Biblio
New malware increasingly adopts novel fileless techniques to evade detection from antivirus programs. Process injection is one of the most popular fileless attack techniques. This technique makes malware more stealthy by writing malicious code into memory space and reusing the name and port of the host process. It is difficult for traditional security software to detect and intercept process injections due to the stealthiness of its behavior. We propose a novel framework called ProcGuard for detecting process injection behaviors. This framework collects sensitive function call information of typical process injection. Then we perform a fine-grained analysis of process injection behavior based on the function call chain characteristics of the program, and we also use the improved RCNN network to enhance API analysis on the tampered memory segments. We combine API analysis with deep learning to determine whether a process injection attack has been executed. We collect a large number of malicious samples with process injection behavior and construct a dataset for evaluating the effectiveness of ProcGuard. The experimental results demonstrate that it achieves an accuracy of 81.58% with a lower false-positive rate compared to other systems. In addition, we also evaluate the detection time and runtime performance loss metrics of ProcGuard, both of which are improved compared to previous detection tools.
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) is a malicious attempt by attackers to disrupt the normal traffic of a targeted server, service or network. This is done by overwhelming the target and its surrounding infrastructure with a flood of Internet traffic. The multiple compromised computer systems (bots or zombies) then act as sources of attack traffic. Exploited machines can include computers and other network resources such as IoT devices. The attack results in either degraded network performance or a total service outage of critical infrastructure. This can lead to heavy financial losses and reputational damage. These attacks maximise effectiveness by controlling the affected systems remotely and establishing a network of bots called bot networks. It is very difficult to separate the attack traffic from normal traffic. Early detection is essential for successful mitigation of the attack, which gives rise to a very important role in cybersecurity to detect the attacks and mitigate the effects. This can be done by deploying machine learning or deep learning models to monitor the traffic data. We propose using various machine learning and deep learning algorithms to analyse the traffic patterns and separate malicious traffic from normal traffic. Two suitable datasets have been identified (DDoS attack SDN dataset and CICDDoS2019 dataset). All essential preprocessing is performed on both datasets. Feature selection is also performed before detection techniques are applied. 8 different Neural Networks/ Ensemble/ Machine Learning models are chosen and the datasets are analysed. The best model is chosen based on the performance metrics (DEEP NEURAL NETWORK MODEL). An alternative is also suggested (Next best - Hypermodel). Optimisation by Hyperparameter tuning further enhances the accuracy. Based on the nature of the attack and the intended target, suitable mitigation procedures can then be deployed.
With the rapid development of Internet Technology in recent years, the demand for security support for complex applications is becoming stronger and stronger. Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) is created as an extension of Intel Systems to enhance software security. Intel SGX allows application developers to create so-called enclave. Sensitive application code and data are encapsulated in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) by enclave. TEE is completely isolated from other applications, operating systems, and administrative programs. Enclave is the core structure of Intel SGX Technology. Enclave supports multi-threading. Thread Control Structure (TCS) stores special information for restoring enclave threads when entering or exiting enclave. Each execution thread in enclave is associated with a TCS. This paper analyzes and verifies the possible security risks of enclave under concurrent conditions. It is found that in the case of multithread concurrency, a single enclave cannot resist flooding attacks, and related threads also throw TCS exception codes.