Biblio
Payment channel networks have been introduced to mitigate the scalability issues inherent to permissionless decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Launched in 2018, the Lightning Network (LN) has been gaining popularity and consists today of more than 5000 nodes and 35000 payment channels that jointly hold 965 bitcoins (9.2M USD as of June 2020). This adoption has motivated research from both academia and industryPayment channels suffer from security vulnerabilities, such as the wormhole attack [39], anonymity issues [38], and scalability limitations related to the upper bound on the number of concurrent payments per channel [28], which have been pointed out by the scientific community but never quantitatively analyzedIn this work, we first analyze the proneness of the LN to the wormhole attack and attacks against anonymity. We observe that an adversary needs to control only 2% of nodes to learn sensitive payment information (e.g., sender, receiver, and amount) or to carry out the wormhole attack. Second, we study the management of concurrent payments in the LN and quantify its negative effect on scalability. We observe that for micropayments, the forwarding capability of up to 50% of channels is restricted to a value smaller than the channel capacity. This phenomenon hinders scalability and opens the door for denial-of-service attacks: we estimate that a network-wide DoS attack costs within 1.6M USD, while isolating the biggest community costs only 238k USDOur findings should prompt the LN community to consider the issues studied in this work when educating users about path selection algorithms, as well as to adopt multi-hop payment protocols that provide stronger security, privacy and scalability guarantees.
In unsecured communications settings, ascertaining the trustworthiness of received information, called authentication, is paramount. We consider keyless authentication over an arbitrarily-varying channel, where channel states are chosen by a malicious adversary with access to noisy versions of transmitted sequences. We have shown previously that a channel condition termed U-overwritability is a sufficient condition for zero authentication capacity over such a channel, and also that with a deterministic encoder, a sufficiently clear-eyed adversary is essentially omniscient. In this paper, we show that even if the authentication capacity with a deterministic encoder and an essentially omniscient adversary is zero, allowing a stochastic encoder can result in a positive authentication capacity. Furthermore, the authentication capacity with a stochastic encoder can be equal to the no-adversary capacity of the underlying channel in this case. We illustrate this for a binary channel model, which provides insight into the more general case.
Ze the quality of channels into either completely noisy or noieseless channels. This paper presents extrinsic information transfer (EXIT) analysis for iterative decoding of Polar codes to reveal the mechanism of channel transformation. The purpose of understanding the transformation process are to comprehend the placement process of information bit and frozen bit and to comprehend the security standard of Polar codes. Mutual information derived based on the concept of EXIT chart for check nodes and variable nodes of low density parity check (LDPC) codes and applied to Polar codes. This paper explores the quality of the polarized channels in finite blocklength. The finite block-length is of our interest since in the fifth telecommunications generation (5G) the block length is limited. This paper reveals the EXIT curve changes of Polar codes and explores the polarization characteristics, thus, high value of mutual informations for frozen bit are needed to be detectable. If it is the other way, the error correction capability of Polar codes would be drastically decreases. These results are expected to be a reference for developments of Polar codes for 5G technologies and beyond.
We propose a coding scheme for covert communication over additive white Gaussian noise channels, which extends a previous construction for discrete memoryless channels. We first show how sparse signaling with On-Off keying fails to achieve the covert capacity but that a modification allowing the use of binary phase-shift keying for "on" symbols recovers the loss. We then construct a modified pulse-position modulation scheme that, combined with multilevel coding, can achieve the covert capacity with low-complexity error-control codes. The main contribution of this work is to reconcile the tension between diffuse and sparse signaling suggested by earlier information-theoretic results.
To be able to meet demanding application performance requirements within a tight power budget, runtime power management must track hardware activity at a very fine granularity in both space and time. This gives rise to sophisticated power management algorithms, which need the underlying system to be both highly observable (to be able to sense changes in instantaneous power demand timely) and controllable (to be able to react to changes in instantaneous power demand timely). The end goal is allocating the power budget, which itself represents a very critical shared resource, in a fair way among active tasks of execution. Fundamentally, if not carefully managed, any system-wide shared resource can give rise to covert communication. Power budget does not represent an exception, particularly as systems are becoming more and more observable and controllable. In this paper, we demonstrate how power management vulnerabilities can enable covert communication over a previously unexplored, novel class of covert channels which we will refer to as POWERT channels. We also provide a comprehensive characterization of the POWERT channel capacity under various sharing and activity scenarios. Our analysis based on experiments on representative commercial systems reveal a peak channel capacity of 121.6 bits per second (bps).
In this paper, we outline a novel, forward error correction-based information hiding technique for adaptive rate wireless communication systems. Specifically, we propose leveraging the functionality of wireless local area network modulation and coding schemes (MCS) and link adaptation mechanisms to significantly increase covert channel throughput. After describing our generalized information hiding model, we detail implementation of this technique within the IEEE 802.11ad, directional multi-Gigabit standard. Simulation results demonstrate the potential of the proposed techniques to develop reliable, high-throughput covert channels under multiple MCS rates and embedding techniques. Covert channel performance is evaluated in terms of the observed packet error ratio of the underlying communication system as well as the bit error ratio of the hidden data.
Covert communications, where a transmitter Alice wishes to hide the presence of her transmitted signal from a watchful adversary Willie, has been considered extensively in recent years. Those investigations have generally considered physical-layer models, where the adversary has access to a sophisticated (often optimal) receiver to determine whether a transmission has taken place, and have addressed the question of what rate can information be communicated covertly. More recent investigations have begun to consider the change in covert rate when Willie has uncertainty about the physical layer environment. Here, we move up the protocol stack to consider the covert rate when Willie is watching the medium-access control (MAC) layer in a network employing a random access MAC such as slotted ALOHA. Based on the rate of collisions and potentially the number of users involved in those collisions, Willie attempts to determine whether unauthorized (covert) users are accessing the channel. In particular, we assume different levels of sophistication in Willie's receiver, ranging from a receiver that only can detect whether there was a collision or not, to one that can always tell exactly how many packets were on the channel in the random access system. In each case, we derive closed-form expressions for the achievable covert rates in the system. The achievable rates exhibit significantly different behavior than that observed in the study of covert systems at the physical layer.
This paper investigates the problem of generating two secret keys (SKs) simultaneously over a five-terminal system with terminals labelled as 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Each of terminal 2 and terminal 3 wishes to generate an SK with terminal 1 over a public channel wiretapped by a passive eavesdropper. Terminal 4 and terminal 5 respectively act as a trusted helper and an untrusted helper to assist the SK generation. All the terminals observe correlated source sequences from discrete memoryless sources (DMS) and can exchange information over a public channel with no rate constraint that the eavesdropper has access to. Based on the considered model, key capacity region is fully characterized and a source coding scheme that can achieve the capacity region is provided. Furthermore, expression for key leakage rate is obtained to analyze the security performance of the two generated keys.