Biblio

Privacy preservation is one of the greatest concerns when data is shared between different organizations. On the one hand, releasing data for research purposes is inevitable. On the other hand, sharing this data can jeopardize users' privacy. An effective solution, for the sharing organizations, is to use anonymization techniques to hide the users' sensitive information. One of the most popular anonymization techniques is k-Anonymization in which any data record is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other records. However, one of the fundamental challenges in choosing the value of k is the trade-off between achieving a higher privacy and the information loss associated with the anonymization. In this paper, the problem of choosing the optimal anonymization level for k-anonymization, under possible attacks, is studied when multiple organizations share their data to a common platform. In particular, two common types of attacks are considered that can target the k-anonymization technique. To this end, a novel game-theoretic framework is proposed to model the interactions between the sharing organizations and the attacker. The problem is formulated as a static game and its different Nash equilibria solutions are analytically derived. Simulation results show that the proposed framework can significantly improve the utility of the sharing organizations through optimizing the choice of k value.

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) play an increasingly significant role in many critical applications. These valuable applications attract various sophisticated attacks. This paper considers a stealthy estimation attack, which aims to modify the state estimation of the CPSs. The intelligent attackers can learn defense strategies and use clandestine attack strategies to avoid detection. To address the issue, we design a Chi-square detector in a Digital Twin (DT), which is an online digital model of the physical system. We use a Signaling Game with Evidence (SGE) to find the optimal attack and defense strategies. Our analytical results show that the proposed defense strategies can mitigate the impact of the attack on the physical estimation and guarantee the stability of the CPSs. Finally, we use an illustrative application to evaluate the performance of the proposed framework.

The paper presents the concept of applying a game theory approach in infrastructure of wireless dynamic networks to counter computer attacks. The applying of this approach will allow to create mechanism for adaptive reconfiguration of network structure in the context of implementation various types of computer attacks and to provide continuous operation of network even in conditions of destructive information impacts.

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) play a vital role in the development of smart cities. They enable various road safety and efficiency applications such as optimized traffic management, collision avoidance, and pollution control through the collection and evaluation of traffic data from Road Side Units (RSUs) and connected vehicles in real time. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to data corruption attacks which can seriously influence their decision-making abilities. Traditional attack detection schemes do not account for attackers' sophisticated and evolving strategies and ignore the ITS's constraints on security resources. In this paper, we devise a security game model that allows the defense mechanism deployed in the ITS to optimize the distribution of available resources for attack detection while considering mixed attack strategies, according to which the attacker targets multiple RSUs in a distributed fashion. In our security game, the utility of the ITS is quantified in terms of detection rate, attack damage, and the relevance of the information transmitted by the RSUs. The proposed approach will enable the ITS to mitigate the impact of attacks and increase its resiliency. The results show that our approach reduces the attack impact by at least 20% compared to the one that fairly allocates security resources to RSUs indifferently to attackers' strategies.

The emergence of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is a potential paradigm shift for the usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). From predominantly a facilitator of information and communication services, the role of ICT in the present age has expanded to the management of objects and resources in the physical world. Thus, it is imperative to devise mechanisms to ensure the trustworthiness of data to secure vulnerable devices against security threats. This work presents an analytical framework based on non-cooperative game theory to evaluate the trustworthiness of individual sensor nodes that constitute the CPS. The proposed game-theoretic model captures the factors impacting the trustworthiness of CPS sensor nodes. Further, the model is used to estimate the Nash equilibrium solution of the game, to derive a trust threshold criterion. The trust threshold represents the minimum trust score required to be maintained by individual sensor nodes during CPS operation. Sensor nodes with trust scores below the threshold are potentially malicious and may be removed or isolated to ensure the secure operation of CPS.

