Biblio
Cloud data integrity verification was an important means to ensure data security. We used public key infrastructure (PKI) to manage user keys in Traditional way, but there were problems of certificate verification and high cost of key management. In this paper, RSA signature was used to construct a new identity-based cloud audit protocol, which solved the previous problems caused by PKI and supported forward security, and reduced the loss caused by key exposure. Through security analysis, the design scheme could effectively resist forgery attack and support forward security.
The recently proposed file-injection type attacks are highlighting the importance of forward security in dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE). Forward security enables to thwart those attacks by hiding the information about the newly added files matching a previous search query. However, there are still only a few DSSE schemes that provide forward security, and they have factors that hinder efficiency. In particular, all of these schemes do not support actual data deletion, which increments both storage space and computational complexity. In this paper, we design and implement a forward secure DSSE scheme with optimal search and update complexity, for both computation and communication point of view. As a starting point, we propose a new, simple, theoretical data structure, called dual dictionary that can take advantage of both the inverted and the forward indexes at the same time. This data structure allows to delete data explicitly and in real time, which greatly improves efficiency compared to previous works. In addition, our scheme provides forward security by encrypting the newly added data with fresh keys not related with the previous search tokens. We implemented our scheme for Enron email and Wikipedia datasets and measured its performance. The comparison with Sophos shows that our scheme is very efficient in practice, for both searches and updates in dynamic environments.
In this paper, a mutual authentication protocol based on ECC is designed for RFID systems. This protocol is described in detail and the performance of this protocol is analyzed. The results show that the protocol has many advantages, such as mutual authentication, confidentiality, anonymity, availability, forward security, scalability and so on, which can resist camouflage attacks, tracking attacks, denial of service attacks, system internal attack.
We propose a lightweight RFID authentication protocol that supports forward and backward security. The only cryptographic mechanism that this protocol uses is a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) that is shared with the backend Server. Authentication is achieved by exchanging a few numbers (3 or 5) drawn from the PRNG. The lookup time is constant, and the protocol can be easily adapted to prevent online man-in-the-middle relay attacks. Security is proven in the UC security framework.