Biblio
Cloud, Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technologies have introduced a new era of cybersecurity threats and challenges. To protect cloud infrastructure, in our earlier work, we proposed Software Defined Security Service (SDS2) to tackle security challenges centered around a new policy-based interaction model. The security architecture consists of three main components: a Security Controller, Virtual Security Functions (VSF), and a Sec-Manage Protocol. However, the security architecture requires an agile and specific protocol to transfer interaction parameters and security messages between its components where OpenFlow considers mainly as network routing protocol. So, The Sec-Manage protocol has been designed specifically for obtaining policy-based interaction parameters among cloud entities between the security controller and its VSFs. This paper focuses on the design and the implementation of the Sec-Manage protocol and demonstrates its use in setting, monitoring, and conveying relevant policy-based interaction security parameters.
Multi-tenant cloud networks have various security and monitoring service functions (SFs) that constitute a service function chain (SFC) between two endpoints. SF rule ordering overlaps and policy conflicts can cause increased latency, service disruption and security breaches in cloud networks. Software Defined Network (SDN) based Network Function Virtualization (NFV) has emerged as a solution that allows dynamic SFC composition and traffic steering in a cloud network. We propose an SDN enabled Universal Policy Checking (SUPC) framework, to provide 1) Flow Composition and Ordering by translating various SF rules into the OpenFlow format. This ensures elimination of redundant rules and policy compliance in SFC. 2) Flow conflict analysis to identify conflicts in header space and actions between various SF rules. Our results show a significant reduction in SF rules on composition. Additionally, our conflict checking mechanism was able to identify several rule conflicts that pose security, efficiency, and service availability issues in the cloud network.
Moving target defense (MTD) is becoming popular with the advancements in Software Defined Networking (SDN) technologies. With centralized management through SDN, changing the network attributes such as routes to escape from attacks is simple and fast. Yet, the available alternate routes are bounded by the network topology, and a persistent attacker that continuously perform the reconnaissance can extract the whole link-map of the network. To address this issue, we propose to use virtual shadow networks (VSNs) by applying Network Function Virtualization (NFV) abilities to the network in order to deceive attacker with the fake topology information and not reveal the actual network topology and characteristics. We design this approach under a formal framework for Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks and apply it to the recently emerged indirect DDoS attacks, namely Crossfire, for evaluation. The results show that attacker spends more time to figure out the network behavior while the costs on the defender and network operations are negligible until reaching a certain network size.
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is an implementation of cloud computing that leverages virtualization technology to provide on-demand network functions such as firewalls, domain name servers, etc., as software services. One of the methods that help us understand the design and implementation process of such a new system in an abstract way is architectural modeling. Architectural modeling can be presented through UML diagrams to show the interaction between different components and its stakeholders. Also, it can be used to analyze the security threats and the possible countermeasures to mitigate the threats. In this paper, we show some of the possible threats that may jeopardize the security of NFV. We use misuse patterns to analyze misuses based on privilege escalation and VM escape threats. The misuse patterns are part of an ongoing catalog, which is the first step toward building a security reference architecture for NFV.
Virtual switches are a crucial component of SDN-based cloud systems, enabling the interconnection of virtual machines in a flexible and "software-defined" manner. This paper raises the alarm on the security implications of virtual switches. In particular, we show that virtual switches not only increase the attack surface of the cloud, but virtual switch vulnerabilities can also lead to attacks of much higher impact compared to traditional switches. We present a systematic security analysis and identify four design decisions which introduce vulnerabilities. Our findings motivate us to revisit existing threat models for SDN-based cloud setups, and introduce a new attacker model for SDN-based cloud systems using virtual switches. We demonstrate the practical relevance of our analysis using a case study with Open vSwitch and OpenStack. Employing a fuzzing methodology, we find several exploitable vulnerabilities in Open vSwitch. Using just one vulnerability we were able to create a worm that can compromise hundreds of servers in a matter of minutes. Our findings are applicable beyond virtual switches: NFV and high-performance fast path implementations face similar issues. This paper also studies various mitigation techniques and discusses how to redesign virtual switches for their integration.
