SMs) have also been used to predict software vulnerabilities, usually with the support of Machine Learning (ML) classification algorithms. Several datasets are available to support the development of improved software vulnerability detection techniques. However, they suffer from the same issues: they are either outdated or use a single type of information. In this paper, we present a methodology for collecting software vulnerabilities from known vulnerability databases and enhancing them with static information (namely SAT alerts and SMs). The proposed methodology aims to define a mechanism capable of more easily updating the collected data.
The intranets in modern organizations are facing severe data breaches and critical resource misuses. By reusing user credentials from compromised systems, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attackers can move laterally within the internal network. A promising new approach called deception technology makes the network administrator (i.e., defender) able to deploy decoys to deceive the attacker in the intranet and trap him into a honeypot. Then the defender ought to reasonably allocate decoys to potentially insecure hosts. Unfortunately, existing APT-related defense resource allocation models are infeasible because of the neglect of many realistic factors.In this paper, we make the decoy deployment strategy feasible by proposing a game-theoretic model called the APT Deception Game to describe interactions between the defender and the attacker. More specifically, we decompose the decoy deployment problem into two subproblems and make the problem solvable. Considering the best response of the attacker who is aware of the defender’s deployment strategy, we provide an elitist reservation genetic algorithm to solve this game. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our deployment strategy compared with other heuristic strategies.
Personally identifiable information (PII) has become a major target of cyber-attacks, causing severe losses to data breach victims. To protect data breach victims, researchers focus on collecting exposed PII to assess privacy risk and identify at-risk individuals. However, existing studies mostly rely on exposed PII collected from either the dark web or the surface web. Due to the wide exposure of PII on both the dark web and surface web, collecting from only the dark web or the surface web could result in an underestimation of privacy risk. Despite its research and practical value, jointly collecting PII from both sources is a non-trivial task. In this paper, we summarize our effort to systematically identify, collect, and monitor a total of 1,212,004,819 exposed PII records across both the dark web and surface web. Our effort resulted in 5.8 million stolen SSNs, 845,000 stolen credit/debit cards, and 1.2 billion stolen account credentials. From the surface web, we identified and collected over 1.3 million PII records of the victims whose PII is exposed on the dark web. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest academic collection of exposed PII, which, if properly anonymized, enables various privacy research inquiries, including assessing privacy risk and identifying at-risk populations.
The widespread adoption of social networking and cloud computing has transformed today's Internet to a trove of personal information. As a consequence, data breaches are expected to increase in gravity and occurrence. To counteract unintended data disclosure, a great deal of effort has been dedicated in devising methods for uncovering privacy leaks. Existing solutions, however, have not addressed the time- and data-intensive nature of leak detection. The shift from hardware-specific implementation to software-based solutions is the core idea behind the concept of Network Function Virtualization (NFV). On the other hand, the Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm is characterized by the decoupling of the forwarding and control planes. In this paper, an SDN/NFV-enabled architecture is proposed for improving the efficiency of leak detection systems. Employing a previously developed identification strategy, Personally Identifiable Information detector (PIID) and load balancer VNFs are packaged and deployed in OpenStack through an NFV MANO. Meanwhile, SDN controllers permit the load balancer to dynamically redistribute traffic among the PIID instances. In a physical testbed, tests are conducted to evaluate the proposed architecture. Experimental results indicate that the proportions of forwarding and parsing on total overhead is influenced by the traffic intensity. Furthermore, an NFV-enabled system with scalability features was found to outperform a non-virtualized implementation in terms of latency (85.1%), packet loss (98.3%) and throughput (8.41%).