Biblio

Digital signal processor (DSP) intellectual property (IP) cores are the underlying hardware responsible for high performance data intensive applications. However an unauthorized IP vendor may counterfeit the DSP IPs and infuse them into the design-chain. Thus fake IPs or integrated circuits (ICs) are unknowingly integrated into consumer electronics (CE) systems, leading to reliability and safety issues for users. The latent solution to this threat is hardware steganography wherein vendor's secret information is covertly inserted into the design to enable detection of counterfeiting. A key-regulated hash-modules chaining based IP steganography is presented in our paper to secure against counterfeiting threat. The proposed approach yielded a robust steganography achieving very high security with regard to stego-key length than previous approaches.

In recent years, Counterfeit goods play a vital role in product manufacturing industries. This Phenomenon affects the sales and profit of the companies. To ensure the identification of real products throughout the supply chain, a functional block chain technology used for preventing product counterfeiting. By using a block chain technology, consumers do not need to rely on the trusted third parties to know the source of the purchased product safely. Any application that uses block chain technology as a basic framework ensures that the data content is “tamper-resistant”. In view of the fact that a block chain is the decentralized, distributed and digital ledger that stores transactional records known as blocks of the public in several databases known as chain across many networks. Therefore, any involved block cannot be changed in advance, without changing all subsequent block. In this paper, counterfeit products are detected using barcode reader, where a barcode of the product linked to a Block Chain Based Management (BCBM) system. So the proposed system may be used to store product details and unique code of that product as blocks in database. It collects the unique code from the customer and compares the code against entries in block chain database. If the code matches, it will give notification to the customer, otherwise it gets information from the customer about where they bought the product to detect counterfeit product manufacturer.

Nowadays, physical tampering and counterfeiting of electronic devices are still an important security problem and have a great impact on large-scale and distributed applications, such as Internet-of-Things. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have the potential to be a fundamental means to guarantee intrinsic hardware security, since they promise immunity against most of known attack models. However, inner nature of PUF circuits hinders a wider adoption since responses turn out to be noisy and not stable during time. To overcome this issue, most of PUF implementations require a fuzzy extraction scheme, able to recover responses stability by exploiting error correction codes (ECCs). In this paper, we propose a Reed-Muller (RM) ECC design, meant to be embedded into a fuzzy extractor, that can be efficiently configured in terms of area/delay constraints in order to get reliable responses from PUFs. We provide implementation details and experimental evidences of area/delay efficiency through syntheses on medium-range FPGA device.

Current anti-counterfeiting supply chains rely on a centralized authority to combat counterfeit products. This architecture results in issues such as single point processing, storage, and failure. Blockchain technology has emerged to provide a promising solution for such issues. In this paper, we propose the block-supply chain, a new decentralized supply chain that detects counterfeiting attacks using blockchain and Near Field Communication (NFC) technologies. Block-supply chain replaces the centralized supply chain design and utilizes a new proposed consensus protocol that is, unlike existing protocols, fully decentralized and balances between efficiency and security. Our simulations show that the proposed protocol offers remarkable performance with a satisfactory level of security compared to the state of the art consensus protocol Tendermint.

Counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) and systems have emerged as a menace to the supply chain of electronic goods and products. Simple physical inspection for counterfeit detection, basic intellectual property (IP) laws, and simple protection measures are becoming ineffective against advanced reverse engineering and counterfeiting practices. As a result, hardware security-based techniques have emerged as promising solutions for combating counterfeiting, reverse engineering, and IP theft. However, these solutions have their own merits and shortcomings, and therefore, these options must be carefully studied. In this work, we present a comparative overview of available hardware security solutions to fight against IC counterfeiting. We provide a detailed comparison of the techniques in terms of integration effort, deployability, and security matrices that would assist a system designer to adopt any one of these security measures for safeguarding the product supply chain against counterfeiting and IP theft.

Globalization of semiconductor design, manufacturing, packaging and testing has led to several security issues like over production of chips, shipping of faulty or partially functional chips, intellectual property infringement, cloning, counterfeit chips and insertion of hardware trojans in design house or at foundry etc. Adversaries will extract chips from obsolete PCB's and release used parts as new chips into the supply chain. The faulty chips or partially functioning chips can enter supply chain from untrusted Assembly Packaging and Test (APT) centers. These counterfeit parts are not reliable and cause catastrophic consequences in critical applications. To mitigate the counterfeits entering supply chain, to protect the Intellectual Property (IP) rights of owners and to meter the chip, Secure Split Test (SST) is a promising solution. CSST (Connecticut SST) is an improvement to SST, which simplifies the communication required between ATP center and design house. CSST addresses the scan tests, but it does not address the functional testing of chips. The functional testing of chips during production testing is critical in weeding out faulty chips in recent times. In this paper, we present a method called PUF-SST (Physical Unclonable Function – SST) to perform both scan tests and functional tests without compromising on security features described in CSST.

RFID-enabled product supply chain visibility is usually implemented by building up a view of the product history of its activities starting from manufacturing or even earlier with a dynamically updated e-pedigree for track-and-trace, which is examined and authenticated at each node of the supply chain for data consistence with the pre-defined one. However, while effectively reducing the risk of fakes, this visibility can't guarantee that the product is authentic without taking further security measures. To the best of our knowledge, this requires deeper understandings on associations of object events with the counterfeiting activities, which is unfortunately left blank. In this paper, the taxonomy of counterfeiting possibilities is initially developed and analyzed, the structure of EPC-based events is then re-examined, and an object-centric coding mechanism is proposed to construct the object-based event “pedigree” for such event exception detection and inference. On this basis, the system architecture framework to achieve the objectivity of object event visibility for anti-counterfeiting is presented, which is also applicable to other aspects of supply chain management.

We present a brief survey on the state-of-the-art design and verification techniques: IC obfuscation, watermarking, fingerprinting, metering, concurrent checking and verification, for mitigating supply chain security risks such as IC misusing, counterfeiting and overbuilding.

RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems are emerging as one of the most pervasive computing technologies in history due to their low cost and their broad applicability. Latest technologies have brought costs down and standards are being developed. Actually, RFID is mostly used as a medium for numerous tasks including managing supply chains, tracking livestock, preventing counterfeiting, controlling building access, and supporting automated checkout. The use of RFID is limited by security concerns and delays in standardization. This paper presents some research done on RFID, the RFID applications and RFID data security.