Biblio
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks provide high situational awareness and automation control for industrial control systems, whilst introducing a wide range of access points for cyber attackers. To address these issues, a line of machine learning or deep learning based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been presented in the literature, where a large number of attack examples are usually demanded. However, in real-world SCADA networks, attack examples are not always sufficient, having only a few shots in many cases. In this paper, we propose a novel few-shot learning based IDS, named FS-IDS, to detect cyber attacks against SCADA networks, especially when having only a few attack examples in the defenders’ hands. Specifically, a new method by orchestrating one-hot encoding and principal component analysis is developed, to preprocess SCADA datasets containing sufficient examples for frequent cyber attacks. Then, a few-shot learning based preliminary IDS model is designed and trained using the preprocessed data. Last, a complete FS-IDS model for SCADA networks is established by further training the preliminary IDS model with a few examples for cyber attacks of interest. The high effectiveness of the proposed FS-IDS, in detecting cyber attacks against SCADA networks with only a few examples, is demonstrated by extensive experiments on a real SCADA dataset.
This paper presents a high-level circuit obfuscation technique to prevent the theft of intellectual property (IP) of integrated circuits. In particular, our technique protects a class of circuits that relies on constant multiplications, such as neural networks and filters, where the constants themselves are the IP to be protected. By making use of decoy constants and a key-based scheme, a reverse engineer adversary at an untrusted foundry is rendered incapable of discerning true constants from decoys. The time-multiplexed constant multiplication (TMCM) block of such circuits, which realizes the multiplication of an input variable by a constant at a time, is considered as our case study for obfuscation. Furthermore, two TMCM design architectures are taken into account; an implementation using a multiplier and a multiplierless shift-adds implementation. Optimization methods are also applied to reduce the hardware complexity of these architectures. The well-known satisfiability (SAT) and automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) based attacks are used to determine the vulnerability of the obfuscated designs. It is observed that the proposed technique incurs small overheads in area, power, and delay that are comparable to the hardware complexity of prominent logic locking methods. Yet, the advantage of our approach is in the insight that constants - instead of arbitrary circuit nodes - become key-protected.
A conventional visible light communication system consists of a transmitter, a jammer that includes a few light emitting diodes, a legal listener and an eavesdropper. In this work, a similar system is designed with a collimating lens in order to create an extra layer of practical physical security measure. The use of a collimating lens makes it available to spatially limiting data transmission to an area under the lensed transmitter. Also focused data transmission through the optical lens, increases the secrecy rate. To investigate the applicability of the proposed design we designed a sample experimental setup using USRP and implemented in a laboratory environment. In the proposed set up, the receiver is in a fixed position. However, it is possible to implement an easy, practical and cheap hardware solution with respect to a beamforming type VLC that uses directional beam forming method to establish transmission to a dynamic target. In addition, it is achievable to control the size of the area where a receiver can access data by manipulating the distance between the optical lens and transmitter.