Biblio

Hardware security has emerged as an important topic in the wake of increasing threats on integrated circuits which include reverse engineering, intellectual property (IP) piracy and overbuilding. This paper explores obfuscation of circuits as a hardware security measure and specifically targets digital signal processing (DSP) circuits which are part of most modern systems. The idea of using desired and undesired modes to design obfuscated DSP functions is illustrated using the fast Fourier transform (FFT) as an example. The selection of a mode is dependent on a key input to the circuit. The system is said to work in its desired mode of operation only if the correct key is applied. Other undesired modes are built into the design to confuse an adversary. The approach to obfuscating the design involves control-flow modifications which alter the computations from the desired mode. We present simulation and synthesis results on a reconfigurable, 2-parallel FFT and discuss the security of this approach. It is shown that the proposed approach results in a reconfigurable and flexible design at an area overhead of 8% and a power overhead of 10%.

In this paper, we address the design an implementation of low power embedded systems for real-time tracking of humans and vehicles. Such systems are important in applications such as activity monitoring and border security. We motivate the utility of mobile devices in prototyping the targeted class of tracking systems, and demonstrate a dataflow-based and cross-platform design methodology that enables efficient experimentation with key aspects of our tracking system design, including real-time operation, experimentation with advanced sensors, and streamlined management of design versions on host and mobile platforms. Our experiments demonstrate the utility of our mobile-device-targeted design methodology in validating tracking algorithm operation; evaluating real-time performance, energy efficiency, and accuracy of tracking system execution; and quantifying trade-offs involving use of advanced sensors, which offer improved sensing accuracy at the expense of increased cost and weight. Additionally, through application of a novel, cross-platform, model-based design approach, our design requires no change in source code when migrating from an initial, host-computer-based functional reference to a fully-functional implementation on the targeted mobile device.

Wearable personal health monitoring systems can offer a cost effective solution for human healthcare. These systems must provide both highly accurate, secured and quick processing and delivery of vast amount of data. In addition, wearable biomedical devices are used in inpatient, outpatient, and at home e-Patient care that must constantly monitor the patient's biomedical and physiological signals 24/7. These biomedical applications require sampling and processing multiple streams of physiological signals with strict power and area footprint. The processing typically consists of feature extraction, data fusion, and classification stages that require a large number of digital signal processing and machine learning kernels. In response to these requirements, in this paper, a low-power, domain-specific many-core accelerator named Power Efficient Nano Clusters (PENC) is proposed to map and execute the kernels of these applications. Experimental results show that the manycore is able to reduce energy consumption by up to 80% and 14% for DSP and machine learning kernels, respectively, when optimally parallelized. The performance of the proposed PENC manycore when acting as a coprocessor to an Intel Atom processor is compared with existing commercial off-the-shelf embedded processing platforms including Intel Atom, Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA, and NVIDIA TK1 ARM-A15 with GPU SoC. The results show that the PENC manycore architecture reduces the energy by as much as 10X while outperforming all off-the-shelf embedded processing platforms across all studied machine learning classifiers.

Ethernet technology dominates enterprise and home network installations and is present in datacenters as well as parts of the backbone of the Internet. Due to its wireline nature, Ethernet networks are often assumed to intrinsically protect the exchanged data against attacks carried out by eavesdroppers and malicious attackers that do not have physical access to network devices, patch panels and network outlets. In this work, we practically evaluate the possibility of wireless attacks against wired Ethernet installations with respect to resistance against eavesdropping by using off-the-shelf software-defined radio platforms. Our results clearly indicate that twisted-pair network cables radiate enough electromagnetic waves to reconstruct transmitted frames with negligible bit error rates, even when the cables are not damaged at all. Since this allows an attacker to stay undetected, it urges the need for link layer encryption or physical layer security to protect confidentiality.

Ensuring the integrity and security of the memory system is critical. Recent studies have shown serious security concerns due to "rowhammer" attacks, where repeated accesses to a row of memory cause bit flips in adjacent rows. Recent work by Google's Project Zero has shown how to leverage rowhammer-induced bit-flips as the basis for security exploits that include malicious code injection and memory privilege escalation. Being an important security concern, industry has attempted to defend against rowhammer attacks. Deployed defenses employ two strategies: (1) doubling the system DRAM refresh rate and (2) restricting access to the CLFLUSH instruction that attackers use to bypass the cache to increase memory access frequency (i.e., the rate of rowhammering). We demonstrate that such defenses are inadequte: we implement rowhammer attacks that both avoid using the CLFLUSH instruction and cause bit flips with a doubled refresh rate. Our next-generation CLFLUSH-free rowhammer attack bypasses the cache by manipulating cache replacement state to allow frequent misses out of the last-level cache to DRAM rows of our choosing. To protect existing systems from more advanced rowhammer attacks, we develop a software-based defense, ANVIL, which thwarts all known rowhammer attacks on existing systems. ANVIL detects rowhammer attacks by tracking the locality of DRAM accesses using existing hardware performance counters. Our detector identifies the rows being frequently accessed (i.e., the aggressors), then selectively refreshes the nearby victim rows to prevent hammering. Experiments running on real hardware with the SPEC2006 benchmarks show that ANVIL has less than a 1% false positive rate and an average slowdown of 1%. ANVIL is low-cost and robust, and our experiments indicate that it is an effective approach for protecting existing and future systems from even advanced rowhammer attacks.

In ad-hoc networks, data messages are transmitted from a source wireless node to a destination one along a wireless multihop transmission route consisting of a sequence of intermediate wireless nodes. Each intermediate wireless node forwards data messages to its next-hop wireless node. Here, a wireless signal carrying the data message is broadcasted by using an omni antenna and it is not difficult for a eavesdropper wireless node to overhear the wireless signal to get the data message. Some researches show that it is useful to transmit noise wireless signal which collide to the data message wireless signal in order for interfering the overhearing. However, some special devices such as directional antennas and/or high computation power for complicated signal processing are required. For wireless multihop networks with huge number of wireless nodes, small and cheap wireless nodes are mandatory for construction of the network. This paper proposes the method for interfering the overhearing by the eavesdropper wireless nodes where routing protocol and data message transmission protocol with cooperative noise signal transmissions by 1-hop and 2-hop neighbor wireless nodes of each intermediate wireless node.

Future transportation systems highly rely on the integrity of spatial information provided by their means of transportation such as vehicles and planes. In critical applications (e.g. collision avoidance), tampering with this data can result in life-threatening situations. It is therefore essential for the safety of these systems to securely verify this information. While there is a considerable body of work on the secure verification of locations, movement of nodes has only received little attention in the literature. This paper proposes a new method to securely verify spatial movement of a mobile sender in all dimensions, i.e., position, speed, and direction. Our scheme uses Doppler shift measurements from different locations to verify a prover's motion. We provide formal proof for the security of the scheme and demonstrate its applicability to air traffic communications. Our results indicate that it is possible to reliably verify the motion of aircraft in currently operational systems with an equal error rate of zero.