Scientific Foundations

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Visible to the public SaTC: Collaborative: Exploiting Spintronics for Security, Trust and Authentication

The Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) based security primitives typically suffer from area/power overhead, sensitivity to environmental fluctuations and limited randomness and entropy offered by Silicon substrate. Spintronic circuits can complement the existing CMOS based security and trust infrastructures. This project explores ways to uncover the security specific properties of the magnetic nanowire and capture them in detailed circuit model.

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Visible to the public SaTC: Collaborative: Exploiting Spintronics for Security, Trust and Authentication

The Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) based security primitives typically suffer from area/power overhead, sensitivity to environmental fluctuations and limited randomness and entropy offered by Silicon substrate. Spintronic circuits can complement the existing CMOS based security and trust infrastructures. This project explores ways to uncover the security specific properties of the magnetic nanowire and capture them in detailed circuit model.

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Visible to the public SaTC: Collaborative: Exploiting Spintronics for Security, Trust and Authentication

The Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) based security primitives typically suffer from area/power overhead, sensitivity to environmental fluctuations and limited randomness and entropy offered by Silicon substrate. Spintronic circuits can complement the existing CMOS based security and trust infrastructures. This project explores ways to uncover the security specific properties of the magnetic nanowire and capture them in detailed circuit model.

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Visible to the public  SaTC: Collaborative: Exploiting Spintronics for Security, Trust and Authentication

The Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) based security primitives typically suffer from area/power overhead, sensitivity to environmental fluctuations and limited randomness and entropy offered by Silicon substrate. Spintronic circuits can complement the existing CMOS based security and trust infrastructures. This project explores ways to uncover the security specific properties of the magnetic nanowire and capture them in detailed circuit model.

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Visible to the public NeTS: Large: Collaborative Research: Measuring and Modeling the Dynamics of IPv4 Address Exhaustion

Today's Internet has some 1.7 billion users, fosters an estimated $1.5 trillion in annual global economic benefits, and is widely agreed to offer a staggering array of societal benefits. The network sees enormous demand---on the order of 40 Tbps of inter-domain traffic and an annual growth rate of 44.5%. Remarkably, in spite of the Internet's importance and rapid growth, the core protocols that support its basic functions (i.e., addressing, naming, routing) have seen little fundamental change over time.

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Visible to the public EAGER: Towards a Traffic Analysis Resistant Internet Architecture

Many nation states restrict citizen access to information over the Internet by analyzing Internet users' traffic and then blocking traffic deemed controversial or antithetical to the views of the nation state. This project explores an alternative end-to-end network architecture that removes the vulnerability of citizens to traffic analysis. The researchers propose alternative Internet architecture and protocol designs, assesses the impact of such designs on Internet stakeholders, and provide assessment methods for correctness, performance, and scalability of the alternative design.

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Visible to the public EAGER: Improving Protocol Vulnerability Discovery via Semantic Interpretation of Textual Specifications

Two methods used for vulnerability discovery in network protocols are testing and a semi-automated technique called model checking. Testing and model checking implementations of network protocols is a tedious and time-consuming task, where significant manual effort goes into designing test cases and protocol property specifications. Both approaches require detailed and structured information about the tested protocols, in the form of messages, state machine, invariants, etc. Most of the time this information is derived manually by people with different levels of expertise.

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Visible to the public EAGER: Exploring the Use of Secure Multi-Party Computation in the Context of Organ Donation

Informally speaking, Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) allows two or more parties to jointly compute some function on their private inputs in a distributed fashion (i.e., without the involvement of a trusted third party) such that none of the parties learns anything beyond its dedicated output and what it can deduce from considering both this output and its own private input. Since its inception in 1982 by Yao, SMPC has advanced greatly and over the years a large body of work has been developed.

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Visible to the public EAGER: Collaborative: Towards Understanding the Attack Vector of Privacy Technologies

Advances in privacy-enhancing technologies, including cryptographic mechanisms, standardized security protocols, and infrastructure, significantly improved privacy and had a significant impact on society by protecting users. At the same time, the success of such infrastructure has attracted abuse from illegal activities, including sophisticated botnets and ransomware, and has become a marketplace for drugs and contraband; botnets rose to be a major tool for cybercrime and their developers proved to be highly resourceful.

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Visible to the public EAGER: Collaborative: Toward a Test Bed for Heavy Vehicle Cyber Security Experimentation

Heavy vehicles, such as trucks and buses, are part of the US critical infrastructure and carry out a significant portion of commercial and private business operations. Little effort has been invested in cyber security for these assets. If an adversary gains access to the vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN), attacks can be launched that can affect critical vehicle electronic components. Traditionally, physical access to a heavy vehicle was required to access the CAN.