Visible to the public Mitigation of Tampering Attacks for MR-Based Thermal Sensing in Optical NoCs

TitleMitigation of Tampering Attacks for MR-Based Thermal Sensing in Optical NoCs
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2020
AuthorsZhou, Jun, Li, Mengquan, Guo, Pengxing, Liu, Weichen
Conference Name2020 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)
Date Publishedjul
KeywordsHandheld computers, hardware security, Metrics, micro-ring resonator, network on chip security, network-on-chip, Optical sensors, pubcrawl, Resiliency, Scalability, security, tampering attack, thermal sensing, Thermal sensors, trojan, Trojan horses, Very large scale integration
AbstractAs an emerging role in on-chip communication, the optical networks-on-chip (ONoCs) can provide ultra-high bandwidth, low latency and low power dissipation for the data transfer. However, the thermo-optic effects of the photonic devices have a great impact on the operating performance and reliability of ONoCs, where the thermal-aware control is used to alleviate it. Furthermore, the temperature-sensitive ONoCs are prone to be attacked by the hardware Trojans (HTs) covertly embedded in the integrated circuits (ICs) from the malicious third-party components, leading to performance degradation, denial of service (DoS), or even permanent damages. In this paper, we focus on the tampering attacks on optical sampling during the thermal sensing process in ONoCs. Corresponding approaches are proposed to mitigate the negative impacts from HT attacks. Evaluation results indicate that our approach can significantly enhance the hardware security of thermal sensing for ONoC with trivial overheads of up to 3.06% and 2.6% in average latency and energy consumption, respectively.
DOI10.1109/ISVLSI49217.2020.00009
Citation Keyzhou_mitigation_2020