Biblio

This paper presents a general model to assess the mixed-degradation profiles of critical components in a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) based on the reliability of its critical physical and software components. In the proposed assessment, the cyber aspect of a CPS was approached from a software reliability perspective. Although extensive research has been done on physical components degradation and software reliability separately, research for the combined physical-software systems is still scarce. The non-homogeneous Poisson Processes (NHPP) software reliability models are deemed to fit well with the real data and have descriptive and predictive abilities, which could make them appropriate to estimate software components reliability. To show the feasibility of the proposed approach, a case study for mixed-degradation profiles assessment is presented with n physical components and one major software component forming a critical subsystem in CPS. Two physical components were assumed to have different degradation paths with the dependency between them. Series and parallel structures were investigated for physical components. The software component failure data was taken from a wireless network switching center and fitted into a Weibull software reliability model. The case study results revealed that mix-degradation profiles of physical components, combined with software component profile, produced a different CPS reliability profile.

Today's smart-grids have seen a clear rise in new ways of energy generation, transmission, and storage. This has not only introduced a huge degree of variability, but also a continual shift away from traditionally centralized generation and storage to distributed energy resources (DERs). In addition, the distributed sensors, energy generators and storage devices, and networking have led to a huge increase in attack vectors that make the grid vulnerable to a variety of attacks. The interconnection between computational and physical components through a largely open, IP-based communication network enables an attacker to cause physical damage through remote cyber-attacks or attack on software-controlled grid operations via physical- or cyber-attacks. Transactive Energy (TE) is an emerging approach for managing increasing DERs in the smart-grids through economic and control techniques. Transactive Smart-Grids use the TE approach to improve grid reliability and efficiency. However, skepticism remains in their full-scale viability for ensuring grid reliability. In addition, different TE approaches, in specific situations, can lead to very different outcomes in grid operations. In this paper, we present a comprehensive web-based platform for evaluating resilience of smart-grids against a variety of cyber- and physical-attacks and evaluating impact of various TE approaches on grid performance. We also provide several case-studies demonstrating evaluation of TE approaches as well as grid resilience against cyber and physical attacks.

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are engineered systems seamlessly integrating computational algorithms and physical components. CPS advances offer numerous benefits to domains such as health, transportation, smart homes and manufacturing. Despite these advances, the overall cybersecurity posture of CPS devices remains unclear. In this paper, we provide knowledge on how to improve CPS resiliency by evaluating and comparing the accuracy, and scalability of two popular vulnerability assessment tools, Nessus and OpenVAS. Accuracy and suitability are evaluated with a diverse sample of pre-defined vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems (ICS), smart cars, smart home devices, and a smart water system. Scalability is evaluated using a large-scale vulnerability assessment of 1,000 Internet accessible CPS devices found on Shodan, the search engine for the Internet of Things (IoT). Assessment results indicate several CPS devices from major vendors suffer from critical vulnerabilities such as unsupported operating systems, OpenSSH vulnerabilities allowing unauthorized information disclosure, and PHP vulnerabilities susceptible to denial of service attacks.

Contingency analysis is a critical activity in the context of the power infrastructure because it provides a guide for resiliency and enables the grid to continue operating even in the case of failure. In this paper, we augment this concept by introducing SOCCA, a cyber-physical security evaluation technique to plan not only for accidental contingencies but also for malicious compromises. SOCCA presents a new unified formalism to model the cyber-physical system including interconnections among cyber and physical components. The cyber-physical contingency ranking technique employed by SOCCA assesses the potential impacts of events. Contingencies are ranked according to their impact as well as attack complexity. The results are valuable in both cyber and physical domains. From a physical perspective, SOCCA scores power system contingencies based on cyber network configuration, whereas from a cyber perspective, control network vulnerabilities are ranked according to the underlying power system topology.
 

Contingency analysis is a critical activity in the context of the power infrastructure because it provides a guide for resiliency and enables the grid to continue operating even in the case of failure. In this paper, we augment this concept by introducing SOCCA, a cyber-physical security evaluation technique to plan not only for accidental contingencies but also for malicious compromises. SOCCA presents a new unified formalism to model the cyber-physical system including interconnections among cyber and physical components. The cyber-physical contingency ranking technique employed by SOCCA assesses the potential impacts of events. Contingencies are ranked according to their impact as well as attack complexity. The results are valuable in both cyber and physical domains. From a physical perspective, SOCCA scores power system contingencies based on cyber network configuration, whereas from a cyber perspective, control network vulnerabilities are ranked according to the underlying power system topology.