Biblio
TCP SYN Flood is one of the most widespread DoS attack types performed on computer networks nowadays. As a possible countermeasure, we implemented and deployed modified versions of three network-based mitigation techniques for TCP SYN authentication. All of them utilize the TCP three-way handshake mechanism to establish a security association with a client before forwarding its SYN data. These algorithms are especially effective against regular attacks with spoofed IP addresses. However, our modifications allow deflecting even more sophisticated SYN floods able to bypass most of the conventional approaches. This comes at the cost of the delayed first connection attempt, but all subsequent SYN segments experience no significant additional latency (\textbackslashtextless; 0.2ms). This paper provides a detailed description and analysis of the approaches, as well as implementation details with enhanced security tweaks. The discussed implementations are built on top of the hardware-accelerated FPGA-based DDoS protection solution developed by CESNET and are about to be deployed in its backbone network and Internet exchange point at NIX.CZ.
With the emergence of computationally intensive and delay sensitive applications, mobile edge computing(MEC) has become more and more popular. Simultaneously, MEC paradigm is faced with security challenges, the most harmful of which is DDoS attack. In this paper, we focus on the resource orchestration algorithm in MEC scenario to mitigate DDoS attack. Most of existing works on resource orchestration algorithm barely take into account DDoS attack. Moreover, they assume that MEC nodes are unselfish, while in practice MEC nodes are selfish and try to maximize their individual utility only, as they usually belong to different network operators. To solve such problems, we propose a price-based resource orchestration algorithm(PROA) using game theory and convex optimization, which aims at mitigating DDoS attack while maximizing the utility of each participant. Pricing resources to simulate market mechanisms, which is national to make rational decisions for all participants. Finally, we conduct experiment using Matlab and show that the proposed PROA can effectively mitigate DDoS attack on the attacked MEC node.
DDoS attacks are a significant threat to internet service or infrastructure providers. This poster presents an FPGA-accelerated device and DDoS mitigation technique to overcome such attacks. Our work addresses amplification attacks whose goal is to generate enough traffic to saturate the victims links. The main idea of the device is to efficiently filter malicious traffic at high-speeds directly in the backbone infrastructure before it even reaches the victim's network. We implemented our solution for two FPGA platforms using the high-level description in P4, and we report on its performance in terms of throughput and hardware resources.
Recently Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) are becoming more and more sophisticated, which makes the existing defence systems not capable of tolerating by themselves against wide-ranging attacks. Thus, collaborative protection mitigation has become a needed alternative to extend defence mechanisms. However, the existing coordinated DDoS mitigation approaches either they require a complex configuration or are highly-priced. Blockchain technology offers a solution that reduces the complexity of signalling DDoS system, as well as a platform where many autonomous systems (Ass) can share hardware resources and defence capabilities for an effective DDoS defence. In this work, we also used a Deep learning DDoS detection system; we identify individual DDoS attack class and also define whether the incoming traffic is legitimate or attack. By classifying the attack traffic flow separately, our proposed mitigation technique could deny only the specific traffic causing the attack, instead of blocking all the traffic coming towards the victim(s).
Network attacks, including Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), continuously increase in terms of bandwidth along with damage (recent attacks exceed 1.7 Tbps) and have a devastating impact on the targeted companies/governments. Over the years, mitigation techniques, ranging from blackholing to policy-based filtering at routers, and on to traffic scrubbing, have been added to the network operator's toolbox. Even though these mitigation techniques provide some protection, they either yield severe collateral damage, e.g., dropping legitimate traffic (blackholing), are cost-intensive, or do not scale well for Tbps level attacks (ACL filtering, traffic scrubbing), or require cooperation and sharing of resources (Flowspec). In this paper, we propose Advanced Blackholing and its system realization Stellar. Advanced blackholing builds upon the scalability of blackholing while limiting collateral damage by increasing its granularity. Moreover, Stellar reduces the required level of cooperation to enhance mitigation effectiveness. We show that fine-grained blackholing can be realized, e.g., at a major IXP, by combining available hardware filters with novel signaling mechanisms. We evaluate the scalability and performance of Stellar at a large IXP that interconnects more than 800 networks, exchanges more than 6 Tbps traffic, and witnesses many network attacks every day. Our results show that network attacks, e.g., DDoS amplification attacks, can be successfully mitigated while the networks and services under attack continue to operate untroubled.
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make an online service, a network, or even an entire organization, unavailable by saturating it with traffic from multiple sources. DDoS attacks are among the most common and most devastating threats that network defenders have to watch out for. DDoS attacks are becoming bigger, more frequent, and more sophisticated. Volumetric attacks are the most common types of DDoS attacks. A DDoS attack is considered volumetric, or high-rate, when within a short period of time it generates a large amount of packets or a high volume of traffic. High-rate attacks are well-known and have received much attention in the past decade; however, despite several detection and mitigation strategies have been designed and implemented, high-rate attacks are still halting the normal operation of information technology infrastructures across the Internet when the protection mechanisms are not able to cope with the aggregated capacity that the perpetrators have put together. With this in mind, the present paper aims to propose and test a distributed and collaborative architecture for online high-rate DDoS attack detection and mitigation based on an in-memory distributed graph data structure and unsupervised machine learning algorithms that leverage real-time streaming data and analytics. We have successfully tested our proposed mechanism using a real-world DDoS attack dataset at its original rate in pursuance of reproducing the conditions of an actual large scale attack.