Biblio
To ensure the accountability of a cloud environment, security policies may be provided as a set of properties to be enforced by cloud providers. However, due to the sheer size of clouds, it can be challenging to provide timely responses to all the requests coming from cloud users at runtime. In this paper, we design and implement a middleware, PERMON, as a pluggable interface to OpenStack for intercepting and verifying the legitimacy of user requests at runtime, while leveraging our previous work on proactive security verification to improve the efficiency. We describe detailed implementation of the middleware and demonstrate its usefulness through a use case.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology increases the evolution of Internet and network development. SDN, with its logical centralization of controllers and global network overview changes the network's characteristics, on term of flexibility, availability and programmability. However, this development increased the network communication security challenges. To enhance the SDN security, we propose the BCFR solution to avoid false flow rules injection in SDN data layer devices. In this solution, we use the blockchain technology to provide the controller authentication and the integrity of the traffic flow circulated between the controller and the other network elements. This work is implemented using OpenStack platform and Onos controller. The evaluation results show the effectiveness of our proposal.
Cloud Management Platforms (CMP) have been developed in recent years to set up cloud computing architecture. Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) is a cloud-delivered model designed by the provider to gather a set of IT resources which are furnished as services for user Virtual Machine Image (VMI) provisioning and management. Openstack is one of the most useful CMP which has been developed for industry and academic researches to simulate IaaS classical processes such as launch and store user VMI instance. In this paper, the main purpose is to adopt a security policy for a secure launch user VMI across a trust cloud environment founded on a combination of enhanced TPM remote attestation and cryptographic techniques to ensure confidentiality and integrity of user VMI requirements.
While traditional HPC has and continues to satisfy most workflows, a new generation of researchers has emerged looking for sophisticated, scalable, on-demand, and self-service control of compute infrastructure in a cloud-like environment. Many also seek safe harbors to operate on or store sensitive and/or controlled-access data in a high capacity environment. To cater to these modern users, the Minnesota Supercomputing Institute designed and deployed Stratus, a locally-hosted cloud environment powered by the OpenStack platform, and backed by Ceph storage. The subscription-based service complements existing HPC systems by satisfying the following unmet needs of our users: a) on-demand availability of compute resources; b) long-running jobs (i.e., 30 days); c) container-based computing with Docker; and d) adequate security controls to comply with controlled-access data requirements. This document provides an in-depth look at the design of Stratus with respect to security and compliance with the NIH's controlled-access data policy. Emphasis is placed on lessons learned while integrating OpenStack and Ceph features into a so-called "walled garden", and how those technologies influenced the security design. Many features of Stratus, including tiered secure storage with the introduction of a controlled-access data "cache", fault-tolerant live-migrations, and fully integrated two-factor authentication, depend on recent OpenStack and Ceph features.
Virtual switches are a crucial component of SDN-based cloud systems, enabling the interconnection of virtual machines in a flexible and "software-defined" manner. This paper raises the alarm on the security implications of virtual switches. In particular, we show that virtual switches not only increase the attack surface of the cloud, but virtual switch vulnerabilities can also lead to attacks of much higher impact compared to traditional switches. We present a systematic security analysis and identify four design decisions which introduce vulnerabilities. Our findings motivate us to revisit existing threat models for SDN-based cloud setups, and introduce a new attacker model for SDN-based cloud systems using virtual switches. We demonstrate the practical relevance of our analysis using a case study with Open vSwitch and OpenStack. Employing a fuzzing methodology, we find several exploitable vulnerabilities in Open vSwitch. Using just one vulnerability we were able to create a worm that can compromise hundreds of servers in a matter of minutes. Our findings are applicable beyond virtual switches: NFV and high-performance fast path implementations face similar issues. This paper also studies various mitigation techniques and discusses how to redesign virtual switches for their integration.
Data privacy and security is a leading concern for providers and customers of cloud computing, where Virtual Machines (VMs) can co-reside within the same underlying physical machine. Side channel attacks within multi-tenant virtualized cloud environments are an established problem, where attackers are able to monitor and exfiltrate data from co-resident VMs. Virtualization services have attempted to mitigate such attacks by preventing VM-to-VM interference on shared hardware by providing logical resource isolation between co-located VMs via an internal virtual network. However, such approaches are also insecure, with attackers capable of performing network channel attacks which bypass mitigation strategies using vectors such as ARP Spoofing, TCP/IP steganography, and DNS poisoning. In this paper we identify a new vulnerability within the internal cloud virtual network, showing that through a combination of TAP impersonation and mirroring, a malicious VM can successfully redirect and monitor network traffic of VMs co-located within the same physical machine. We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack in a prominent cloud platform - OpenStack - under various security requirements and system conditions, and propose countermeasures for mitigation.
With an aim of provisioning fast, reliable and low cost services to the users, the cloud-computing technology has progressed leaps and bounds. But, adjacent to its development is ever increasing ability of malicious users to compromise its security from outside as well as inside. The Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) techniques has gone a long way in detection of known and unknown attacks. The methods of detection of intrusion and deployment of NIDS in cloud environment are dependent on the type of services being rendered by the cloud. It is also important that the cloud administrator is able to determine the malicious intensions of the attackers and various methods of attack. In this paper, we carry out the integration of NIDS module and Honeypot Networks in Cloud environment with objective to mitigate the known and unknown attacks. We also propose method to generate and update signatures from information derived from the proposed integrated model. Using sandboxing environment, we perform dynamic malware analysis of binaries to derive conclusive evidence of malicious attacks.