Securing Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber-attacks is challenging due to the wide range of possible attacks - from stealthy ones that seek to manipulate/drop/delay control and measurement signals to malware that infects host machines that control the physical process. This has prompted the research community to address this problem through developing targeted methods that protect and check the run-time operation of the CPS. Since protecting signals and checking for errors result in performance penalties, they must be performed within the delay bounds dictated by the control loop. Due to the large number of potential checks that can be performed, coupled with various degrees of their effectiveness to detect a wide range of attacks, strategic assignment of these checks in the control loop is a critical endeavor. To that end, this paper presents a coherent runtime framework - which we coin BLOC - for orchestrating the CPS with check blocks to secure them against cyber attacks. BLOC capitalizes on game theoretical techniques to enable the defender to find an optimal randomized use of check blocks to secure the CPS while respecting the control-loop constraints. We develop a Stackelberg game model for stateless blocks and a Markov game model for stateful ones and derive optimal policies that minimize the worst-case damage from rational adversaries. We validate our models through extensive simulations as well as a real implementation for a HVAC system.

This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. A CCPA consists of a physical attack, such as disconnecting a transmission line, followed by a coordinated cyber attack that injects false data into the sensor measurements to mask the effects of the physical attack. Such attacks can lead to undetectable line outages and cause significant damage to the grid. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of the physical attack by actively perturbing the grid's transmission line reactances using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. We identify the MTD design criteria in this context to thwart CCPAs. The proposed MTD design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize the defense cost during the system's operational time, we use a game-theoretic approach to identify the best subset of links (within the D-FACTS deployment set) to perturb which will provide adequate protection. Extensive simulations performed using the MATPOWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator's defense cost.

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to analyze the interactions between an attacker and a defender in a cyber-physical system (CPS) and develops effective defense strategies. In a CPS, the attacker launches cyber attacks on a number of nodes in the cyber layer, trying to maximize the potential damage to the underlying physical system while the system operator seeks to defend several nodes in the cyber layer to minimize the physical damage. Given that CPS attacking and defending is often a continual process, a zero-sum Markov game is proposed in this paper to model these interactions subject to underlying uncertainties of real-world events and actions. A novel model is also proposed in this paper to characterize the interdependence between the cyber layer and the physical layer in a CPS and quantify the impact of the cyber attack on the physical damage in the proposed game. To find the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game, we design an efficient algorithm based on value iteration. The proposed general approach is then applied to study the wide-area monitoring and protection issue in smart grid. Extensive simulations are conducted based on real-world data, and results show the effectiveness of the defending strategies derived from the proposed approach.

Reliable operation of power systems is a primary challenge for the system operators. With the advancement in technology and grid automation, power systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The main goal of adversaries is to take advantage of these vulnerabilities and destabilize the system. This paper describes a game-theoretic approach to attacker / defender modeling in power systems. In our models, the attacker can strategically identify the subset of substations that maximize damage when compromised. However, the defender can identify the critical subset of substations to protect in order to minimize the damage when an attacker launches a cyber-attack. The algorithms for these models are applied to the standard IEEE-14, 39, and 57 bus examples to identify the critical set of substations given an attacker and a defender budget.

With the rapid development of sophisticated attack techniques, individual security systems that base all of their decisions and actions of attack prevention and response on their own observations and knowledge become incompetent. To cope with this problem, collaborative security in which a set of security entities are coordinated to perform specific security actions is proposed in literature. In collaborative security schemes, multiple entities collaborate with each other by sharing threat evidence or analytics to make more effective decisions. Nevertheless, the anticipated information exchange raises privacy concerns, especially for those privacy-sensitive entities. In order to obtain a quantitative understanding of the fundamental tradeoff between the effectiveness of collaboration and the entities' privacy, a repeated two-layer single-leader multi-follower game is proposed in this work. Based on our game-theoretic analysis, the expected behaviors of both the attacker and the security entities are derived and the utility-privacy tradeoff curve is obtained. In addition, the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for the collaborative entities is proven, and an asynchronous dynamic update algorithm is proposed to compute the optimal collaboration strategies of the entities. Furthermore, the existence of Byzantine entities is considered and its influence is investigated. Finally, simulation results are presented to validate the analysis.