Smart Internet of Things (IoT) applications will rely on advanced IoT platforms that not only provide access to IoT sensors and actuators, but also provide access to cloud services and data analytics. Future IoT platforms should thus provide connectivity and intelligence. One approach to connecting IoT devices, IoT networks to cloud networks and services is to use network federation mechanisms over the internet to create network slices across heterogeneous platforms. Network slices also need to be protected from potential external and internal threats. In this paper we describe an approach for enforcing global security policies in the federated cloud and IoT networks. Our approach allows a global security to be defined in the form of a single service manifest and enforced across all federation network segments. It relies on network function virtualisation (NFV) and service function chaining (SFC) to enforce the security policy. The approach is illustrated with two case studies: one for a user that wishes to securely access IoT devices and another in which an IoT infrastructure administrator wishes to securely access some remote cloud and data analytics services.
Life-cycle management of stateful VNF services is a complicated task, especially when automated resiliency and scaling should be handled in a secure manner, without service degradation. We present FlowSNAC, a resilient and scalable VNF service for user authentication and service deployment. FlowSNAC consists of both stateful and stateless components, some of that are SDN-based and others that are NFVs. We describe how it adapts to changing conditions by automatically updating resource allocations through a series of intermediate steps of traffic steering, resource allocation, and secure state transfer. We conclude by highlighting some of the lessons learned during implementation, and their wider consequences for the architecture of SDN/NFV management and orchestration systems.
The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a main concern in network security. Since the attackers have developed different techniques and methods, preventing DDoS attacks has become more difficult. Traditional firewall is ineffective in preventing DDoS attacks. In this paper, we propose a new type of firewall named XFirewall to defend against DDoS attacks. XFirewall is a temporary firewall and is created when an attack occurs. Also, XFirewall will be configured with dynamic rules based on real-time traffic analysis. We will discuss in detail the design and algorithm for generating an XFirewall.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a sophisticated cyber-attack due to its variety of types and techniques. The traditional mitigation method of this attack is to deploy dedicated security appliances such as firewall, load balancer, etc. However, due to the limited capacity of the hardware and the potential high volume of DDoS traffic, it may not be able to defend all the attacks. Therefore, cloud-based DDoS protection services were introduced to allow the organizations to redirect their traffic to the scrubbing centers in the cloud for filtering. This solution has some drawbacks such as privacy violation and latency. More recently, Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and edge computing have been proposed as new networking service models. In this paper, we design a framework that leverages NFV and edge computing for DDoS mitigation through two-stage processes.
Two emerging architectural paradigms, i.e., Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), enable the deployment and management of Service Function Chains (SFCs). A SFC is an ordered sequence of abstract Service Functions (SFs), e.g., firewalls, VPN-gateways, traffic monitors, that packets have to traverse in the route from source to destination. While this appealing solution offers significant advantages in terms of flexibility, it also introduces new challenges such as the correct configuration and ordering of SFs in the chain to satisfy overall security requirements. This paper presents a formal model conceived to enable the verification of correct policy enforcements in SFCs. Software tools based on the model can then be designed to cope with unwanted network behaviors (e.g., security flaws) deriving from incorrect interactions of SFs of the same SFC.
The National Science Foundation has made investments in Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) for many years, in both the research and infrastructure areas. SDN and NFV enable systems to become more open to transformative research, with implications for revolutionary new applications and services. Additionally, the emerging concept of Software-Defined Exchanges will enable large-scale interconnection of Software Defined infrastructures, owned and operated by many different organizations, to provide logically isolated 'on demand' global scale infrastructure on an end-to-end basis, with enhanced flexibility and security for new applications. This talk will examine past NSF investments and successes in SDN/NFV, identify new research opportunities available to the community and present challenges that need to be overcome to make SDN/NFV a reality in operational cyberinfrastructure.