Hardware

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Visible to the public TWC: Large: Collaborative: Verifiable Hardware: Chips that Prove their Own Correctness

This project addresses how semiconductor designers can verify the correctness of ICs that they source from possibly untrusted fabricators. Existing solutions to this problem are either based on legal and contractual obligations, or use post-fabrication IC testing, both of which are unsatisfactory or unsound. As a sound alternative, this project designs and fabricates verifiable hardware: ICs that provide proofs of their correctness for every input-output computation they perform in the field.

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Visible to the public STARSS: Small: Defending Against Hardware Covert Timing Channels

Safeguarding sensitive user information stored in computer systems is a fast growing concern, especially as computers are universally used everywhere from national defense to mobile phones. Malicious hackers have found unscrupulous ways to steal sensitive information largely by exploiting the vulnerabilities in existing hardware and software. Among the many forms of information leakage, covert timing channels exfiltrate secrets from a trojan process with higher security credentials to a spy process with lesser credentials by exploiting the access timing of system resources.

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Visible to the public  TWC: Medium: Language-Hardware Co-Design for Practical and Verifiable Information Flow Control

Current cloud computing platforms, mobile computing devices, and embedded devices all have the security weakness that they permit information flows that violate the confidentiality or integrity of information. This project explores an integrated approach in which software and hardware are co-designed with strong, comprehensive, verifiable security assurance. The goal is to develop a methodology for designing systems in which all forms of information flow are tracked, at both the hardware and software levels, and between these levels.

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Visible to the public Forum on Cyber Resilience

This project provides support for a National Academies Roundtable, the Forum on Cyber Resilience. The Forum will facilitate and enhance the exchange of ideas among scientists, practitioners, and policy makers concerned with the resilience of computing and communications systems, including the Internet, critical infrastructure, and other societally important systems.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Combatting Integrated Circuit Counterfeiting Using Secure Chip Odometers

Electronics counterfeiting is a significant and growing problem for electronics manufacturers, system integrators, and end customers, with an estimated annual economic impact in billions of dollars. These counterfeit Integrated Circuits (ICs) can have degraded reliability, smaller operating ranges, or lower performance compared to the genuine article.

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Visible to the public TWC: Small: Side Channels through Lower-Level Caches: Attacks, Defenses and Security Metrics

In cache-based side-channel attacks, an attacker with no special privileges or physical access can extract secrets from a victim process by observing its memory accesses through a shared cache. Such attacks have been demonstrated on a number of platforms, and represent a dangerous and open threat. This project explores side-channel attacks on the shared lower-level-caches (LLCs) in modern CPUs.

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Visible to the public STARSS: Small: Self-reliant Field-Programmable Gate Arrays

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are hardware circuits that can be reconfigured by a system user after being deployed. FPGAs are a compelling alternative architecture that may allow hardware performance to continue to improve at a dramatic rate. Unfortunately, systems that incorporate an FPGA may allow a potentially untrusted user to reprogram hardware after it has been deployed. Such a scenario enables novel security attacks that can leak a user's private information or corrupt critical information stored on a system, but are performed entirely in hardware.

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Visible to the public TWC: Frontier: Collaborative: Enabling Trustworthy Cybersystems for Health and Wellness

This frontier project tackles many of the fundamental research challenges necessary to provide trustworthy information systems for health and wellness, as sensitive information and health-related tasks are increasingly pushed into mobile devices and cloud-based services.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Design of Secure and Anti-Counterfeit Integrated Circuits

Hardware security, whether for attack or defense, differs from software, network, and data security in that attackers may find ways to physically tamper with devices without leaving a trace, and mislead the user to believe that the hardware is authentic and trustworthy. Furthermore, the advent of new attack modes, illegal recycling, and hard-to-detect Trojans make hardware protection an increasingly challenging task. Design of secure hardware integrated circuits requires novel approaches for authentication that are ideally based on multiple layers of protection.

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Visible to the public TWC: Medium: Secure and Resilient Vehicular Platooning

The goal of the project is to provide a secure foundation for a transportation system that increasingly relies on the cooperation, connectedness, and automation of vehicles to achieve increases in safety, efficiency, and capacity. The financial losses attributable to congestion in America's transportation infrastructure are more than $1 trillion annually and the parallel loss of life in vehicle collisions is 40,000 deaths per year.