Biblio
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is an often-occurring major attack that developers should consider when developing web applications. We develop a system that can provide practical exercises for learning how to create web applications that are secure against XSS. Our system utilizes free software and virtual machines, allowing low-cost, safe, and practical exercises. By using two virtual machines as the web server and the attacker host, the learner can conduct exercises demonstrating both XSS countermeasures and XSS attacks. In our system, learners use a web browser to learn and perform exercises related to XSS. Experimental evaluations confirm that the proposed system can support learning of XSS countermeasures.
In cloud computing environments with many virtual machines, containers, and other systems, an epidemic of malware can be crippling and highly threatening to business processes. In this vision paper, we introduce a hierarchical approach to performing malware detection and analysis using several recent advances in machine learning on graphs, hypergraphs, and natural language. We analyze individual systems and their logs, inspecting and understanding their behavior with attentional sequence models. Given a feature representation of each system's logs using this procedure, we construct an attributed network of the cloud with systems and other components as vertices and propose an analysis of malware with inductive graph and hypergraph learning models. With this foundation, we consider the multicloud case, in which multiple clouds with differing privacy requirements cooperate against the spread of malware, proposing the use of federated learning to perform inference and training while preserving privacy. Finally, we discuss several open problems that remain in defending cloud computing environments against malware related to designing robust ecosystems, identifying cloud-specific optimization problems for response strategy, action spaces for malware containment and eradication, and developing priors and transfer learning tasks for machine learning models in this area.
Verifying complex Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) is increasingly important given the push to deploy safety-critical autonomous features. Unfortunately, traditional verification methods do not scale to the complexity of these systems and do not provide systematic methods to protect verified properties when not all the components can be verified. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a real-time mixed-trust computing framework that combines verification and protection. The framework introduces a new task model, where an application task can have both an untrusted and a trusted part. The untrusted part allows complex computations supported by a full OS with a realtime scheduler running in a VM hosted by a trusted hypervisor. The trusted part is executed by another scheduler within the hypervisor and is thus protected from the untrusted part. If the untrusted part fails to finish by a specific time, the trusted part is activated to preserve safety (e.g., prevent a crash) including its timing guarantees. This framework is the first allowing the use of untrusted components for CPS critical functions while preserving logical and timing guarantees, even in the presence of malicious attackers. We present the framework design and implementation along with the schedulability analysis and the coordination protocol between the trusted and untrusted parts. We also present our Raspberry Pi 3 implementation along with experiments showing the behavior of the system under failures of untrusted components, and a drone application to demonstrate its practicality.
In multi-tenant datacenters, the hardware may be homogeneous but the traffic often is not. For instance, customers who pay an equal amount of money can get an unequal share of the bottleneck capacity when they do not open the same number of TCP connections. To address this problem, several recent proposals try to manipulate the traffic that TCP sends from the VMs. VCC and AC/DC are two new mechanisms that let the hypervisor control traffic by influencing the TCP receiver window (rwnd). This avoids changing the guest OS, but has limitations (it is not possible to make TCP increase its rate faster than it normally would). Seawall, on the other hand, completely rewrites TCP's congestion control, achieving fairness but requiring significant changes to both the hypervisor and the guest OS. There seems to be a need for a middle ground: a method to control TCP's sending rate without requiring a complete redesign of its congestion control. We introduce a minimally-invasive solution that is flexible enough to cater for needs ranging from weighted fairness in multi-tenant datacenters to potentially offering Internet-wide benefits from reduced interflow competition.
Attacks on cloud-computing services are becoming more prevalent with recent victims including Tesla, Aviva Insurance and SIM-card manufacturer Gemalto[1]. The risk posed to organisations from malicious insiders is becoming more widely known about and consequently many are now investing in hardware, software and new processes to try to detect these attacks. As for all types of attack vector, there will always be those which are not known about and those which are known about but remain exceptionally difficult to detect - particularly in a timely manner. We believe that insider attacks are of particular concern in a cloud-computing environment, and that cloud-service providers should enhance their ability to detect them by means of indirect detection. We propose a combined attack-tree and kill-chain based method for identifying multiple indirect detection measures. Specifically, the use of attack trees enables us to encapsulate all detection opportunities for insider attacks in cloud-service environments. Overlaying the attack tree on top of a kill chain in turn facilitates indirect detection opportunities higher-up the tree as well as allowing the provider to determine how far an attack has progressed once suspicious activity is detected. We demonstrate the method through consideration of a specific type of insider attack - that of attempting to capture virtual machines in transit within a cloud cluster via use of a network tap, however, the process discussed here applies equally to all cloud paradigms.
