Biblio
This paper explores the benefits of 3D face modeling for in-the-wild facial expression recognition (FER). Since there is limited in-the-wild 3D FER dataset, we first construct 3D facial data from available 2D dataset using recent advances in 3D face reconstruction. The 3D facial geometry representation is then extracted by deep learning technique. In addition, we also take advantage of manipulating the 3D face, such as using 2D projected images of 3D face as additional input for FER. These features are then fused with that of 2D FER typical network. By doing so, despite using common approaches, we achieve a competent recognition accuracy on Real-World Affective Faces (RAF) database and Static Facial Expressions in the Wild (SFEW 2.0) compared with the state-of-the-art reports. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a deep learning combination of 3D and 2D facial modalities is presented in the context of in-the-wild FER.
Modern smartphone platforms implement permission-based models to protect access to sensitive data and system resources. However, apps can circumvent the permission model and gain access to protected data without user consent by using both covert and side channels. Side channels present in the implementation of the permission system allow apps to access protected data and system resources without permission; whereas covert channels enable communication between two colluding apps so that one app can share its permission-protected data with another app lacking those permissions. Both pose threats to user privacy.
In this work, we make use of our infrastructure that runs hundreds of thousands of apps in an instrumented environment. This testing environment includes mechanisms to monitor apps' runtime behaviour and network traffic. We look for evidence of side and covert channels being used in practice by searching for sensitive data being sent over the network for which the sending app did not have permissions to access it. We then reverse engineer the apps and third-party libraries responsible for this behaviour to determine how the unauthorized access occurred. We also use software fingerprinting methods to measure the static prevalence of the technique that we discover among other apps in our corpus.
Using this testing environment and method, we uncovered a number of side and covert channels in active use by hundreds of popular apps and third-party SDKs to obtain unauthorized access to both unique identifiers as well as geolocation data. We have responsibly disclosed our findings to Google and have received a bug bounty for our work.
The growing complexity and diversification of cyber-attacks are largely reflected in the increasing sophistication of security appliances, which are often too cumbersome to be run in virtual services and IoT devices. Hence, the design of cyber-security frameworks is today looking at more cooperative models, which collect security-related data from a large set of heterogeneous sources for centralized analysis and correlation.In this paper, we outline a flexible abstraction layer for access to security context. It is conceived to program and gather data from lightweight inspection and enforcement hooks deployed in cloud applications and IoT devices. We also provide a preliminary description of its implementation, by reviewing the main software components and their role.