Security at virtualization level has always been a major issue in cloud computing environment. A large number of virtual machines that are hosted on a single server by various customers/client may face serious security threats due to internal/external network attacks. In this work, we have examined and evaluated these threats and their impact on OpenStack private cloud. We have also discussed the most popular DOS (Denial-of-Service) attack on DHCP server on this private cloud platform and evaluated the vulnerabilities in an OpenStack networking component, Neutron, due to which this attack can be performed through rogue DHCP server. Finally, a solution, a game-theory based cloud architecture, that helps to detect and prevent DOS attacks in OpenStack has been proposed.
In the process of big data analysis and processing, a key concern blocking users from storing and processing their data in the cloud is their misgivings about the security and performance of cloud services. There is an urgent need to develop an approach that can help each cloud service provider (CSP) to demonstrate that their infrastructure and service behavior can meet the users' expectations. However, most of the prior research work focused on validating the process compliance of cloud service without an accurate description of the basic service behaviors, and could not measure the security capability. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to verify cloud service security conformance called CloudSec, which reduces the description gap between the cloud provider and customer through modeling cloud service behaviors (CloudBeh Model) and security SLA (SecSLA Model). These models enable a systematic integration of security constraints and service behavior into cloud while using UPPAAL to check the conformance, which can not only check CloudBeh performance metrics conformance, but also verify whether the security constraints meet the SecSLA. The proposed approach is validated through case study and experiments with a cloud storage service based on OpenStack, which illustrates CloudSec approach effectiveness and can be applied in real cloud scenarios.
In previous work, we proposed a solution to facilitate access to computer science related courses and learning materials using cloud computing and mobile technologies. The solution was positively evaluated by the participants, but most of them indicated that it lacks support for laboratory activities. As it is well known that many of computer science subjects (e.g. Computer Networks, Information Security, Systems Administration, etc.) require a suitable and flexible environment where students can access a set of computers and network devices to successfully complete their hands-on activities. To achieve this criteria, we created a cloud-based virtual laboratory based on OpenStack cloud platform to facilitate access to virtual machine both locally and remotely. Cloud-based virtual labs bring a lot of advantages, such as increased manageability, scalability, high availability and flexibility, to name a few. This arrangement has been tested in a case-study exercise with a group of students as part of Computer Networks and System Administration courses at Kabul Polytechnic University in Afghanistan. To measure success, we introduced a level test to be completed by participants prior and after the experiment. As a result, the learners achieved an average of 17.1 % higher scores in the post level test after completing the practical exercises. Lastly, we distributed a questionnaire after the experiment and students provided positive feedback on the effectiveness and usefulness of the proposed solution.
Cloud service providers typically adopt the multi-tenancy model to optimize resources usage and achieve the promised cost-effectiveness. Sharing resources between different tenants and the underlying complex technology increase the necessity of transparency and accountability. In this regard, auditing security compliance of the provider's infrastructure against standards, regulations and customers' policies takes on an increasing importance in the cloud to boost the trust between the stakeholders. However, virtualization and scalability make compliance verification challenging. In this work, we propose an automated framework that allows auditing the cloud infrastructure from the structural point of view while focusing on virtualization-related security properties and consistency between multiple control layers. Furthermore, to show the feasibility of our approach, we integrate our auditing system into OpenStack, one of the most used cloud infrastructure management systems. To show the scalability and validity of our framework, we present our experimental results on assessing several properties related to auditing inter-layer consistency, virtual machines co-residence, and virtual resources isolation.
Cloud service providers typically adopt the multi-tenancy model to optimize resources usage and achieve the promised cost-effectiveness. Sharing resources between different tenants and the underlying complex technology increase the necessity of transparency and accountability. In this regard, auditing security compliance of the provider's infrastructure against standards, regulations and customers' policies takes on an increasing importance in the cloud to boost the trust between the stakeholders. However, virtualization and scalability make compliance verification challenging. In this work, we propose an automated framework that allows auditing the cloud infrastructure from the structural point of view while focusing on virtualization-related security properties and consistency between multiple control layers. Furthermore, to show the feasibility of our approach, we integrate our auditing system into OpenStack, one of the most used cloud infrastructure management systems. To show the scalability and validity of our framework, we present our experimental results on assessing several properties related to auditing inter-layer consistency, virtual machines co-residence, and virtual resources isolation.
prevent attackers from gaining control of the system using well established techniques such as; perimeter-based fire walls, redundancy and replications, and encryption. However, given sufficient time and resources, all these methods can be defeated. Moving Target Defense (MTD), is a defensive strategy that aims to reduce the need to continuously fight against attacks by disrupting attackers gain-loss balance. We present Mayflies, a bio-inspired generic MTD framework for distributed systems on virtualized cloud platforms. The framework enables systems designed to defend against attacks for their entire runtime to systems that avoid attacks in time intervals. We discuss the design, algorithms and the implementation of the framework prototype. We illustrate the prototype with a quorum-based Byzantime Fault Tolerant system and report the preliminary results.