OS kernel is the core part of the operating system, and it plays an important role for OS resource management. A popular way to compromise OS kernel is through a kernel rootkit (i.e., malicious kernel module). Once a rootkit is loaded into the kernel space, it can carry out arbitrary malicious operations with high privilege. To defeat kernel rootkits, many approaches have been proposed in the past few years. However, existing methods suffer from some limitations: 1) most methods focus on user-mode rootkit detection; 2) some methods are limited to detect obfuscated kernel modules; and 3) some methods introduce significant performance overhead. To address these problems, we propose VKRD, a kernel rootkit detection system based on the hardware assisted virtualization technology. Compared with previous methods, VKRD can provide a transparent and an efficient execution environment for the target kernel module to reveal its run-time behavior. To select the important run-time features for training our detection models, we utilize the TF-IDF method. By combining the hardware assisted virtualization and machine learning techniques, our kernel rootkit detection solution could be potentially applied in the cloud environment. The experiments show that our system can detect windows kernel rootkits with high accuracy and moderate performance cost.
The difficult of detecting, response, tracing the malicious behavior in cloud has brought great challenges to the law enforcement in combating cybercrimes. This paper presents a malicious behavior oriented framework of detection, emergency response, traceability, and digital forensics in cloud environment. A cloud-based malicious behavior detection mechanism based on SDN is constructed, which implements full-traffic flow detection technology and malicious virtual machine detection based on memory analysis. The emergency response and traceability module can clarify the types of the malicious behavior and the impacts of the events, and locate the source of the event. The key nodes and paths of the infection topology or propagation path of the malicious behavior will be located security measure will be dispatched timely. The proposed IaaS service based forensics module realized the virtualization facility memory evidence extraction and analysis techniques, which can solve volatile data loss problems that often happened in traditional forensic methods.
The Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile systems nowadays are required to perform more intensive computation, such as facial detection, image recognition and even remote gaming, etc. Due to the limited computation performance and power budget, it is sometimes impossible to perform these workloads locally. As high-performance GPUs become more common in the cloud, offloading the computation to the cloud becomes a possible choice. However, due to the fact that offloaded workloads from different devices (belonging to different users) are being computed in the same cloud, security concerns arise. Side channel attacks on GPU systems have been widely studied, where the threat model is the attacker and the victim are running on the same operating system. Recently, major GPU vendors have provided hardware and library support to virtualize GPUs for better isolation among users. This work studies the side channel attacks from one virtual machine to another where both share the same physical GPU. We show that it is possible to infer other user's activities in this setup and can further steal others deep learning model.
In monolithic operating system (OS), any error of system software can be exploit to destroy the whole system. The situation becomes much more severe in cloud environment, when the kernel and the hypervisor share the same address space. The security of guest Virtual Machines (VMs), both sensitive data and vital code, can no longer be guaranteed, once the hypervisor is compromised. Therefore, it is essential to deploy some security approaches to secure VMs, regardless of the hypervisor is safe or not. Some approaches propose microhypervisor reducing attack surface, or a new software requiring a higher privilege level than hypervisor. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named HyperPS, which separates the fundamental and crucial privilege into a new trusted environment in order to monitor hypervisor. A pivotal condition for HyperPS is that hypervisor must not be allowed to manipulate any security-sensitive system resources, such as page tables, system control registers, interaction between VM and hypervisor as well as VM memory mapping. Besides, HyperPS proposes a trusted environment which does not rely on any higher privilege than the hypervisor. We have implemented a prototype for KVM hypervisor on x86 platform with multiple VMs running Linux. KVM with HyperPS can be applied to current commercial cloud computing industry with portability. The security analysis shows that this approach can provide effective monitoring against attacks, and the performance evaluation confirms the efficiency of HyperPS.
Security of VMs is now becoming a hot topic due to their outsourcing in cloud computing paradigm. All VMs present on the network are connected to each other, making exploited VMs danger to other VMs. and threats to organization. Rejuvenation of virtualization brought the emergence of hyper-visor based security services like VMI (Virtual machine introspection). As there is a greater chance for any intrusion detection system running on the same system, of being dis-abled by the malware or attacker. Monitoring of VMs using VMI, is one of the most researched and accepted technique, that is used to ensure computer systems security mostly in the paradigm of cloud computing. This thesis presents a work that is to integrate LibVMI with Volatility on a KVM, a Linux based hypervisor, to introspect memory of VMs. Both of these tools are used to monitor the state of live VMs. VMI capability of monitoring VMs is combined with the malware analysis and virtual honeypots to achieve the objective of this project. A testing environment is deployed, where a network of VMs is used to be introspected using Volatility plug-ins. Time execution of each plug-in executed on live VMs is calculated to observe the performance of Volatility plug-ins. All these VMs are deployed as Virtual Honeypots having honey-pots configured on them, which is used as a detection mechanism to trigger alerts when some malware attack the VMs. Using STIX (Structure Threat Information Expression), extracted IOCs are converted into the understandable, flexible, structured and shareable format.
Cloud Management Platforms (CMP) have been developed in recent years to set up cloud computing architecture. Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) is a cloud-delivered model designed by the provider to gather a set of IT resources which are furnished as services for user Virtual Machine Image (VMI) provisioning and management. Openstack is one of the most useful CMP which has been developed for industry and academic researches to simulate IaaS classical processes such as launch and store user VMI instance. In this paper, the main purpose is to adopt a security policy for a secure launch user VMI across a trust cloud environment founded on a combination of enhanced TPM remote attestation and cryptographic techniques to ensure confidentiality and integrity of user VMI requirements.
Recent studies have shown that co-resident attacks have aroused great security threat in cloud. Since hardware is shared among different tenants, malicious tenants can launch various co-resident attacks, such as side channel attacks, covert channel attacks and resource interference attacks. Existing countermeasures have their limitations and can not provide comprehensive defense against co-resident attacks. This paper combines the advantages of various countermeasures and proposes a complete co-resident threat defense solution which consists of co-resident-resistant VM allocation (CRRVA), analytic hierarchy process-based threat score mechanism (AHPTSM) and attack-aware VM reallocation (AAVR). CRRVA securely allocates VMs and also takes load balance and power consumption into consideration to make the allocation policy more practical. According to the intrinsic characteristics of co-resident attacks, AHPTSM evaluates VM's threat score which denotes the probability that a VM is suffering or conducting co-resident attacks based on analytic hierarchy process. And AAVR further migrates VMs with extremely high threat scores and separates VM pairs which are likely to be malicious to each other. Extensive experiments in CloudSim have shown that CRRVA can greatly reduce the allocation co-resident threat as well as balancing the load for both CSPs and tenants with little impact on power consumption. In addition, guided by threat score distribution, AAVR can effectively guarantee runtime co-resident security by migrating high threat score VMs with less migration cost.
In Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds, there exist many virtual machines (VMs) that are not used for a long time. For such VMs, many vulnerabilities are often found in installed software while VMs are suspended. If security updates are applied to such VMs after the VMs are resumed, the VMs easily suffer from attacks via the Internet. To solve this problem, offline update of VMs has been proposed, but some approaches have to permit cloud administrators to resume users' VMs. The others are applicable only to completely stopped VMs and often corrupt virtual disks if they are applied to suspended VMs. In addition, it is sometimes difficult to accurately emulate security updates offline. In this paper, we propose OUassister, which enables consistent offline update of suspended VMs. OUassister emulates security updates of VMs offline in a non-intrusive manner and applies the emulation results to the VMs online. This separation prevents virtual disks of even suspended VMs from being corrupted. For more accurate emulation of security updates, OUassister provides an emulation environment using a technique called VM introspection. Using this environment, it automatically extracts updated files and executed scripts. We have implemented OUassister in Xen and confirmed that the time for critical online update was largely reduced.
In Cloud Computing Environment, using only static security measures didn't mitigate the attack considerably. Hence, deployment of sophisticated methods by the attackers to understand the network topology of complex network makes the task easier. For this reason, the use of dynamic security measure as virtual machine (VM) migration increases uncertainty to locate a virtual machine in a dynamic attack surface. Although this, not all VM's migration enhances security. Indeed, the destination server to host the VM should be selected precisely in order to avoid externality and attack at the same time. In this paper, we model migration in cloud environment by using continuous Markov Chain. Then, we analyze the probability of a VM to be compromised based on the destination server parameters. Finally, we provide some numerical results to show the effectiveness of our approach in term of avoiding intrusion.